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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
In den vergangenen Jahren haben Finanzinnovationen und Entwicklungen im Banken-
sektor die Art und Weise, wie Firmen und Einzelpersonen liquide Mittel investieren und
Kredite aufnehmen, stark gea¨ndert. Zuna¨chst konnten traditionelle Gescha¨ftsbanken (d.
h. Einlagekreditinstitute) als dominierender Anbieter von Krediten an Haushalte und
Firmen angesehen werden. Hierbei nutzen Banken die Vielzahl kurzfristiger Depositen
ihrer Einleger, um langfristige Investitionsprojekte zu ermo¨glichen. Diese traditionelle
Finanzintermediation hat sich in den vergangen Jahrzehnten durch den Einfluss von
Regulierung, Wettbewerb und Innovationen stark gewandelt (siehe hierzu Pozsar, 2008;
Rosen, 2009 und Blair, 2010).
Vera¨nderte Regulierung und Innovationen im Finanzsektor haben den Wettbewerbsvor-
teil der Banken geschma¨lert und somit zum Wachstum des Schattenbankensektors auf
rund 71 Billionen Dollar beigetragen. Schattenbanken erweitern den traditionellen Inter-
mediationsprozess mit einer Vielzahl von Akteuren und Aktivita¨ten, welche in ihrer In-
teraktion miteinander die Intermediationsaufgabe der traditionellen Bank u¨bernehmen.
Das Schattenbankensystem sollte in dieser Rolle als Erweiterung des traditionellen Ban-
kensystems wahrgenommen werden, in welchem sich traditionelles und innovatives Bank-
wesen vereinen. Der Begri↵ Schattenbankensystem umfasst im weitesten Sinne eine Reihe
von Entita¨ten, wie beispielsweise Finance Companies, Fonds, Banken und Zweckgesell-
schaften und komplexe Instrumente wie Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Asset Backed
Commercial Papers (ABCP) und Repogescha¨fte (kurzfristig besicherte Kredite). Gene-
rell haben sich multiple Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Entita¨ten entwickelt. Jede
einzelne dieser Entita¨ten nimmt eine bestimmte Rolle in der Intermediationskette der
Schattenbanken ein. Anders als traditionelle Banken ko¨nnen Schattenbanken im Rah-
men ihrer Intermediationsaufgabe nicht auf o zielle Garantien und andere garantierte
Schutzmechanismen, wie den Einlagensicherungsfond oder die Teilnahme an O↵enmarkt-
gescha¨ften der Europa¨ischen Zentralbank zuru¨ckgreifen.
Bisher war die bestehende Regulierung von Banken und anderen Finanzmarktakteu-
ren, wie beispielsweise Fonds, sehr stark auf Verbraucherschutz ausgerichtet. Im Zu-
ge der Finanzkrise 2008 und 2009 wurde jedoch der Bedarf nach Regelungen, die sich
auch auf Finanzmarktstabilita¨t richten, deutlich. Die traditionelle Bankenregulierung
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der Baseler Akkorde, als auch in der supranationalen sowie nationalen Umsetzung, setzt
mit ihren Neuerungen im Nachgang der Finanzkrise auf neue Eigenkapital- und Li-
quidita¨tsrichtlinien, die Banken zu weniger riskanten Gescha¨ften und gro¨ßerer Liqui-
dita¨tsvorsorge zwingen und so den Verbraucher zu schu¨tzen. Institute des Schattenban-
kensektors gelten allgemein als nicht oder nur wenig reguliert. Dennoch zeigt sich, dass
Teile des Sektors bereits einer umfangreichen Regulierung unterliegen. Im Rahmen der
U¨berlegungen hinsichtlich gro¨ßerer Stabilita¨t im globalen Finanzsystem nahmen die G20
auch die U¨berwachung und Regulierung des Schattenbankensektors auf die Agenda. Der
Finanzstabilita¨tsrat (FSB) wurde von den G20 erma¨chtigt, potentielle Regulierungs-
ansa¨tze zu entwickeln, um so die Risiken, die Stabilita¨t und Vitalita¨t des Finanzsystems
gefa¨hrden, zu adressieren.
Der Zusammenbruch des globalen Finanzsystems und im Besonderen des Schattenban-
kensystems a¨ußerte sich vor allem durch Verwerfungen im Verbriefungssektor, Absatz-
probleme von verbrieften Produkten (d. h. ABS) und den Abzug von Anteilen und Ein-
lagen bei Geldmarktfonds sowie Banken. Vor allem bei Geldmarktfonds wurde deutlich,
wie abha¨ngig das reibungslose Funktionieren und die Finanzierung des Schattenbanken-
systems von einem stabilen Geldmarktfondsektor ist.
Die vorliegende Arbeit beabsichtigt die Regulierungsempfehlungen, die sich auf Sta-
bilisierung von Geldmarktfonds und die damit verbundenen Finanzierung des Schat-
tenbankensystems beziehen, zu strukturieren und hinsichtlich ihrer Umsetzbarkeit und
o¨konomischen Auswirkungen zu bewerten. Um die entsprechenden Bedingungen fu¨r ei-
ne kritische Bewertung zu scha↵en, wird das Schattenbankensystem im ersten Schritt,
in Kapitel 2, der vorliegenden Arbeit definiert. Es wird deutlich, dass eine ada¨quate
Definition die Gro¨ße, Art und den Umfang des Schattenbankensystems stark beein-
flusst. Abha¨ngig von der zugrundeliegenden Definition wird der Kreis der Entita¨ten fu¨r
die Gro¨ßenberechnung des Systems entsprechend abgegrenzt. Eine allgemein akzeptierte
Definition bildet somit die Grundlage fu¨r weitere U¨berlegungen zur deskriptiven Analyse
und der Evaluation der potentiellen Regulierungsvorschriften.
Die Arbeit stu¨tzt sich auf einen Definitionsansatz des FSB, welcher das Schattenban-
kensystem als System von Entita¨ten und Aktivita¨ten innerhalb sowie außerhalb des
regulierten Bankensektors, welche Kreditintermediation durchfu¨hren. Generell kann die
Gesamtheit der Schattenbanken als System bezeichnet werden, bei welchem eine Reihe
von Entita¨ten und Aktivita¨ten in Kombination den Intermediationsprozess einer ein-
zigen Bank durchfu¨hren und hierbei keiner oder nur geringer Regulierung unterliegen.
Hinsichtlich einer passenden Definition sollten sowohl Entita¨ten als auch Aktivita¨ten ein-
bezogen werden, da auch Aktivita¨ten die durch Finanzinstitutionen ausgefu¨hrt werden,
die Stabilita¨t des Finanzsystems maßgeblich beeinflussen ko¨nnen.
Zuna¨chst ermo¨glicht eine deskriptive Analyse von Entita¨ten und Aktivita¨ten das Schat-
tenbankensystem in drei Bereiche zu unterteilt – Kreditvergabe, Kreditpooling und Ver-
briefung sowie die Finanzierung des Schattenbankensystems. Der Kreditvergabeprozess
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wird vor allem durch traditionelle Banken und Schattenbanken im engeren Sinne durch-
gefu¨hrt. Somit werden e ziente Investitionsprojekte realisiert. Sie refinanzieren diese
Kreditvergabe durch den Verkauf von Teilen des Kreditportfolios, Depositen (Banken)
und kurzfristig bereicherte Kredite (Schattenbanken im engeren Sinne). Im na¨chsten
Schritt kaufen Zweckgesellschaften, die von Banken und Schattenbanken im engeren
Sinne verkauften, Kredite auf und wandeln diese in handelbare, liquide Aktiva um (Ver-
briefung in ABS und ABCP). Institutionelle Investoren, welche die Finanzierung des
Schattenbankensystems ermo¨glichen, stehen am Ende dieser Schattenbankeninterme-
diationskette. Sie kaufen die in Form von ABS und ABCP verbrieften Kreditportfolien
auf und bieten Refinanzierung mittels Repos. Die Analyse der verschiedenen Entita¨ten
und Aktivita¨ten ermo¨glicht umfangreiche Informationen u¨ber die quantitative Zusam-
mensetzung, die Entwicklung und die Bedeutung der einzelnen Komponenten und des
gesamten Systems zu erhalten.
Das Wissen hinsichtlich der Beziehungen und Stellung der einzelnen Akteure zueinan-
der und auch der Beziehung zwischen traditionellen Banken und Schattenbanksystem,
ermo¨glicht eine Aussage daru¨ber, welche regulierenden Maßnahmen das Wachstum und
das Verhalten der einzelnen Akteure positiv als auch negativ beeinflussen ko¨nnen. Die
quantitative Analyse erlaubt es, einen stilisierten Sektor abzuleiten. Diese deskriptive
Analyse des Schattenbankensystems und Beschreibung des stilisierten Sektors bildet die
Grundlage fu¨r das Szenario eines modern-type Bank-Runs in Kapitel drei.
Zu Beginn des dritten Kapitels werden die Risiken, die sowohl im traditionellen als
auch im Schattenbankensystem bestehen, aufgezeigt. Risiken wie Prozyklizita¨t, Inter-
konnektivita¨t von Entita¨ten, das Risiko eines (modern-type) Bank-Run und Fire-Sale
Risiken bestehen sowohl im traditionellen Bankensektor als auch im Schattenbankensek-
tor und ko¨nnen die Gefahr eines Zusammenbruchs eines Finanzintermedia¨rs und damit
einhergehend den Zusammenbruch der Finanzmarktstabilita¨t versta¨rken.
Vor allem die direkten und indirekten Verbindungen zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren
des traditionellen und des Schattenbankensystems ko¨nnen Probleme eines Instituts auf
andere Akteure u¨bertragen und so die Gesamtstabilita¨t beeinflussen. Das Szenario in
Kapitel drei zeigt die bestehenden Verbindungen zwischen Schattenbanken und Ban-
ken sowie mo¨gliche Problempunkte der Schattenbankintermediationskette auf. Durch
die Identifikation dieser verschiedenen kritischen Punkte, deren Auslo¨sen bis zu einem
Zusammenbruch des gesamten Systems fu¨hren kann, ist es mo¨glich, gezielte Regulie-
rungsmaßnahmen (diese Punkte betre↵end) zu u¨berpru¨fen und zu evaluieren. Durch
die Szenarioanalyse wird deutlich, wie wichtig die stabile und funktionierende Finan-
zierung des Schattenbankensystems durch Geldmarktfonds ist und welche Auswirken
Unregelma¨ßigkeiten und Funktionssto¨rungen im Finanzierungsprozess auch auf den tra-
ditionellen Bankensektor haben ko¨nnen.
Aufgrund der Erkenntnisse aus Kapitel drei werden in Kapitel 4 die Empfehlungen zur
Regulierung von Schattenbanken durch das Finanzstabilita¨tsgremium (FSB) untersucht,
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die darauf abzielen, die Stabilisierung des Finanzierungsmechanismus zu unterstu¨tzen
und zu sichern. Dies beinhaltet Regelungen, die auf die Stabilisierung von Geldmarkt-
fonds abzielen und Maßnahmen, die die Qualita¨t des Verbriefungsprozesses und die Sta-
bilita¨t von besicherten Repogescha¨ften erho¨hen.
Zur Stabilisierung von Geldmarktfonds hat der FSB in erster Linie Regulierungsansa¨tze
erarbeitet, die sich vorwiegend auf die Regulierung des Investitionsportfolios der Fonds
(aktivseitige Regulierung) und die Begrenzung und Aussetzung von Auszahlungen bei
Ru¨ckzahlungsforderungen von Investoren (passivseitige Regulierung) beziehen. Bei der
Regulierung des Investitionsportfolios ist jedoch zu beachten, dass eine Regulierung
der Aktivseite die Fonds eventuellen Wettbewerbsnachteilen aussetzt. Weiterhin ko¨nnen
auch Regelungen, die eine Angleichung der verschiedenen Fondsportfolien nach sich zieht,
zu sogenannten Klumpenrisiken fu¨hren. Maßnahmen, die Auszahlungsforderungen von
Kunden verzo¨gern oder aussetzen, ko¨nnen eher als wahrscheinlich und umsetzbar an-
gesehen werden. Hier mo¨chte man den plo¨tzlichen Abzug von Fondsanteilen verhindern
und so auch die Finanzierungsfa¨higkeit des Fonds aufrecht erhalten. Weiterhin kann auch
ein Wechsel in der Bewertungsmethode von Fondanteilen zu einer Marktbewertung als
stabilisierend erachtet werden. Investoren ist es so mo¨glich, die inha¨rent bestehenden
Risiken zu antizipieren, indem sie den Werteverlauf des Anteils beobachten ko¨nnen und
trotz eventueller kurzfristiger Verluste im Fond investiert leiben.
Die Arbeit diskutiert auch die Mo¨glichkeit, Geldmarktfonds potentiell den Zugang zu
Zentralbanktransaktionen und somit Liquidita¨t im Notfall zu ermo¨glichen. Sollte es
Geldmarktfonds mo¨glich sein, an O↵enmarktgescha¨ften teilzunehmen und auf zusa¨tzliche
Liquidita¨t zuru¨ckzugreifen, um entsprechende Zahlungsforderungen bedienen zu ko¨nnen,
wa¨re die Finanzierung des Schattenbankensektors im Falle von plo¨tzlichen Auszahlungs-
anforderungen gesichert. Eine solche Mo¨glichkeit mu¨sste aber durch verschiedene Geset-
zesa¨nderungsverfahren auf europa¨ischer Ebene umgesetzt werden. Weiterhin wurde im
vierten Kapitel die Stabilisierung des Repomarktes sowie die Sicherung der Qualita¨t des
Verbriefungsprozesses und der verbrieften Wertpapiere thematisiert. Im Repo-Segment
setzen die Regulierungsvorschla¨ge in erste Linie bei Transparenz und Standardisierung
an. Die Festsetzung von Hair-cuts von Repogescha¨ften, d. h. Abschla¨gen auf den Wert
der Sicherheit, sollte jedoch als kritisch betrachtet werden. Nach U¨berlegungen stellt die-
se Regulierungsmaßnahme einen Eingri↵ in den Preissetzungsmechanismus der Ma¨rkte
dar und kann unter anderem Transaktionen beschra¨nken und somit zu Liquidita¨tsbedarf
fu¨hren. Ein qualitativ hochwertiger Verbriefungsprozess und Informationen hinsichtlich
der Qualita¨t von verbrieften Portfolien, sichert im Falle von Marktverwerfungen eine
stabile Wertentwicklung von verbrieften Wertpapieren und reduziert das Risiko von Fire
Sales. Zur Signalisierung der Qualita¨t wurden auf europa¨ischer und auch amerikanischer
Ebene bereits regulatorische Selbstbehalte eingefu¨hrt. Jedoch sind diese Selbstbehalte
bisher fix mit mindestens fu¨nf Prozent angesetzt. Es ist zu bema¨ngeln, dass diese festen
fu¨nf Prozent in keinster Weise auf die Charakteristika des Originators, des verbrieften
Portfolios und weiteren Marktgegebenheiten eingeht.
Contents v
Im Rahmen der gesamten Analyse wird deutlich, dass ein integrativer Ansatz der al-
le Akteure und Instrumente und deren Zusammenwirken umfasst, empfehlenswert ist.
Eine einseitige und unabha¨ngige Regulierung von einzelnen Sektoren des Systems kann
unerwu¨nschte Aus-, Neben- und Wechselwirkungen hervorrufen. Ein komplettes Verbot
von Aktivita¨ten und Entita¨ten, die als Teil des Schattenbanksystems betrachtet werden,
ist nicht als sinnvoll zu erachten, da hierdurch weitere Regulierungsarbitrage entstehen
kann. Weiterhin ist das Schattenbankensystem als wichtiger Teil, d. h. als Erweiterung,
des traditionellen Bankensystems anzusehen, welches wichtige Aufgaben, die nicht im
traditionellen Bankensystem wahrgenommen werden, u¨bernimmt. Potentielle Regulie-
rung sollte daher stark auf Transparenz und Standardisierung ausgerichtet sein, um die
komplexen Strukturen des Schattenbankensystems erfassen zu ko¨nnen und potentielle
Problemfelder fru¨hzeitig zu erkennen und bewa¨ltigen zu ko¨nnen.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Financial innovations and development in banking have changed the way businesses and
individuals borrow and invest money. Traditionally, commercial banks (i.e., depository
institutions) were the dominant suppliers of credit to firms and households. Banks use
short-term deposits to issue long-term loans. This intermediation process occurs on the
balance sheet. Issued loans are held as an investment in a diversified portfolio. How-
ever, traditional banking has evolved due to regulation, competition and innovation (see
e.g., Pozsar, 2008; Rosen, 2009 and Blair, 2010). A series of regulatory changes and
innovations eroded the competitive advantage of banks and led to the growth of the
shadow banking system. The system of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFI; i.e.,
shadow banks) has grown rapidly in recent decades (Clement, 2010) up to a roughly
size of about Dollar 71 trillion. Supported by regulatory gaps, policy decisions and by
a growing market of assets under management, the system and shadow banking related
markets reached their first peak in 2007 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010).
The involvement of this hybrid aggregate of institutions and functions in the financial
system has increased significantly over time. The shadow banking system s hould be
considered to be a part of a banking system that evolved out of the traditional banking
system, and which combines traditional and innovative banking. The shadow banking
system comprises institutions, such as finance companies; several managed funds; a com-
plex array of instruments, such as Asset Backed Securities and repurchase agreements;
and structures and markets that replicate core banking activities. Overall, a complex
chain of multiple relations between a numbers of institutions has evolved. Each of these
institutions perform a di↵erent part of the intermediation process (see Pozsar et al. ,
2010). So far, regulation has focused on protecting investors rather than on the safety
and soundness of the financial institutions, and financial stability. These institutions
are therefore barely regulated, have few reporting obligations and need to meet only a
few legal standards. They do not benefit from safety nets such as deposit insurance or
1
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o cial guarantees. There are a number of arguments for launching prudential regulation
for the shadow banking sector: (1) the risks associated with circumventing existing rules
and the accumulation of high levels of debt, (2) the growing size of the shadow banking
system and its associated impact on the real economy and (3) risk stemming from the
interconnection and interdependency of banks and shadow banks.
The breakdown of the financial system and, in particular, the shadow banking system
in 2008 and 2009 could be observed in the disruption of the securitization market, sales
problems associated with securitized funding and “breaking the buck” within the asset
management market segment of Money Market Funds (MMF). All these instruments and
sub-segments indicated a crisis of the shadow banking system. This is also emphasized by
Perry Mehrling1 in his speech at the 16th International Banking Conference on Shadow
Banking in Chicago, 2013. New e↵orts reforming the regulation of capital markets by
the Group of 20 (G20) concern, overall, the enhancement of financial system stability.
This includes, primarily, the strengthening of both the quality and quantity of regulatory
capital and liquidity to absorb losses and to react to risks within the financial system.
With the G20 Summit in Cannes 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was assigned
to work on potential shadow banking regulation in order to address risks that threaten
the overall stability and vitality of the financial system.
The present paper aims to structure and organize this proposed policy. To create proper
conditions to evaluate potential regulation, a comprehensive overview of the shadow
banking system and a detailed, generally accepted definition is first provided. Those
information help to decide if further regulatory actions would have a quantitative impact,
and in which manner those actions might influence the whole system and other entities.
Furthermore, it also helps to prevent possible gaps within regulation.
The borders of the shadow banking sector must first be outlined. Several regulatory
authorities and researchers have defined the system. Here, it became apparent that the
definition determines the size and range of the whole system, as well as individual entities
and activities within the system. The present paper applies an approach to a definition
that combines the entities and activities of the shadow banking system; it therefore
adopts the definition given by the FSB, which appears to be the most suitable definition
that covers the aspects of the shadow banking system. The FSB defines shadow banking
in a broader approach as “a system of credit intermediation that involves entities
and activities outside the regular banking system”. In narrowing the focus,
the activities and entities conducted by shadow banks give rise to i) systemic risk
concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and lawed credit
risk transfer (CRT), and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns (Financial Stability
Board, 2011a, p. 3).
1Perry Mehrling is an American economist and one of the leading researchers in the field of shadow
banking.
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The literature has shown that there is no consistent framework of the system’s structure,
and no system-wide overview (a comprehensive overview of the literature and research
on the shadow banking sector and its sub-segments is given in the following section of
this introductory Chapter). A number of question arise as to how the individual entities
of the system are connected and which activities are carried out; through which balance
sheet positions and exposures entities are connected with each other and what these
interlinkages create; how sub-sectors of the shadow banking system evolved compared
to each other; and how this co-evolution influenced the whole system.
Individual entities have been explored and examined with reference to their development
and involvement in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Securitization was one of these
issues, and was examined in wide range of publications (see Cerrato, 2010; European
Central Bank, 2011a, Gorton & Metrick, 2009; Shin, 2009 and Schwarcz, 2009). The
management of assets in funds and especially MMFs was also studied (see Afonso et al.
, 2010; Bengtsson, 2013; Birdthistle, 2010; Wermers, 2012 and Witmer, 2012). However,
to date, the research in this area lacks an integrated overview. The present paper
structures the shadow banking system in di↵erent sub-systems, and allocates entities
and activities into these sub-systems. The shadow banking sector and the development
of single entities and activities within these sub-systems is described quantitatively.
Individual behavior patterns of individual entities are derived to answer the question of
what objectives these entities have to operate both as separate entities and as part of a
larger system.
In the course of this paper a stylized sector is compiled and individual components of the
sector and the entities’ balance sheets are depicted in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 provides a
comprehensive overview of the individual entities’ characteristics and their quantitative
development. This serves as the basis for an analysis of a run scenario of an MMF.
The scenario analysis in Chapter 3 will highlight the risks inherent in the traditional
and shadow banking system that amplify the failure of individual institutions, and that
could thereby lead to a failure of financial stability and the insolvency of multiple entities
within the financial system. As MMFs serve as an important funding source for the whole
shadow banking system, liquidity problems are transmitted through interconnections
within the financial system. Funds can be seen as first target of consequences by the
financial crisis, meaning a modern-type bank run. Liquidity demand through redemption
requests is relayed and slide to other entities which consequently creates a funding gap.
Risks stemming from activities within the banking system and the shadow banking
system, as well as from the interconnections between these mutually dependent systems,
will also be described in Chapter 3. These risks comprise procyclicality, the possibility
of a bank run and interconnection of entities. Furthermore, the strict regulation of the
banking sector and di↵erences in national and international regulation create a risk of
regulatory arbitrage. Risks could occur within either the traditional banking system or
the shadow banking system. A traditional bank run (as defined by Diamond & Dybvig,
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1983) can emerge in the form of modern-type bank runs on MMFs. Bank runs can have
profound e↵ects, as the shadow banking system and, especially, MMFs do not have access
to governmental guarantees or liquidity to absorb losses. Also, the interconnection of
shadow banks and banks could amplify risks, as the nature of these interconnections are
not understood well enough to assess their impact. The use of innovative instruments as
securitization also creates the risk of a defective CRT. Increased asymmetric information
and disillusioned expectations about the development of the assets’ value within the CRT
process both influence the e↵ectiveness of transmission channels, as well as the funding
of the system and the value concept of collaterals. The scenario analysis o↵ers answers
to the questions of how di↵erent risks within financial markets a↵ect the shadow banking
and the traditional banking system at di↵erent stages of the intermediation and funding
process. Which risks emerge through the interaction of banks and shadow banks? And
do interconnections of both systems amplify the transmission of risks and are, hence, a
potential target for regulation?
Information about the institutional setup of the shadow banking system given in Chap-
ter 2, along with the analysis of the risks inherent in the overall financial system and the
transmission of risks throughout the system provided in Chapter 3 will be the basis for
the critical discussion of proposed regulation and new regulatory approaches in Chapter
4. In analyzing the scenario of a run and the individual risks inherent in the system,
potential regulatory gaps become apparent. The discussion of proposed regulation has
the goal of clarifying, which regulatory demands are incidental and which regulatory ar-
rangements appear useful in mitigating risk and stabilizing the shadow banking system.
Regarding MMFs and wholesale funding in general, asset managers play a major role
within the funding process of the shadow banking system. The encompassing scenario
model reveals interconnections, possible ways of transmission and further dependencies
that could transfer negative e↵ects throughout the whole financial system. The scenario
and further regulatory issues mainly approach the structure of MMFs, their valuation
practice and missing access to central bank liquidity. Furthermore, the importance of
a well-performing securitization process for shadow banking funding becomes apparent,
with a need to protect these securitized instruments against impairment. A stabilization
of the repo funding market is also addressed by several regulatory issues. Repurchase
Agreement (repo) transactions need to be standardized and markdowns on collateral
value (haircuts) caped to stabilize funding and ensure the functioning of the intermedi-
ation process.
The integrated framework and comprehensive overview compiled in Chapter 2 can be
used to answer additional questions. The outline of the interconnections among entities
and the quantitative importance of single institutions may support the answer help the
author to answer questions concerning shadow banking’s impact on monetary policy. As
central bank policy no longer just refers to price stability, di↵erent questions regarding
monetary policy and transmission arise. The ability to provide credit to the real sector
and to extend the traditional credit lending process has an impact on the credit channel
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of monetary policy. The model of the shadow banking system and associated behavioral
assumptions can provide a basis for further (macro) economic research in order to achieve
a deeper understanding of the e↵ects and impact of shadow banking on both the financial
system and monetary policy.
1.2 Literature Review
During the last few decades an array of literature concerning shadow banking has
emerged. The term NBFI became more prominent due to its significant growth as
an object of research (see McCulley, 2007 and Clement, 2010). Thorn (1958), Ettin
(1964) and Patinkin (1961) made contributions to understanding the issue of NBFIs
as a non-regulated financial intermediary, as well as their influence on monetary pol-
icy. McCulley (2007) was the first to use the term shadow banking, describing highly
leveraged and unregulated financial institutions that do not benefit from a safety net or
from other o cial guarantees. In the course of the 2008–2009 crisis a number of studies
addressed various issues of the shadow banking system, including general development,
structure, transmission mechanisms and risks and regulation. To date, the literature
has shown that there is no consistent framework to the system’s structure, as well as no
system-wide oversight. In a number of studies, individual entities have been viewed and
examined in reference to their development and involvement within the financial crisis.
Adrian & Shin (2009) and Farhi & Cintra (2009) as well as Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission (2010), Pozsar (2008) and Pozsar et al. (2010) provided a first overview of the
institutions and instruments engaged in the shadow banking system. Pozsar et al. (2010)
and Pozsar (2008) were the first to catalogue the types of shadow banks, mapping and
describing the shadow banking system as a daisy chain of financial intermediaries that
conduct credit intermediation. However, they do not provide a comprehensive quantita-
tive overview that gives information about the overall development and size of the whole
shadow banking system. They present the shadow banking system as a network of risk
originators, securitization vehicles and risk bearers connected through di↵erent financial
instruments, and provide an initial structural overview. The map of the shadow banking
network is a complex framework fitted to the United States (US) market. This rather
complex framework is very detailed and contains a wide range of entities. The purpose
of the present paper is to facilitate and map the shadow banking system to derive state-
ments about inherent risks due to interconnections, as well as starting points for prudent
regulation. This map could also be used as a general, globally applicable template. The
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) also describes the nature and scope of the
shadow banking system, o↵ering a definition of the system and an overview of important
institutions and instruments. However, there is no explanation on the interconnections
or on how the institutions interact with each other. Furthermore, the Financial Crisis
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Inquiry Commission (FCIC) piece only discusses select components of the shadow bank-
ing system (institutions and instruments) independently, and not as a system. Farhi &
Cintra (2009) discuss the interaction among di↵erent financial intermediaries within the
shadow banking system; however, this paper has a more descriptive character, focusing
on how the system evolved over time and which drivers led to growth. It lacks an in-
tegrated framework with which to describe how the participants of the system interact.
The FCIC paper also o↵ers few recommendations concerning improved regulation and
supervision.
Based on this overview, it is apparent that the literature in this area lacks an integrated
framework that also provides quantitative information, based on the study of both the
impact of individual sub-sectors and the whole system. A generally accepted definition
of shadow banking also needs to be introduced. The first part of the present paper will
address these gaps as well as provide information about size and development of the
shadow banking system. Pozsar et al. (2010), Acharya & Richardson (2009), Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) and Farhi & Cintra (2009) introduce a general defi-
nition of the shadow banking system. However these definitions do not seem to cover
all aspects of the wide range of shadow banking. Studying di↵erent definitions and the
entities included in a particular definition demonstrates the importance of a proper defi-
nition to determine both the size of the shadow banking system and regulatory demand.
Some definitions include di↵erent entities as part of the shadow banking system, chang-
ing what should be under particular forms of control. The Financial Stability Board
(2011a) has drafted a comprehensive definition that addresses potential shadow banking
entities and activities. This implies that not just entities, but also activities should be
observed and examined. The FSB defines shadow banking as “a system of credit
intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking
system”. In narrowing the focus, the activities and entities conducted by shadow banks
give rise to i) systemic risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transforma-
tion, leverage and lawed credit risk transfer (CRT), and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage
concerns (Financial Stability Board, 2011a, p. 3). Based on this definition, such ac-
tivities as repurchase agreement transactions, securities lending and securitization will
be examined with an eye to their size and development. In the following section, the
present paper will draw on the afore-mentioned comprehensive definition by the FSB,
concentrating on potential shadow banking entities and activities.
There is a large body of literature concentrating on the events of the most recent financial
crisis, as well as on the role of the shadow banks or markets and the instruments that
can be identified as being part of or related to the shadow banking system. Many
analyses of the financial crisis highlighted the growth of the shadow banking sector and
its collapse during the crisis. This also comprises the FSB monitoring report of 2012a
and 2013b. Blair (2010) examines the development of the shadow banking system and
financial innovations from a more legal perspective. She points out that regulators have
been confronted with the growth of this new financial sector and mentions key drivers
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of development. However, although main institutions of the system are explored, these
institutions are not combined into a framework. Adrian & Shin (2009) compare the
shadow banking system and the market based financial system with the bank based
financial sector. The authors highlight the growth of the system and point out some
implications for further regulation. However, the system is only described, and lacks
a framework for the interactions among shadow banking intermediaries. Rosen (2009)
provides information about the evolution of the US financial system, which has shifted
from traditional banking to shadow banking. The author also focuses on the role of the
shadow banking system in the increasing interconnectedness and leverage of financial
intermediaries, and argues that the financial crisis was a logical outcome. Stein (2010)
provides a short overview of the securitization process, which is depicted as a major part
of the shadow banking system; this overview includes how the securitization process was
developed at the time of the crisis and how it is conducted within the shadow banking
system. Stein also mentions individual participants of the shadow banking system.
Although these participants are not combined into an integrated framework, the article
does o↵er some regulatory approaches to securitization and suggests some ideas for
future regulation. Fuchita (2011) suggests ways to regulate shadow bank intermediaries
and to enlarge the safety net. To sum, the existing literature to date concentrates on
descriptive analysis: how the system and main important parts developed before and
during the crisis, and what are important aspects that led to the growth of certain parts
of the financial system.
Gorton & Metrick (2010c) document the development of the shadow banking system
over the last three decades. The article describes important features of the sector,
such as securitization, repurchase agreements and MMFs, and the interconnection of
these within the shadow banking system. As with the previously discussed literature,
the authors describe important features of the system, and a simple framework with
the basic structure of the system is shown, but they do not cover all participants and
instruments. This paper does also propose some initial principles for regulation and how
to implement them.
The regulation of shadow banking is generally conducted by the FSB, as assigned by the
G20. The European Commission and US authorities conduct parallel regulatory pro-
cesses. The process for identifying regulatory gaps and following regulatory proposals
can be found in Financial Stability Board (2011b), Financial Stability Board (2011a)
and European Commission (2012). Particular issues and risks associated with shadow
bank activities are handled in separate Workstreams; these Workstreams comprise MMF
stability and funding of shadow banks, securitized funding and repo contracts, securiti-
zation and other shadow banking issues. Some of the afore-mentioned authors addressed
some initial questions regarding general aspects of shadow banking regulation (see Gor-
ton & Metrick, 2010b; Blair, 2010). Traditional banking regulation is incorporated into
the shadow banking regulation process, since, due to the interconnection between banks
and shadow banks, the regulation of banks could influence shadow banking regulation in
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both way – negatively and positively. Banking regulation initiated by the Basel Commit-
tee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) can be found in various publications of the BCBS:
BCBS, 2010 and BCBS, 2010/2011, as well as a comprehensive overview by Deutsche
Bundesbank (2011). So far there has been no comprehensive statement about the impact
of banking regulation on shadow banking entities and regulation. The present paper will
make statements on interconnections and possible transmission channels between banks
and shadow banks.
In the following section, the literature concerning di↵erent shadow banking sub-systems
will be outlined and briefly analyzed. Money Market Funds are special types of asset
managers and a crucial funding source of both the shadow banking and the banking
systems. Due to their specific characteristics, MMFs have become more important for
regulators. First, their short-term liability side is characterized as deposit-like. Second,
due to their crucial role in funding the shadow banking system, they could endanger the
overall stability of the financial system if they become inoperative as a funding source.
Finally, unlike banks, MMFs are not able to draw upon deposit insurance or other o cial
guarantees. In addition to the o cial and regulatory literature on MMF regulation pro-
posals published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
(see IOSCO, 2012c; IOSCO, 2012d and IOSCO, 2012e) several pieces have focused on the
MMF characteristics that cause runs on assets under management and threaten financial
stability. Wermers (2012) studied the investor flow both into and out of MMFs, partic-
ularly during the period of the financial crisis, showing that big institutional investors
tend to run in the event of a crisis. These runs can then spread across various MMF
sectors. The paper does not, however, provide recommendations on what to do in the
event of a run, or on how runs can transmit liquidity problems throughout the financial
system to other financial institutions and banks. The possibility of runs is addressed by
academic literature, including HSBC (2011b), Rosengren (2012) and Bengtsson (2013).
One aspect that has been identified as contributing to runs is the di↵erent valuation of
fund shares by constant Net Asset Value (cNAV) and variable Net Asset Value (vNAV)
funds. It is argued by Birdthistle (2010) and Gordon & Gandia (2012) that a valuation
under amortized cost valuation both causes and amplifies runs. Regulators, such as
the FSB and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have adopted this issue
and discuss possible action alternatives. The HSBC (2011b) Bengtsson (2013) argue
that runs cannot be fully eliminated by any action taken or valuation method change.
Most papers concentrate on one specific regulatory proposal. Birdthistle (2010) concen-
trates solely on cNAV and vNAV valuation, and suggests an overall shift to vNAV funds.
Rosengren (2012) addresses the sponsoring of funds, and the associated risks and signals
sent to the market. The present paper will o↵er possible alternatives, with the goal of
preventing runs and stabilizing the MMF sector. If di↵erent actions are undertaken,
this will create di↵erent conditions, and taking one proposed action could make another
impossible, or create unintended e↵ects. It is therefore important to concentrate on the
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aggregate impact of proposed regulatory alternatives within the intermediation chain or
the transmission process.
As the present paper mainly analyses the proposed reforms of the MMF sector, this
might also include prior regulatory undertakings, especially by US authorities. The
MMF sector has been subject to fundamental regulatory reform by US regulators in the
form of the amended Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, who reacted to
the global financial distress and the breakdown of the Reserve Primary Fund in 2008.
They addressed the risk of modern-type bank runs and the subsequent contagion prior
to FSB proposals. The 2010 reforms were discussed in a number of works including PwC
(2012), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (2012) and Scharfstein (2012). In order to reduce the
risk of bank runs, American regulators made it almost mandatory to move from cNAV
to vNAV valuation within the US area (also addressed by HSBC, 2011b). Regulators
also presented strict quantitative rules for asset-side management. The FSB framework
lacks such quantitative rules. However, the afore-mentioned regulations and academic
literature concentrate on the US, and do not cover the global MMF industry, interaction
with other shadow banking entities or other regulatory proposals. The present paper
will examine both the overlap and di↵erences in US and FSB regulations.
Repo transactions have been the subject of academic literature in recent years. However,
after the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, the literature focused more on stability issues
surrounding repo transactions, especially as they are a major funding source for the
shadow banking sector. Short-term funding in the form of repo contracts plays a crucial
role in the functioning of the intermediation chain. In addition to deposits and interbank
loans, banks use short-term credit contracts to refinance the asset side of their balance
sheet; shadow banks are even more reliant on repo contracts. Asset managers provide
funding to banks and shadow banks through repo contracts. As global assets under
management experienced exponential growth (see Gorton &Metrick, 2010c) institutional
investors used repo contracts to safely store liquid resources while still earning interest.
Consequently, repo contracts experienced a huge growth (see Krishnamurthy et al. ,
2011). The literature discussed below aims to understand the crucial role of repos
within the shadow banking system.
Gorton & Metrick (2010c) emphasizes the role of repos in the financial crisis. They
describe the run on the shadow banking system and the shortage of funding as a run
on repo, much akin to runs on deposits. However, as an integrative intermediation
process is introduced in this present work, the run on repo can be seen as an aftere↵ect.
Originally, investors in the private sector withdraw their investments, in the form of
MMF shares. As a consequence, MMFs did not renew repo contracts to meet previous
redemption requests by the private sector. This lack of investment in repo contracts can
be considered a run by institutional investors, and as an outcome of the run on bank
deposits and MMF shares (see Gorton & Metrick, 2010a; Gorton & Metrick, 2010b;
Gorton & Metrick, 2010c, and Adrian & Shin, 2010).
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Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) aimed to provide new data on the repo lending contracts of
MMFs. However, Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) was not able to produce further insight
on the drivers of growing repo lending and the run on those repos. The present paper
argues that the run on repos, as posited by Gorton & Metrick (2010c), was not the
central or original driver of the financial crisis, but rather that runs on repos are a
follow-up to the modern-type bank run on institutional investors.
Dang et al. (2011) provide an overview of why haircuts or margins exist and how they
are calculated. Haircuts gave evidence of the rise of the crisis. Gorton & Metrick (2010c)
provide evidence of the dramatic increase of haircuts with the crisis. The procyclicality of
margins, haircuts and characteristics can be considered to be major issues in regulation
proposed with the goal of stabilizing and supporting repo markets. To constrain risk-
taking and the build-up of leverage, a number of papers have discussed the minimum
margin requirements, as well as other possible policy options (see Gai & Kapadia, 2011;
Goodhart et al. , 2011; Brumm et al. , 2011; Stein, 2011 and Gorton & Metrick, 2010b).
Biais et al. (2011) analyze the possibility of using central clearing to standardize and
harmonize repo markets.
The literature on securitization has so far focused on market development, growth and
involvement within the financial crisis. Problematic areas that led to the financial crisis
or that amplified negative developments have been detected and analyzed. Altunbas
et al. (2009) reviews the securitization activities within the Euro area and points out
the banks’ capacity to supply new credit to the private sector. However, they also point
to the severe impact on banks’ risk positions, as well as possible negative developments
or impacts on financial stability. Caprio et al. (2009) identify the roots and causes of the
financial crisis as a breakdown of incentives in securitization. Wrong incentives lead to
a defective CRT, and could destabilize the financial system. Caprio et al. (2009) argue
for reform in securitization transparency and accountability within the securitization
process. Further insight into analyzing and describing the securitization process, along
with potential problems that may arise, can be found in Erber (2008), Franke (2005),
Gorton & Metrick (2012), Rosen (2010) and Shin (2009).
As the growth of the global securitization market was accompanied and influenced by
the exponential growth of assets under management and the demand for high-quality
collateral to be used in those short-term lending transactions (see DeMarzo, 2005), reg-
ulatory proposals should focus on activities that raise the quality of securitized products
that serve as collateral in securitized lending. Regulatory actions should also strengthen
the awareness of screening and monitoring processes. These actions mainly include the
standardization of securitization and risk-retention regulation. A number of academic
papers have examined the regulatory aspects of securitization. Main focus was the as-
surance of payments to the investors, funding of the securitization process and stability
of the overall financial system; this includes securitization as major financial innovation.
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The present paper will evaluate proposed regulation concerning risk retention, mainly
focusing on the di↵erences between various risk-retention strategies. The main question
that arises applies to the sustainability and stabilizing function of retention: how could
current regulation be complemented to ensure a positive and stabilizing impact? Almost
all of the literature concerning risk retention approves the introduction of risk-retention
rates to incentivize the monitoring and screening of securitization quality (see Ki↵ &
Kisser, 2011; Ki↵ & Kisser, 2010; Malekan & Dionne, 2012; Fender & Mitchell, 2009b
and Fender & Mitchell, 2009a). However, it is argued by the above-mentioned papers
that an optimal retention rate should not be fixed, and depends on di↵erent parameters.
The approaches to risk retention made by the FSB, the US and European regulators are
connected with the existing literature and other proposed regulations to study impact
and e↵ects of applied risk retention.
Generally, the present study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the shadow
banking system, regarding the quantity, proportionality and development of activities
and entities. The meaning of di↵erent sub-sections of the shadow banking system is
also shown. Together with the existing literature, the present study sums up all of the
regulatory proposals concerning the shadow banking system and financial system sta-
bility. Important issues concerning the scenario analysis of a modern-type bank run on
MMFs are highlighted and viewed critically. To date, regulatory proposals have been
only looked at in isolation; no one has compared individual proposals to analyze conse-
quences, spillover e↵ects and interdependencies. Which options might have stabilizing
or even destabilizing e↵ects in combination with other regulatory proposals?
Chapter 2
Definition and Development of
the Shadow Banking System
———————————————————————————-
2.1 Theory of Traditional Financial Intermediation
To illustrate the di↵erences between the traditional and the shadow banking systems,
and to define the term shadow banking it is important to first describe the (traditional)
intermediation process. Within a national economy individuals may have higher capital
demand for consumption and investment projects than their initial endowment allows. In
the following sections, these participants are labeled capital-seeking parties. In contrast,
market participants with payment surplus are the (original) lenders of capital to the
capital-seeking parties.
On a non-unionized capital market, credit contacts are negotiated individually and with-
out a common framework. In the case of an organized capital market, lenders and
borrowers trade within a market framework, but still directly, without a third party
involved. There are a number of sources of friction that influence this contractual re-
lationship. First, there might be asymmetric information available about lenders and
borrowers, as neither party is able to monitor or screen each other in a professional way.
Next, lot-size problems between capital lenders and borrowers may appear if di↵erent
volumes are o↵ered than are requested. Divergences about contractual maturity could
also arise. Without the intermediary action of a third party, investors are locked into
long-term investment projects, which preclude other investment opportunities. At the
same time, capital borrowers could be exposed to situations of liquidity shortfall. Within
an individual contract, both parties are restricted in screening and monitoring risk ap-
petite (i.e., risk problems), the initial situation, and further market developments, as
large-scale screening and monitoring by individual participants entails high costs and
12
Chapter 2. Definition and Development of the Shadow Banking System 13
complex techniques. To sum, these problems do not present insurmountable obstacles,
but do have considerable costs (see Claus & Smith, 1999). Agents between lenders and
capital-seeking parties are labeled financial intermediaries and o↵er an indirect method
of allocation (for information on the general intermediation process see Obst & Hint-
ner, 2000, p. 15; Hartmann-Wendels et al. , 2004, p. 127-147 and 2-11; Bitz & Stark,
2008, p. 1 and Gischer et al. , 2005, p. 7). Financial intermediaries make rational
decisions concerning the disposition of funds and the assignment of savings to invest-
ment projects (i.e., capital allocation). The wide allocation function can be divided into
information, funding, transformation, and control functions and generally causes higher
capital productivity and enhances control over risk. Intermediaries are tasked with
providing su cient information about risks, opportunities, and alternative investment
projects, and with facilitating appropriate financial resources (the information and allo-
cation function of intermediaries is discussed in Diamond, 1984; Mayer, 1988; Hellwig,
1991 and Edwards & Fisher, 1994).
Figure 2.1: Stylized Traditional Intermediation Chain (Author’s drawing based on
Gorton & Metrick, 2010b, p. 45)
With the implementation of a financial intermediary, possible problems can be min-
imized or even eliminated, minimizing costs. The intermediation function mediates
between contracting parties, and is an e cient way of allocating resources, i.e., clearing
investment requests and financing needs, as well as providing information. The interme-
diation process has an enhanced relevance to the national economy, as it enables parties
seeking capital to connect with lenders of capital through a financial intermediary, al-
lowing investment projects to be realized. However, there is no immediate benefit from
mere intermediation; the economic gain results only if transaction costs are reduced by
intermediation, as compared to other arrangements. In addition to o↵ering direct nego-
tiation, intermediaries have comprehensive and professional opportunities to screen and
monitor market participants, as well as to assess risks and command cost advantages.
The post-Keynesian approach to macroeconomic intermediation does not require the
pre-existence of deposits to fund credit institutions within the traditional intermediation
process. Rather, deposits are generated through credit lending as banks’ money-creation
process. McLeay et al. (2014) explain that the common intermediation approach is
popularly misunderstood as banks simply acting as intermediaries rather than as money
creators. Deposits are created by the savings decisions of households; in a modern
economy, money is created by banks through credit lending.
Chapter 2. Definition and Development of the Shadow Banking System 14
The intermediation process itself is characterized by the following factors: maturity and
liquidity transformation (i.e., receiving short-term, liquid funds to serve long-term, rel-
atively illiquid investment projects), leverage, and CRT (i.e., transferring credit risks to
other parties; Kodres, 2013). To conduct this intermediation, banks and other finan-
cial intermediaries collect deposits from the public and grant credit to capital-seeking
parties, channeling funds from the general public to investment projects and allocating
resources properly. Deposits collected from the private sector are generally liquid and
available to depositors at short notice, and are provided to the financial intermediary
for a short time horizon. Investment projects realized with those deposits are generally
long-term and illiquid. In these cases, intermediaries provide a liquidity and maturity
transformation, and the intermediation task is characterized by the first two factors
mentioned above. Financial intermediaries are able to mismatch these maturities and
deposit liquidities from short-term assets and long-term investments, as it is assumed
that not all depositors or other market participants holding short-term claims against
financial intermediaries will withdraw at the same time. However, this transformation
process makes financial intermediaries vulnerable to runs, thereby impacting the overall
financial system (see Claus & Smith, 1999, p. 8). The funding of intermediation activ-
ities is mainly financed by short-term debt instruments such as repurchase agreements
and others, and deposits, constituting the leverage aspect of intermediation. In order to
transfer risks o↵ of their own balance sheet, intermediaries (in the traditional interme-
diation process, mainly banks) sell loans to other financial entities. This CRT could be
thought of as the first connection and manifestation of the shadow banking system in
the financial intermediation process. The well functioning of the intermediation process
can influence the functioning of the financial system and its overall stability. Therefore,
it is crucial to understand the traditional intermediation process and the functioning of
the traditional financial system. This understanding must follow the shadow banking
intermediation process, as well as the interconnection of both intermediary procedures.
2.2 Definition concepts relating to Shadow Banking
The shadow banking system has developed rapidly in recent decades, and the traditional
intermediation process has been extended through shadow banking entities into an inter-
mediation chain. To understand further implications, it is important to know which part
of the financial system can be defined as shadow banking and how to delineate between
traditional and shadow banking entities. “The di culty starts with definition” (Turner,
2012, p.3). Like traditional banks, shadow banks or NBFIs intermediate between bor-
rowers and lenders of financial resources. They operate parallel to the formal banking
system and provide credit, liquidity, and money-like financial instruments with a limited
regulatory structure, which governs banks and other depository institutions that o↵er
central bank liquidity or public sector guarantees. These NBFIs are highly leveraged
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in comparison by the formal banking system. Major parts of the shadow banking sys-
tem borrow short in rollover debt markets (securities lending and repurchase agreement
transactions), and invest in longer-term and illiquid assets (Acharya et al. , 2010b, p.
319; Acharya et al. , 2010a, p. 2-3 and Blair, 2010, p. 3). The interactions among
di↵erent intermediaries and the use of several instruments form an intricate system. An
initial definition, made by the FCIC, broadly encompasses broker-dealers (i.e., invest-
ment banks), insurance companies (including monolines), financial companies, managed
funds (such as hedge funds, money market funds, and various o↵-balance-sheet entities
and other vehicles that aggregate and hold financial assets). (Acharya & Richardson,
2009, p. 117 and Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010, p. 7 and 23). O↵ Balance
Sheet Entities (OBSEs) or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), in the context of this anal-
ysis, are not classified as financial intermediaries, since they do not intermediate directly
between borrowers and lenders; OBSEs that transform loans into tradable securities are,
in fact, more of an auxiliary construction for the purpose of securitization. As the name
SPV implies, these vehicles are set up for the sole purpose of loan sale and securitization.
Several instruments linked to the shadow banking system should be mentioned. Shadow
banks issue loans to the private sector. However, unlike traditional depository institu-
tions, shadow banks do not fund loans by accepting deposits. Special OBSEs raise funds
through the issuance of financial market debt instruments backed by a pool of assets,
like ABSs, Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs), Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO),
and short-term Asset Backed Commercial Papers (ABCPs). Furthermore, managed
funds and other institutional investors that hold securitized assets in their portfolios re-
ceive liquid resources from households and businesses in exchange for deposit-like fund
shares. They design portfolios consisting of di↵erent financial market debt instruments
and store remaining resources in repurchase agreement transactions. Again, taking a
closer look at the post-Keynesian intermediation process, credit lending generates de-
posits or other deposit-like instruments, which serve as funding sources for the whole
system. Regulatory authorities and central banks are challenged by the task of prop-
erly defining shadow banking, in order to implement e cient regulation. So far, there
does not exist a clear and commonly agreed upon definition of what can be understood
as shadow banking, or how to di↵erentiate the NBFI system. This is also a result of
the varying definitions and regulatory standards of the traditional financial system in
each jurisdiction. Regulatory bodies agree that there is a parallel financial sector, but
not on precisely what it is, how to define it, and which entities and activities are part
of it. As shadow banking markets will continue to emerge, a flexible, forward-looking
perspective is crucial; regulators must stay ahead of changes to cover new instruments
and entities. As shadow banking constitutes a system of multiple entities that cooperate
in an intermediation chain, rather than one single entity, an appropriate definition has
to capture the whole chain of intermediation. The individual entities of the system are
di↵erently shaped by various jurisdictions; therefore, definition and subsequent regula-
tion need to apply to the economic substance or activities, rather than the overt form
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or entity. In addition, the definition has to capture a global picture, given that parts of
the shadow banking intermediation chain can be located in di↵erent jurisdictions (see
Kocjan et al. , 2012 and Financial Stability Board, 2011a). The first crucial problem of
shadow banking regulation becomes apparent: an elaborated definition is fundamental
for further regulation, as it is essential to know what exactly needs to be regulated and
which entities should be covered by regulation. Furthermore, a comprehensive definition
is needed for the monitoring and screening of institutions that may pose major risks to
financial stability and to the overall financial system.
Another motive to call for a strict and comprehensive definition—in order to get a clear
picture of the object that needs to be regulated—is the interconnection of banks and
shadow banks. Both bank and non-bank intermediaries are highly connected through
di↵erent channels. Traditional banks can be part of the shadow banking intermediation
chain or may provide liquidity support to non-banks in the form of backstop facilities.
Another boundary point can be the investment in the financial products of the shadow
banking system by the traditional sector, or even investment in the same or similar asset
classes. Hence, traditional banks are exposed to a common concentration of risks through
their asset holdings. This can heighten the risk of asset bubbles and may lead to fire sale
situations, especially when entities in both sectors invest in the same assets. Clearly,
banks are e↵ected by the development of the shadow banking sector by these issues (see
Financial Stability Board, 2011b). A strict definitional segregation of banks and shadow
banks is needed to gain further insight into these two entities’ interconnection.
Within the consultation process of Financial Stability Board (2011b), certain authors
expressed the point of view that a comprehensive definition is not necessary. For in-
stance, according to the International Banking Federation, the absence of a common
definition should not prevent regulatory and/or supervisory actions, as no definition is
needed to create regulation. For example, traditional banking regulation has not been
prevented by the global inconsistency over what a bank is and does; there are still tight
regulatory standards and supervisory oversight (International Banking Federation, 2011,
p. 2). However, despite the view of the International Banking Federation, it is essential
to agree on a clear definition and to distinguish what needs to be regulated in which
way and concentration. It is essential to clearly circumscribe both the banking and the
shadow banking sectors. Di↵erent definitions of traditional banking will influence the
definition of NBFI, and various definitions di↵er in the scope of what they cover.
The Financial Stability Board, mandated by the G20, defines shadow banking using
a two-dimensional approach as “a system of credit intermediation that involves
entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. In narrowing the
focus, the activities and entities conducted by shadow banks give rise to i) systemic
risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and lawed
credit risk transfer (CRT), and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns (see European
Commission, 2012 and Financial Stability Board, 2011a).
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Following the EU Commission Green Paper on Shadow Banking, which extended the
FSB definition approach, entities outside the regulated system can be defined as NBFIs
if they are involved in any of the following activities: (see European Commission, 2012):
(1) perform maturity and/or liquidity transformation, (2) accept funding with deposit-
like characteristics, (3) undergo CRT, or (4) use direct or indirect credit leverage. This
definition encompasses entities that perform activities that constitute an important way
of funding the shadow banking sector: (1) securitization, (2) securities lending, and (3)
repurchase transactions (repos). This list takes an activity-based approach to definition.
Adrian & Ashcraft (2012), in contrast, use a much broader scope and define shadow
banking as “banking intermediation without public liquidity or credit guarantees.” Shadow
banks, in this context, “channel funding from savers to investors through a range of se-
curitization and secured funding techniques.” Mehrling et al. (2013) define shadow
banking concisely as “money market funding of capital market borrowing” with “no
direct public backstop.” 2 The definition by Mehrling et al. (2013) focuses on activities
that are funded by (short-term) capital market instruments. This definition seems sim-
ple, but also determines a crucial characteristic of the shadow banking system: money
market funding. This highlights the importance of funding sources, and by extension,
the importance of keeping the money market funding stable. If funding sources run dry,
entities relying on that funding experience financial distress. The funding part of the
shadow banking system might not be harmed in the first place; however, other entities
and counterparties may be forced to liquidate assets in order to meet requests.
The FSB, in contrast, emphasizes shadow banking activities (mainly the act of credit
intermediation) in creating their definition. In this way, the FSB covers a wide range
of financial activities and maps a system that might be bigger than estimates under the
definition by Mehrling et al. (2013). The European Commission also defines the shadow
banking system using a functional approach, trying to capture as many potential shadow
banking activities and entities as possible. These di↵erent approaches highlight the fact
that the definition influences the perception of how big the system is, which activities
and entities are part of the system, and what needs to be regulated. In planning global
monitoring, the definition of shadow banks will determine the size of the sector. Keeping
these issues in mind, regulators and authorities need to decide which definition is most
e cient in ensuring the stability of the shadow banking sector and the overall financial
system. The following questions also arise: should a definition cover all possible entities
and activities, even though, later on, these entities and activities might be declared not
important to concerns of stability and risk? Or should a definition encompass only parts
that are explicitly identified as shadow banking entities?
To identify mutations or adoptions as potential concerns, and to derive and implement
policy options, regulators focus on activities where certain concerns are likely to arise,
notably: i) systemic risk through maturity and/or liquidity transformation; ii) leverage;
2For further definitions see Appendix.
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and iii) regulatory arbitrage, which can be used to circumvent and undermine banking
regulation (e.g., CRT; Financial Stability Board, 2011b, p. 3). These factors are con-
gruent with the essential characteristics of traditional intermediation and influence the
financial system and overall financial stability. The intermediation process and possible
development needs to be monitored and supervised. Consequently, a definition focused
on the intermediation process and possible risks is most practical. The fact that shadow
banking intermediation is characterized by the same factors of intermediation implies
the importance of also screening and monitoring the shadow banking intermediation
process with respect to overall stability.
According to the FSB approach, maturity and/or liquidity transformation, along with
extended leverage, raise concerns about creating additional (systemic) risks within the
shadow banking system, which could spread to the whole financial system through var-
ious channels of interconnections. Shadow banks typically use short-term and highly
liquid non-deposit instruments (e.g., repos, ABCPs) to fund themselves via wholesale
funds. Risk profiles of these instruments are somewhat unpredictable, as they are not
subject to the usual banking supervision and standards, and/or are o↵ered without of-
ficial sector backstops. There does not exist government insurance for the safe return
of such funds to investors in the event of market failure (Kocjan et al. , 2012, p. 5).
Short-term funding can build up additional leverage (e.g., through re-hypothecation
and securitization) and may lead to “modern-type bank runs” 3. Furthermore, distinct
leverage in the shadow banking system can amplify procyclicality. Activities within the
system promote high leverage, particularly when asset prices are buoyant and haircuts
and margins are low. But, market participants are exposed to disruptions in the financial
system. This could lead to sudden deleveraging and fire sales of assets held by NBFIs
and the traditional banking sector (see Financial Stability Board, 2011a, p. 4).
The shadow banking system conducts bank-like activities (i.e., broadly speaking, the
intermediation task) with seemingly little or no regulatory constraints. Although many
parts of the shadow banking system (e.g., MMFs, banks) are already subject to regula-
tion, others (e.g., OBSE, finance companies) are so far unnoticed by financial authorities.
Individually, these entities might not pose much risk to the financial system; however,
their interplay and interconnection within the shadow banking system, along with the
connection points with the traditional banking system—all without guaranteed access
to central bank money or similar tools—could create the risk of a systemic failure. How-
ever, current regulation of these entities does not cover interactions of institutions and
their impact on the financial system and on financial stability. Regulation of most en-
tities has so far focused on consumer protection rather than on the financial stability
of the system. Compared to banks, shadow banks might be able to obtain a funding
advantage. Banks use these arbitrage e↵ects to undermine regulation. This leads to
3A Modern-type bank run is in this context defined as runs on run-able deposit-like instruments such
as short-dated ABCPs, repos, and MMF investments (Financial Stability Board, 2011a, p. 4). The risks
of a modern-type bank run through short-term funding, as well as other risks within the intermediation
chain, are illustrated in the scenario modeled in Chapter 4.
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Figure 2.2: Stylized Shadow Banking Intermediation Chain (Author’s drawing).
a build-up of additional risk and leverage, and the use of less regulated entities (e.g.,
OBSE) to circumvent these regulatory capital and liquidity requirements.
With regard to already regulated entities of the shadow banking intermediation chain, it
should be kept in mind that there is not necessarily urgent demand for new and stricter
regulation, although authorities should monitor NBFIs and create transparency. Regu-
lation and definition need to focus more on the intermediation task and risks stemming
from this process, as well as interconnections between the entities. In the following sec-
tion, this work will concentrate on the definition and regulatory approaches made by
the FBS.
2.3 Shadow Banking Intermediation Chain - Entities and
Instruments
2.3.1 General Annotations
Traditional banking can be regarded as an integral part of the new intermediation model
of shadow banking. Theoretically, the traditional intermediation process is enhanced by
shadow banking entities and activities. Both the shadow banking system and the tradi-
tional banking system perform intermediation. This process is characterized by liquidity
and maturity transformation, CRT, and leverage, and intermediation is split up and car-
ried out by a number of capital market participants. The interaction of many entities
conducts the same intermediation tasks as a single bank does. The afore-mentioned
definitions provide a rough overview of the entities that are part of the shadow banking
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system. Chapter 2 aims to deliver an accurate analysis of entities and activities, covering
their quantitative size, interaction with other parts of the system, and general impact
on the entire shadow banking system. Which part do these entities play within the in-
termediation process? For a simple consideration of the shadow banking intermediation
chain, this analysis follows an approach similar to Pozsar (2008); the entities and in-
struments discussed below will be classified simply into the institutions and instruments
involved in the issuance of loans (i.e., risk originators) and in the creation of securities
(i.e., loan warehousing and ABS issuance), as well as institutions that invest in these
instruments (i.e., risk bearers). Risk originators (e.g., depository institutions, finance
companies, and broker-dealers) provide loans to the private sector, including businesses
and consumers. Entities involved in loan warehousing and security issuance are OB-
SEs. Investors of instruments issued by risk originators through OBSEs are commercial
banks, broker-dealers, managed funds (e.g., MMFs), and insurance companies. Some
institutions may behave as risk originators or risk bearers, depending on the kind of
transactions they undertake. For the purpose of the framework in the present paper,
important participants and instruments as well as their development will be analyzed.
The loan origination task that enables the realization of investment projects through
the traditional intermediation process is conducted by banks and shadow banks in a
narrow sense (e.g., finance companies), providing loans to the private sector and hence,
the real economy. Loan originators channel funds to projects in the form of granted
credits. McLeay et al. (2014) describes the money creation process, as loan originators
lend money to the private sector and so create money. Loan sales and securitization
to OBSEs extends money creation. This supports the statement that the central bank
determines the quantity of loans within the financial system, and the money multiplier.
Loan sales enable banks to o↵er more loans to the market and create further money.
Maturity and liquidity transformation characterizes mainly short-term and liquid fund-
ing of primarily long-term and hard to sell, illiquid loans. In the shadow banking interme-
diation chain, maturity and liquidity transformation is conducted by a chain of entities,
whereby liquid and short-term investments of the private sector are transferred to loans
and other long-term and rather illiquid investments. Funding takes place through insti-
tutional investors, especially MMFs, that provide repos and other short-term credit to
originators, and who also act as investors of short-term debt instruments that are issued
for funding purposes. Furthermore, banks receive deposits and interbank loans. Insti-
tutional investors and MMFs generate funding by issuing shares to the private sector.
Shadow banks in a narrow sense that conduct loan origination are not able to receive
deposits and therefore depend heavily on loan sales, repos, issuance of money, and cap-
ital market instruments. The characteristic leverage or debt funding of the asset side
through repos and other short-term debt transactions constitutes another important
characteristic of the intermediation process.
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All forms of CRT are conducted in the shadow banking system through the sale of
loan portfolios to OBSEs in excessive amounts. It is assumed that both banks and
shadow banks (in a narrow sense), sell originated loans to OBSEs, which convert these
loans into tradable securities. These bonds are sold on a wholesale market to funds and
banks, thereby funding the shadow banking system. Primarily, loans and other assets
are sold for the purpose of securitization to OBSEs. The securitized assets are, for their
part, sold to both the wholesale market and to originators. Originators (i.e., banks and
shadow banks in a narrow sense) buy securitized assets that can be used as collateral
in later transactions. Parts of the securitized portfolio are also bought by originators
due to regulatory constraints such as risk retention. Funding of originators is conducted
through loan sales and secured short-term loans (e.g., repo contracts) backed by retained
securitized parts of the portfolio (retained portion as skin in the game). Funds buy
ABSs for portfolio diversification purposes. Banks sell loans to free up capital bound by
regulatory capital requirements (i.e., liquidity perspective) to fund parts of their asset
portfolios. The securitization process enables banks to circumvent capital requirements
(i.e., arbitrage perspective). Shadow banks (in a narrow sense) are not subject to capital
requirements, and they sell their loans for refinancing purposes mainly under the liquidity
aspect. Aside from short-term secured loans, securitization is the main source of funding
for their asset portfolios.
O↵-balance sheet entities are entities in charge of buying loans and converting them to
tradable securities. They are a crucial part of the securitization process. O↵-balance
sheet entities also transfer payment streams. In the context of this paperxt, OBSEs
are a simplified element that conducts securitization of loans into ABSs (the details
will be explained later on in section 2.3.3). Institutional investors (such as funds and,
especially, MMFs) constitute the end of the intermediation chain and o↵er an interest-
earning alternative for investors in the private sector, including households and firms
and others. Money Market Funds appear as wholesale investors, providing funding to
the shadow banking system. Wholesale investors played also a major role concerning
the development of the securitization market. The growth of the securitization market
is also triggered by the demand side, which constitutes the connection with the growth
of the asset management market. There has been an exponential increase in the assets
under management, as those institutional investors are not subject to deposit insurance
and do not have access to safe, short-term, interest-earning investments. Two parts of
the financial system find common ground: one side needs to store huge excess liquidity,
and the other side needs funding This leads to a growth of the repurchase agreement
market, where institutional investors can store liquid resources safely, backed by collat-
eral. These transactions are considered to be investments that are highly safe, liquid,
and redeemable on short notice. This increased use of collateralized transactions led
to an increased demand for high-level collateral (i.e., collateral mining), which can be
posited as a driver of securitization (Gorton, 2010 and Gorton & Metrick, 2010c). The
total balance significantly exceeds the total of insured deposits (see Greenwood et al.
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, 2013 and Pozsar, 2011). Funds hold diversified portfolios of repos to other financial
intermediaries, company shares and company equity, OBSE-issued bonds (i.e., ABSs),
and other financial securities. Money Market Fund shares are considered by financial
investors (households and companies) to be liquid, secure, highly rated, and equivalent
to safe deposits, as they are redeemable on a daily basis, just like bank deposits.
Compared to the traditional intermediation process, which has only a single financial
intermediary, the intermediation chain can be disrupted at di↵erent stages. This could
result in unrealized investment projects and lead to severe negative influences on the
real economy. It is therefore important to know (1) which entities belong to this chain
and what their tasks are within the intermediation process; (2) which problems emanate
from those entities, especially through interconnections; and (3) where and how adequate
regulation should be set up. Di↵erent problem areas along the intermediation chain are
made clear in the scenario outlined in Chapter 3. In the following section, entities
belonging to the intermediation chain will be analyzed regarding their position within
the intermediation process, market development, and growth. They will be brought into
a comprehensive framework that aims to depict relations between individual entities
through their activities and exposures.
2.3.2 Loan Origination
2.3.2.1 Depository institutions
The group of depository institutions or Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) com-
prises credit institutions and all other financial institutions whose business is to receive
deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities, as well as, for their own ben-
efit, to grant credit and/or invest in securities (European Central Bank, 2004, p. 115
and Cohen, 2004, p. 48). Deposits are often payable on demand and issued to a large
number of di↵erent businesses and individuals in the private sector. Primarily, these
funds are used for loans to the private sector. The post-Keynesian approach of generat-
ing deposits has to be kept in mind. Depositor institutions issue loans to the real sector,
which in turn store their deposits generated through loan issuance at those depository
institutions. In the US banking system, the definition of depository institutions includes
commercial banks, saving institutions, and credit unions. Commercial banks account
for about 80 to 90% of the total assets of depository institutions in the United States.
Therefore, only commercial banks will be taken into account in the present paper. In
the Euro Area, the MFIs group includes credit institutions, central banks, MMFs, and
other institutions4. For the following section, only credit institutions will be taken into
account.
4See also http://www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/money/mfi/mfi_definitions.pdf
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Mainly, depository institutions issue loans to households, businesses, and other cus-
tomers, which together comprise the real sector). Furthermore, they invest parts of
their funds in debt instruments as well as in mutual fund shares. Currently, total assets
of Euro Area credit institutions amount to Euro 29.613 billion (Quarter IV; Year 2013).
The level of assets grew constantly from 2000 until the fourth quarter of 2008, up to a
value of Euro 30.556 billion. This was followed by a decline to Euro 29.911 billion in
Quarter IV 2009. The observed credit institutions issue 60 to 65 % of their assets as
credit to households, firms, and other capital market participants (see Figure 2.3). The
same observation can generally be made for the US commercial banking sector. Total
assets of US commercial banks amounted to Dollar 12.092 billion in May 2009, followed
by a decline, which hit a low point in March 2010 at Dollar 11.631 billion. Currently,
total assets amount to Dollar 14.190 billion. Until the end of 2008, US commercial banks
issued 80 to 85% of their assets as loans to the private sector, which had been reduced
to about 70% by 2013. From 2009 until 2013 banks performed regrouping from credit
issuance to cash assets, which can be assumed to be more liquid. This allows banks to
prepare for sudden liquidity needs due to withdrawal. Loan issuance amounts are now
up to 70% o↵ overall assets (see Figure 2.4). Also observable is the decline of interbank
loans beginning at the end of 2008. This point of time denotes the bankruptcy of the
investment bank Lehman Brother that resulted in a loss of confidence in short-term lend-
ing markets. Int he course of the Lehman Brothers’ insolvency, the interbank market
experienced stagnation and rising interest rates in interbank loans, leading to declining
interbank loan amounts.
Deposits dominate the liability side of depository institutions. Credit institutions in the
Euro Area fund 50% of their assets through deposits on the liability side (see Figure
2.5). During the crisis of 2008 and 2009, there had been no significant decrease in
depository funding. United States commercial banks receive funding through deposits
up to an amount of 70% of the total liabilities. Figure 2.6(b) shows a sudden decline in
deposits or withdrawal by the private sector at the end of 2008. This sudden decline in
deposits was compensated with net due related to foreign o ces, meaning cash reserves
from other contries. Furthermore, credit institutions and commercial banks also fund
themselves through the issuance of financial market instruments, capital and reserves,
and borrowings like interbank loans.
2.3.2.2 Broker-dealer (investment banks)
Investment banking includes a rather heterogeneous set of activities, which can be clas-
sified as follows: (1) traditional investment banking, (2) trading and brokerage, and (3)
asset management. Traditional investment banking can include advisory work, assist-
ing in transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, or debt restructuring; as well as
underwriting services, such as assisting in raising capital on financial markets. Trading
and brokerage includes the purchase, sale, and brokerage of securities, either for one’s
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.3: Total Assets Credit Institutions Euro Area. Level of total assets (a)
and fraction of single assets (European Central Bank Statistical Warehouse; http:
//sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn3506 Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.4: Total Assets U.S. Commercial Banks. Level of total assets (a) and fraction
of single assets (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Data Download Pro-
gram; http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H8; Table
H.8; Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.5: Total Liabilities Credit Institutions Euro Area. Level of total liabilities
(a) and fraction of single liabilities (European Central Bank Statistical Warehouse;
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn3506 Date of Download: 06. June
2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.6: Total Liabilities U.S. Commercial Banks. Level of total liabilities (a)
and fraction of single liabilities (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Data Download Program; http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.
aspx?rel=H8 Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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own account (proprietary trading) or the accounts of others (brokerage). Lastly, asset
management and securities services imply the management of investors’ money, using
traditional (i.e., open-end mutual funds) and alternative investment strategies (i.e., real
estate funds, hedge funds, etc.) (Iannotta, 2010, p. 1-2 and Morrison & Wilhelm, 2008,
p. 21 f.).
Investment banks mediate between sellers and buyers of securities. They sell issued
securities to raise money that corporations need (Fleuriet, 2008, p. 34). Investment and
commercial banking can be performed by one bank, referred to as universal banking.
In the past, universal banking was prohibited in some jurisdictions (e.g., the US). The
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) was enacted to prevent commercial banks
from engaging in investment bank activities. The Financial Modernization Act of 1999
(Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) repealed the existing separation between investment and
commercial banks (Iannotta, 2010, p. 6; for further insight, see Barth et al. , 2000 and
Barth et al. , 2008). Since 2011, depository institutions and, especially, broker–dealers
are subject to the Volcker Rule (included in Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; DFA)), which prohibits insured depository from
proprietary trading and restricts investment in hedge and private equity funds5.
Broker–dealer balance sheets di↵er strongly from those of conventional depository insti-
tutions. Unlike depository institutions, investment banks or broker–dealers do not take
deposits as their main funding source. Their importance in the supply of loans has in-
creased with securitization. By the 1960s, broker-dealers got a number of companies to
finance themselves through the issuance of commercial paper (CPs). Later on, securiti-
zation was one of the first activities for which broker–dealers competed with commercial
banks. On the asset side of the balance sheet, investment banks hold 25% of credit
market instruments, such as CP, ABS, equity and shares, and di↵erent kinds of bonds
(e.g., corporate bonds and municipal bonds). About 50% of the asset side is made up of
miscellaneous assets, including loans. About 20% of the liability side is owed by a parent
or funded through direct investment (i.e., miscellaneous liabilities). A further 50% of
the broker–dealer balance sheet is funded through security credit due from commercial
banks, households, and the rest of the world, and 20% is funded through repurchase
agreements (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011, L.128).
2.3.2.3 Finance Companies
Finance companies are either independent financial firms (i.e., consumer and commer-
cial finance companies, leasing companies and factors) or captive financing subsidiaries
of non-financial corporations (e.g., Capital One, Ally Finance (former General Motors
Acceptance Corporation; GMAC)) (Carey et al. , 1998, p. 848). Stated statistics refer
to American data, as the institutional type of finance company exists almost solely in
5See http://www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/volcker-rule/overview/
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the US, where these companies, along with depository institutions, are important sup-
pliers of credit to businesses and consumers (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010,
p. 28). However, unlike banks, finance companies do not take deposits. Instead, they
must raise funds by issuing commercial papers and other short- and medium-term debt
instruments to finance their loans (Tucker, 2010, p. 3). Finance companies raise large
amounts through the issuance of debt instruments and lend credits in smaller amounts
to borrowers. Depository institutions, in comparison, collect deposits in small amounts
and make large loans. As finance companies do not receive deposits, they are not sub-
ject to bank regulation and therefore have no access to a discount window or deposit
insurance. There are no regulation constraints concerning the assets finance companies
hold or how they raise funds. They are therefore better able to provide customized loans
than banking institutions (Mishkin & Eakins, 2008, W-2 and Dynan et al. , 2002, p.
7)6.
The issuance of short- and medium-term debt instruments represents an important
source of funding. The proportion amounts to more than 60% of all funding sources.
They also obtain funds by borrowing from banks (about 5 to 10%) and the parent com-
pany (about 15%) (i.e., captive finance company). Finance companies operate from a
narrow equity base. The proportion of capital, surplus, and undivided profits together
amount to less than 10%. About 65 to 75% of finance companies’ assets are issued as
loans, such as real estate, business loans, or consumer loans. Furthermore, finance com-
panies invest about 25% in other assets, such as debt instruments (see Figure 2.7). The
issuance of consumer loans peaked in the first quarter of 2008. After a decline until 2009
(Quarter III), issuance went up again. Real estate loans experienced a sharp decline
until the time of writing. Business loans remained almost stable throughout the years
2000–2013, although there were some deviations (see Figure 2.8).
2.3.2.4 Stylized Loan Originator
For the purpose of the analysis in the present paper, two kinds of loan originators are
assumed: (1) banks, as the part of the system with central bank liquidity access and
governmental guarantees and (2) shadow banks (in the narrow sense), as the part of the
system dependent on market funding.
Banks with central bank access are assumed to have the following assets: required
reserves rD, whereD are the deposits of the non-bank sector and r is the required reserve
rate; loans Lb supplied to the private sector (households and firms Lb = Lhb +L
f
b ); loans
Ls supplied to shadow banks in a narrow sense (broker–dealer and finance companies);
loans issued to other banks (interbank loans) Ks; debt instruments issued by OBSEs
Bbo and institutional investors B
b
i ; and excess reserves E. Furthermore, banks grant
credit enhancement in the form of credit lines to OBSEs Lo. As contingent liabilities,
6See http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/2095/2146070/CH26.pdf
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.7: Balance sheet U.S. Finance Companies. Total assets finance compa-
nies (a) and total liabilities (b) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Data Download Program; http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.
aspx?rel=G20; Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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Figure 2.8: Loans U.S. Finance Companies. Level of loans (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System Data Download Program; http://www.federalreserve.
gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=G20; Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
credit lines cannot be included and do not appear on the balance sheet. Commercial
banks are also able to sell parts of their loan portfolios to OBSEs in exchange for liquid
resource reserves, moving the sold loan position o↵ the balance sheet  Lob . These liquid
resources are used for new loan origination. Banks manage the volume and structure of
their asset portfolio with an eye to liquidity and solvency. Empirical research shows that
securitization is mainly driven by liquidity considerations (Cerrato, 2010). In addition to
liquidity, risk reduction and regulatory arbitrage amplify securitization. This has been
confirmed by Totzek (2009). Early withdrawals are reasonable for the liquidity holdings
of banks to meet small sudden withdrawals and requests. Therefore, B, Ks, and E are
considered to be liquid assets, and fluctuate on short notice. Liabilities of commercial
banks are deposits D, loans issued by other banks Kd, surplus and capital Cb, and repob
issued by institutional investors or the central bank. The relationship between interbank
and central bank loans is defined as follows: Ks+Kc = Kd. Banks use repos as a short-
term funding source, as well as interbank loans that can be considered substitutes for
repos. This relationship becomes meaningful in the scenario analysis in Chapter 4. For
the sake of simplicity, required reserves held with the central bank rD and deposits D
from the private sector will be consolidated as (1 r)D on the liability side of the balance
sheet. The balance sheet of commercial banks reads:
Lb   Lob + Ls +Bbo +Bbi +Ks + E = (1  r)D + repob +Kd + Cb
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Shadow banks (in a narrow sense) encompass broker–dealers and finance companies,
and play an important role in the credit market. As they do not receive deposits or
hold reserves with the central bank, shadow banks are not as regulated in their credit
lending activities as traditional banks are. Shadow banks are assumed to have the
following assets: loans to the private sector Ls (households and firms Ls = L
f
s+Lhs ), debt
instruments issued by OBSEs Bso and institutional investors B
s
i , and a limited amount
of bank deposits Ds. On the liability side, shadow banks are financed by repurchase
agreement transactions repos with institutional investors, issuance of commercial papers
to institutional investors CP , loans issued by banks Ls, and surplus and capital Cs. Like
banks, shadow banks (in a narrow sense) are also able to sell parts of their loan portfolios
to OBSEs  Los and receive liquid resources in exchange. Like banks, shadow banks sell
assets or play a major role in securitization for the purpose of ensuring adequate liquidity
or reducing risk on their balance sheet. Their balance sheet reads:
Ls   Los +Bsi +Bso +Ds = repos + CP + Cs + Ls
Debt instruments issued by OBSEs are mainly held as assets on the balance sheet for the
purpose of signaling. Banks and shadow banks that are involved in origination buy parts
of the securitized portfolio to reflect certain qualities. As part of the financial regulation
and stabilization of the securitization market, institutions involved in origination are
compelled to hold part of the securitized portfolio as risk retention (for further insight
on retention regulation and proper CRT see Chapter 4).
2.3.3 Loan Warehousing and Securities Issuance (ABS)
2.3.3.1 Technical details and development
While moving from traditional financing to shadow banking, there has been a rise
in structured finance. Structured finance encompasses arrangements that refinance or
hedge any economic activity beyond the scope of conventional forms of on-balance-sheet
securities, at low agency and capital costs. Securitization and credit derivatives are the
two major classes of structured finance. For the purpose of this analysis, the focus is
on securitization for funding purpose (Jobst, 2005/2006, p. 2). Securitization denotes
a financing process whereby illiquid assets (i.e., loans and other receivables) are pooled
and transformed into liquid financial instruments (Art 4 (61) CRR - Regulation (EU) No
575/2013) and BaFin, 1997). Generally, the securitization process follows a particular
pattern: The originator (e.g., bank, finance company) transfers a portfolio of assets to a
special purpose vehicle (SPV; i.e, pooling of loans). The SPV in turn issues rated secu-
rities backed by this portfolio (Sachversta¨ndigenrat, 2007, p. 108). This securitization
process converts loans that have been held on balance sheet into marketable securities
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that are sold and traded by the SPV. Banks that sell their loans on the securitization
market are able to distribute the risk associated with the assets across a wider range of
investors, rather than taking on the entire risk themselves (CRT; Stein, 2010, p. 44).
Special purpose vehicles, also known as OBSEs, are legal entities created for the purpose
of transferring assets (i.e., loans) o↵ the balance sheet of the originating firm (i.e., risk
originator). These special purpose entities are thinly capitalized and have no manage-
ment or employees, and administrative functions are performed by a trustee. Due to
constrained business activity and limited ability to incur debt, OBSEs risk having a
shortfall of cash, below what they need to pay investors. Securitization transactions rely
on the quality of the underlying assets. Therefore, in most transactions, it is essential
to design the right legal and financial structure to receive the requested rating. This
structural support is usually referred to as credit enhancement and can be provided
in many di↵erent ways. The following internal and external forms of credit enhance-
ment could be provided: overcollateralization, cash collateral account, letter of credit,
credit insurance, financial guarantee insurance, and subordination. O↵ balance sheet
entities are created as bankruptcy remote, meaning that OBSEs are created to protect
the originating firm in the case of bankruptcy, as the insolvency of the originating firm
has no impact in the OBSE. In case of bankruptcy in the originator, their creditors
cannot seize assets of the OBSE. Furthermore, the OBSE itself cannot become legally
bankrupt (for more information, see Gorton & Souleles, 2005, p. 560; Ba¨r, 1997, p.
104; Schepers, 2006, p. 259 and Gorton & Metrick, 2010b, Deloitte und Touche GmbH
Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft, 2011, p. 90).
Literature distinguishes between true sale and synthetic securitization. In a true sale
transaction, the originator actually sells and transfers the legal title and the physical
position of the underlying assets o↵ the balance sheet to the SPV. The originator, in
turn, receives a purchase price for the assets sold in the transaction. The o↵-balance-
sheet entity issues securities backed by the assets purchased. This transaction allows
the originator to free capital (i.e., asset swap of illiquid assets into liquid resources),
thereby reducing capital requirements. With the liquid resources received, the originator
can either meet liabilities or use them to issue new loans to the private sector. In a
synthetic transaction, the originator transfers only the credit risk, not the legal title, to
the OBSE, using credit derivatives. The physical position remains on the originator’s
balance sheet and no transfer of the legal title occurs (Deloitte und Touche GmbH
Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft, 2011, p. 87). The sale of an asset position to an OBSE
is generally a funded risk transfer; some instruments solely transfer the credit risk, but
do not provide funds at the time the risk is transferred. For further considerations, this
analysis will concentrate on the securitization of asset portfolios via OBSEs rather than
via direct transactions or single-name transactions (Committee on the Global Financial
System - Bank of International Settlement, 2003, p. 5).
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Asset Backed Securities transactions are distinguished by their payment structure, i.e.,
how the payment flow (i.e., interest rates and amortization) is treated. In a pass-through
structure, the cash flow generated by the underlying asset portfolio is pooled and dis-
tributed directly to the investor. With the investment made, the investor purchases a
share of the payment flow. Regarding cash flow and risk, all investors acquire an equal
position. Pay-through structures, on the other hand, give the investor a proportional
claim against the asset pool. Investors receive di↵ering interests and amortization in
a subordinated structure (i.e., waterfall principle). In the most common cases, OBSEs
issue tranches of securities to the market in a hierarchic structure (AAA first, followed
by AA, A, BBB, BB, and so on). Payments on assets, as well as losses, are distributed
in a predefined order. This results in di↵erent risk profiles (i.e., rating) of the di↵erent
tranches. The equity tranche (i.e., first loss piece; FLP), with the lowest rating, is ex-
posed to the highest credit risk. Losses are first distributed to the FLP. In contrast, the
senior tranche, with the highest rating, is exposed to the lowest credit risk. Payments are
allocated in the senior tranche first (Deloitte und Touche GmbH Wirtschaftspru¨fungs-
gesellschaft, 2011, p. 86↵, for a simple model of the securitization structure Figure
2.9).
Securities issued by OBSEs in the securitization process are referred to as ABSs. They
are defined as one major group of capital-market-structured finance products, and are
mostly used for refinancing purpose. Asset Backed Securities is also a collective term
and includes all other classes. Asset Backed Securities, in a wide sense, are classi-
fied by their maturity, underlying pool of assets, and payment structure (pass-through
or pay-through). Depending on the underlying asset class, literature di↵erentiates be-
tween ABSs in a narrow sense (i.e., traditional ABSs), MBSs, CDOs, and short-term
ABCPs. The underlying asset pool of ABSs, in a narrow sense, mostly consists of
trade and credit card receivables, consumer credit, and lease contracts. Mortgage-
backed securities, a large part of ABSs, are ordinarily based on a pool of residential
mortgages (i.e., residential mortgage backed securities; RMBSs) and commercial mort-
gages (i.e., commercial mortgage backed securities; CMBSs) (Deloitte und Touche GmbH
Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft, 2011, p. 10 and Ricken, 2008, p. 39). CDOs are secu-
ritized loan and bond portfolios, including mezzanine tranches of securitized portfolios
(i.e., collateralized loan obligations, CLO; collateralized bond obligations, CBO and
collateralized fund obligations, CFO). The repeated securitization of ABS tranches is
also known as re-securitization, and can be carried out several times (see Pozsar, 2008
for Matryoshka CDOlls, i.e., multi-layered structured credit products; Ricken, 2008, p.
56; Jobst, 2005/2006 and Deloitte und Touche GmbH Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft,
2011). Multi-layered structured credit products and the resulting complexity are ad-
dressed by regulators. Standardization of the securitization process and products is
supposed to reduce complexity while optimizing functionality and transparency for in-
vestors in assessment and valuation.
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Figure 2.9: Simple securitization structure of Asset Backed Securities and Asset
Backed Commercial Papers with OBSEs (FLP = First Loss Piece). Author’s drawing
based on Deloitte und Touche GmbH Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft, 2011, p. 108 and
111.
Asset Backed Securities are classified by their defined time to maturity into term trans-
actions (e.g., traditional ABSs, MBSs, and CDOs) and short-term ABCP-programs.
Asset Backed Commercial Papers constitute a short term, not-market-listed debt in-
strument, backed by collateral. Depending on their time to maturity, OBSEs are also
classified into OBSEs for term transactions and ABCP conduits. Term transactions
have a minimum time to maturity of two years, and therefore receive a long-term rat-
ing for any individual tranche (Ricken, 2008, p. 40 and Deloitte und Touche GmbH
Wirtschaftspru¨fungsgesellschaft, 2011, p. 91). Short-term ABCPs are normally used
to refinance long-term assets. Therefore, ABCP programs and associated conduits are
set up permanently to issue revolving ABCPs. In general, OBSEs for term transac-
tions are set up as single-seller entities. Asset Backed Commercial Papers conduits are
Chapter 2. Definition and Development of the Shadow Banking System 36
OBSEs that finance the purchase of receivables, primarily through issuing short-term
debt instruments. These conduits are generally built as multi-seller conduits. Usually,
ABCP conduits form a holding structure, where one OBSE purchases assets from many
originators, while another OBSE issues the short-term debt instruments. There are a
number of securitization program types and combinations of credit and liquidity support
mechanisms (Ricken, 2008, p. 40–41; for more specific details on ABCP conduit types,
see DBRS, 2009, p. 8–11 and Moody’s Investor Services, 2003).
Globally, the issuance of ABSs decreased sharply in 2007, as US markets constitute the
majority of issued ABSs and European and Asian markets remained constant. In 2008,
US issuance was small and Euro Area issuance increased. In 2009, issuance increased
again and remained at a relatively constant level until the time of writing. Relatively
small amplitudes can be observed (see Figure 2.10).
Figure 2.10: Global Issuance Structured Finance (Association for Financial Markets
in Europe (AFME) Statistics, Securitization Data Report QI 2004 - QIV 2013; http:
//www.afme.eu/documents/statistics-and-reports.aspx; Date of Download 06.
June 2014).
The issuance of securitized products in Europe and the US evolved di↵erently. Out-
standing short-term ABCP amounts peaked at the end of 2007. The year after, the
level decreased sharply. From 2009 on the level decreased more gradually, to a low of
Dollar 233,4 billion. In Europe, short-term ABCP amounts that were outstanding de-
veloped unsteadily. Until 2007, the amount increased, followed by a decline until the
end of 2008. Over the course of the events of 2008 and 2009, the outstanding amount
decreased sharply and remained at this level until 2011. Another short peak was reached
in 2012 (Quarter I), after which it decreased almost to the level of 2009 and 2010 (see
Figure 2.11). The ABS amount outstanding in US markets peaked in 2007 (Dollar 2.909
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billion), and from 2008 until 2012 the amount decreased constantly, remaining stable
in 2013 (see Figure 2.12(a)). Compared to this, structured finance in the Euro Area
increased constantly until 2009 (Quarter IV). A sharp increase was noticed between
Quarter III and Quarter IV of 2008. Following the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009,
the outstanding amount decreased gradually. Compared to the amount outstanding in
the US, the decrease of securitized assets outstanding in the Euro Area occurred down-
stream. This can be seen in the increase in 2008 and peak in 2009 in the Euro Area,
while the US market had already decreased in 2008 (see Figure 2.11(a)). The develop-
ment of underlying assets varied strongly in the US market. In the year 1985 until 1990
automobile credit portfolios dominated. In the 1990s, the major underlying collaterals
were credit card loans, which totaled about 50%. In 2012 and 2013 CDOs (i.e., re-
securitization) and other underlyings dominated the US portfolio (see Figure 2.12(b)).
In the Euro Area, underlying portfolios evolved to be mainly made up of MBSs (50 to
70 %). This displays the funding of the mortgage market in the Euro Area. Compared
to the US market, CDOs account for a relatively small fraction in the Euro Area (see
Figure 2.11(b)).
In the course of the financial crisis, a number of sources of friction within the securi-
tization process became apparent (see Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). These mainly
include asymmetrical information between participants in the securitization process and
highly reliant ratings. In the following section, it is discussed how regulators address
these frictions, with both di↵erent regulatory proposals and actions. Reliance on ratings
of ABS transactions and linked valuation of collateral is dealt with by the FSB. Stable
ratings will help investors to make investment decisions. The main reason to reduce
rating reliance is to ensure the long-term stability of ABS value, so possible downgrad-
ing does not have an overall severe impact on market stability, as investors might be
encouraged to draw back their engagement due to declining values, which could possibly
lead to herd behavior. This analysis will concentrate mainly on risk retention regulation
to ease and reduce asymmetric information and to resolve defective CRT.
2.3.3.2 Stylized OBSE
Stylized OBSEs serve only a securitization purpose. They purchase parts of loan
portfolios or the whole pool of loans Lob + L
o
s in exchange for liquid resources (i.e.,
asset swap). The purchase of loans is refinanced through the issuance of structured
debt instruments (e.g., ABCPs, ABSs, etc.) to commercial banks, shadow banks, and
institutional investors. The process of purchasing loans and selling debt instruments
occurs unu actu. In the case of credit failure, OBSEs have access to credit lines granted
by commercial banks to meet their claims. The OBSE does not take any decision-making
role. Within the stylized model, the OBSE’s only purpose is to transform loan portfolios
in tradable securities, which, as the name implies, are special purpose vehicles.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.11: ABCP Amounts Outstanding Euro Area (a) and U.S. (b) ((a) Associa-
tion for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) Statistics - Securitization Data Report QI
2004 - QIV 2013; http://www.afme.eu/documents/statistics-and-reports.aspx;
Date of Download 06. June 2014; (b) Securities Industry and Financial Markets As-
sociation (SIFMA) Research - Statistics on Funding U.S. Commercial Paper monthly
June 2004 - March 2014; http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx; Date
of Download: 06. June 2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.12: Structured Finance Amounts Outstanding by Collateral Euro Area. (a)
Level of structured finance by collateral and (b) fraction of single collateral (Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Research - quarterly data from
1999 - 2014 [done in partnership with AFME]; http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx; Date of Download: 06. June 2014)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.13: U.S. Structured Finance Amounts Outstanding by Collateral. (a) Level
of structured finance by collateral and (b) fraction of single collateral (Securities In-
dustry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Research - yearly data from 1985
- 2014; http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx; Date of Download: 06.
June 2014)
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Their balance sheet reads:
Lob + L
o
s = Bo
2.3.4 Wholesale Funding - Risk Bearers
2.3.4.1 Assets under management - institutional investors and managed
funds
Conventional assets under management
In the context of this analysis, institutional investors are defined as entities that invest in
debt instruments issued by risk originators and who provide collateralized credit (in the
form of repos) to loan originators. Assets under management are the sum of all entities
that fund the shadow banking system and constitute the end of the shadow banking
intermediation chain. With the purchase of these instruments, the risk associated with
the underlying asset moves from the risk originator’s balance sheet to the risk bearer.
Depository institutions and broker–dealers may also act as risk bearers, purchasing debt
instruments and holding them in diversified portfolios on their balance sheets. This is
considered a point of interconnection between the shadow and traditional banking sys-
tems. Issued ABSs find their way onto the balance sheet of depository institutions (i.e.,
banks). Asset price movements of these securities influence the entities’ stability, and
are therefore one source of contagion. Alongside these institutions, di↵erent institutions
specialized in asset management can be defined as risk bearers, as they bear the risks
of the issued securitized products, which they hold in their portfolios. The following
section will describe types of assets under management, with a focus mainly on MMFs
as shadow bank depositors.
Global asset management includes conventional funds, such as pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies, as well as alternative funds, such as hedge funds, pri-
vate equity funds, and exchange-traded funds. Conventional funds under management
accounted for about Dollar 71.3 trillion by the end of 2008. Combined with alternative
funds, the global fund management industry totaled around Dollar 105 trillion by the
end of 2009 (Maslakovic, 2010a). Here, this analysis will focus on mutual funds and, in
particular, MMFs as conventional assets under management.
Mutual funds, as conventional asset-management funds, invest in diversified portfolios
of securities, such as stocks, bonds, money market instruments, or combinations of these
assets. Funds pool resources from investors, such as individuals, businesses, and other
financial institutions, through the sale of mutual fund shares. In this way, it is possible
for mutual funds to refinance their asset portfolios. Through collective investment, each
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investor benefits from professional investment management, diversification, liquidity,
and other benefits. Fund shares are redeemable, i.e., investors can sell their shares back
to the fund (or to a broker acting for the fund) at any time. Basic types of mutual funds
are stock (also called equity), bond, and money market funds (Investment Company
Institute, 2010, p. 217 and Investment Company Institute, 2007, p. 3)7.
The total assets of investment funds worldwide amount to Euro 19.925 billion (Quarter
I; Year 2013). A 27% decline in mutual fund assets in 2008 was followed by an increase of
21% in 2009. From 2009 on, the total assets of mutual funds rose constantly. About 50%
of current mutual fund assets belong to the US financial sector, and 35% of investment
fund assets are located in the Euro Area (see Figure 2.14).
Money Market Funds are collective investment schemes that mainly invest in short-
term, high credit quality, and liquid debt instruments, such as government securities,
CPs, ABSs, ABCPs, certificates of deposit (CDs), discount notes, and other short-
term securities, or that provide repos financing. Money Market Funds are classified
based upon the clients they serve and the securities they invest in (e.g., prime MMFs,
government MMFs, and treasury funds). Money Market Funds o↵er a bank-like service
of almost-instant liquidity and a safe haven comparable to a safe deposit box. Funds
may be withdrawn any time with little or no penalty. Compared with banks, MMFs
earn a slightly higher yield relative to yields earned by deposit accounts. However,
unlike depository institutions, MMFs are not guaranteed by deposit insurance or similar
government guarantees (Tucker, 2010, p. 2 and Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
2010, p. 23).
The portfolio mix of MMFs is a↵ected by guidelines set by security regulators and rat-
ing agencies. In the US, the SEC regulates the credit quality, issuer concentration, and
maturity of assets that MMFs can hold in their portfolios, in accordance with Rule 2a-78
adopted pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940. In Europe, MMFs comply
with the Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS)
Directive (see Directive 85/611/EEC; Directive 2007/16/EC; Directive 2010/43/EU;
Directive 2010/42/EU and Directive 2009/65/EC). The Committee of European Securi-
ties Regulators (CESR) published guidelines for harmonized MMFs. Funds that comply
with the UCITS Directive also adopt these guidelines. Dollar funds domiciled in Eu-
rope adopt the code of practice by the Institutional Money Market Funds Association
(IMMFA). These guidelines are very similar to the restrictions under Rule 2a-7 (Baba
et al. , 2009, p. 68; Fund and Asset Manager Rating Group, 2010, p. 2 and Gorton &
Metrick, 2010b, p. 6-7).
Similar to mutual funds, 60% of MMF assets are located in the United States and 30% in
the Euro Area financial system. The level of MMF global total assets was equal to Euro
7See also http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm
8Rule 2a-7 includes restrictions to the portfolio mix concerning credit quality, diversification, maturity,
and liquidity, as well as rules surrounding ongoing operation, reporting, and transparency.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.14: Global Mutual Fund Assets. (a) Global Mutual Fund assets and
(b) fraction of single region (European Federation of Investment Funds and Compa-
nies (EFAMA) Research and Statistics – quarterly data 2004 - 2013; http://www.
efama.org/statistics/SitePages/Statistics.aspx and Investment Company In-
stitute (ICI) Research and Statistics - Supplementary Tables; http://www.ici.org/
research/stats/worldwide/data; Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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3.337 billion in 2013. Money Market Funds total assets peaked in the first quarter of
2009 and decreased in the following quarter. This peak and decrease in 2009 was mainly
driven by the US market. Beginning in 2010, the level of total assets remained almost
stable (see Figure 2.15). Worldwide, MMFs account for about 19% of mutual fund
assets. United States mutual funds engage about 40% of their available funds in credit
market instruments. Other assets that MMFs hold are treasury securities, repos, bonds,
and both agency and municipal securities (see Figure 2.16). Shareholders of MMFs are
households, corporate businesses, state and local governments, other funds and insurance
companies, and funding corporations. Households hold the largest proportion of MMF
shares (45–50%). In recent years, households have continually reduced their proportion
of MMF shares (see Figure 2.17(b)). Funding corporations hold about 25% of total
US MMF shares. Figure 2.17(a) shows that during the 2008–2009 crisis, shareholders
reduced their engagement sharply. This could indicate a modern-type bank run, where
shareholders redeem shares on a large scale.
Pension funds and insurance companies are considered part of contractual saving
institutions, and provide insurance and retirement funding for the private sector. The
acquire funds at periodic intervals on a contractual basis. Unlike depository institutions
or mutual funds, they are able to predict with reasonable accuracy how much they have
to pay out in benefits. Therefore, liquidity of their assets is not that important. They
invest in di↵erent stocks, bonds, and types of loan packages, such as mortgage backed
securities and other debt-market instruments (Mishkin, 2006, p. 35 and Madura, 2010,
p. 641f. and 660f.).
Alternative assets under management
Mutual funds, which are more intended for a retail clientele, are restricted under Rule
2a-7. Unlike mutual funds, in particular MMFs, hedge funds are restricted to a small
number of sophisticated customers and therefore do not need to be registered (the so-
called ‘private adviser’ exemption). The term hedge fund has no precise legal or univer-
sally accepted definition. According to the SEC, hedge fund refers to ”an (unregulated)
entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets that does not register its
securities under the Securities Act and which is not registered as an investment company
under the Investment Company Act” (SEC definition of hedge funds 9). Hedge funds
invest in equity and use leverage and short selling to ‘hedge’ the portfolio’s exposure
to movements of the equity market. They adopt a variety of investment strategies and
styles (Sami, 2009 and United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003).
Beginning with the discussion on shadow banking and the breakdown of the Primary
Reserve Fund in 2009, hedge funds have faced calls for stricter regulation. The FSB
was established in April 2009, following the G20 London summit. This new body
9Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.15: Global MMF Assets. (a) Global MMF assets and (b) fraction of
single regions (European Federation of Investment Funds and Companies (EFAMA)
Research and Statistics – quarterly data 2004 - 2013; http://www.efama.org/
statistics/SitePages/Statistics.aspx and Investment Company Institute (ICI)
Research and Statistics - Supplementary Tables; http://www.ici.org/research/
stats/worldwide/data; Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.16: Assets MMF Portfolio Composition. (a) Total Assets of MMFs and
(b) portfolio composition (Flow of Funds – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System Data Download Program; http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/
Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1; Table L.120, Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.17: Money Market Fund Investors. (a) Money Market Fund investors and (b)
fraction of single investors (Flow of Funds – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System Data Download Program; http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/
Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1; Table L.206, Date of Download: 06. June 2014).
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was extended to all financial institutions important to global financial stability, and
included—for the first time—large hedge funds. US Congress passed a major regulatory
reform, the Dodd-Frank (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection) Act of 2010,
which made numerous changes to the registration, reporting, and record-keeping require-
ments of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 amended Through P.L. 112-90 Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010. Advisers to many private funds (i.e., hedge funds and private equity) in
the US must now register with the SEC (Title IV ”Regulation of Advisers to Hedge
Funds and Others”)10. In 2009, the European Commission also published a proposal for
a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU)
to establish European Union (EU)-level regulation. The Directive enables hedge fund
managers to conduct business in each member state through a single registration. The
AIFMD will a↵ect about a third of EU-domiciled hedge fund assets (Maslakovic, 2010b).
Two main types of hedge funds—macro and arbitrage funds—can be identified based on
the investment strategy they employ. Macro funds take positions in currencies based in
various financial and macroeconomic fundamentals, while arbitrage funds exploit pricing
discrepancies between di↵erent financial market instruments, primarily through short
selling.
In 2010, the global hedge fund assets under management amounted to Dollar 1.920
billion, which is below the record of Dollar 2.150 billion at the end of 2007. The hedge
fund industry has become more and more concentrated over the last few years. In 2003,
the top 100 hedge funds accounted for about 54% of the total industry. Currently, 70%
of total industry assets are under the management of one percent of all hedge funds.
With less liquid and more volatile markets, hedge funds shrank their balance sheets by
de-leveraging, simplifying their strategies, and moving to core competencies (Maslakovic,
2010b).
2.3.4.2 Repurchase agreements and securities lending
In the run up to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, an increase in the level of repo
transactions was noted (see Gorton & Metrick, 2010b). The demand for repo grew
with the rapid growth of institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds,
hedge funds, and other managed funds. These institutions do not come under deposit
insurance. Therefore, institutional investors do not have access to a safe, short-term,
demand deposit-like product that earns interest while retaining flexibility. Furthermore,
repurchase agreement transactions represent an important source of funding for loan
originators (Gorton & Metrick, 2010a, see also King, 2008, for institutional features of
the repo market, e.g., Du e, 1996; Garbade, 2006 and Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 2010).
10See http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/hedgefundadvisers.shtml
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Broker-Dealer
Shadow Bank
Institutional Investor
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Collateral worth $ 100
$ 95 Haircut 5%
Figure 2.18: Structure of a repurchase agreement transaction. Author’s drawing on
basis of Krishnamurthy et al. , 2011, p. 11
Sale and repurchase agreements (i.e., repos) present a type of short-term funding used by
a variety of market participants, such as institutional investors and non-financial firms
with large holdings, to store cash safely, earn some interest, and have ready access. The
market of sales and repurchase agreements can be divided um into repo transactions
and securities lending. Whereas the term securities lending describes the lending of
actual securities by investors against the collateral cash. The repo transaction describes
the lending of cash by capital seeking parties against a collateral in the narrow sense,
a security. The securities lending activity can also be named a reverse repo. For the
following analysis and further descriptions both activities will be summarized by the
term repo transaction. These activities by counterparties seeking to invest money or to
borrow securities are called security driven repo transactions (i.e., securities lending).
Depository institutions and broker–dealers use repo transactions to finance inventories,
create leverage, cover short positions, or hedge and speculate in interest rate movements.
Activities of counterparties that seek to borrow cash are cash driven repo transactions
(i.e., the pure repo transaction). A repo transaction involves the simultaneous sale of
a security (i.e., collateral) and the agreement to repurchase the security at a later date
at an agreed-upon higher price. Furthermore, institutional investors, such as di↵erent
mutual funds, insurance companies, or corporate treasures use these transactions either
to invest surplus cash and earn returns, or to raise cash for investments (Ho¨rdahl &
King, 2008, p. 38, see Figure 2.18 for a model of the repurchase agreement structure).
Non-bank financial intermediaries largely use repurchase agreements for funding (e.g.,
broker–dealers) or investment purposes (e.g., MMF). The di↵erence between the pur-
chase price or value of the collateral (Yt) and sale price of the collateral at a later date
(Y(t+n)) is the interest rate, also known as the repo rate (
Y(t+n) Yt
Yt
). A repo transaction
can also be viewed as a short-term collateralized loan, where the lender of the security
posts an asset as collateral with a cash provider (Gorton & Metrick, 2010a, p. 508 and
Ho¨rdahl & King, 2008, p. 37).
Collateral can be divided into traditional forms of collateral, such as treasuries and
agency securities, and non-traditional forms of collateral, such as ABSs, MBSs, corpo-
rate debt, and equity. Depending on the type of collateral, the depositor may demand
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a margin or haircut. Typically, the borrower has to post collateral in excess of the
notational amount of the loan (i.e., overcollateralization). This haircut is defined as
a risk control measure applied to the underlying asset. The value of the collateral is
calculated as marketable value reduced by a certain percentage. Haircuts are defined
as di↵erence between the value of the cash and the value of the collateral and reflect
the expectations of the future development of the underlying collateral and are used to
protect the depositor from potential losses due to declines in the market value (Adrian
et al. , 2013 and European Central Bank, 2011b, p. 143). Repo haircuts vary with
the risk of the underlying collateral. The haircut is defined as (1   VF ), with value of
the collateral V and notational amount of the loan F . Prior to the 2008–2009 crisis,
haircuts on non-traditional collaterals, especially ABSs, were extremely low (2%). Over
the course of the crisis, haircuts rose to more than 50% (see also; Gorton & Metrick,
2009; Stein, 2010, p. 46 and Krishnamurthy et al. , 2011, p. 8 f.).
Data available on repurchase agreement transactions is limited due to their complexity
and a lack of transparency. Also, the majority of repo agreements are over-the-counter
transactions (OTCs), and are therefore not recorded. Proposed regulation of repo agree-
ments addresses the problems associated with this complexity and proposes standard-
ization and documentation to avoid raising haircuts and instability. For the purpose
of the analysis in the present paper, it is important to highlight major lenders in repo
transactions. Figure 2.19 confirms the assumption that MMFs and other funds are ma-
jor providers of repo agreements (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
2011, Table L.207).
Figure 2.19: Lenders in Repo Transactions (U.S.) (Flow of Funds – Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Data Download Program; http://www.
federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1; Table L.207, Date of
Download: 06. June 2014).
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2.3.4.3 Stylized Funds
Managed funds or institutional investors play an important role in the refinancing
of banks and shadow banks (in a narrow sense); they are therefore referred to as shadow
bank depositors. In this framework it is assumed that shadow bank depositors have
the following assets: debt instruments issued by OBSEs Bio or by firms Bf , all surplus
and capital of entities within the system C = Cf + Cb + Cs, and commercial papers
issued by shadow banks CP . Shadow bank depositors also o↵er repurchase agreements
to banks and shadow banks. Their asset side is financed through the issuance of fund
shares to the private sector Bi. It is assumed that the private sector will not actively
manage a portfolio of financial assets, but will instead transfer this task to funds, thereby
gaining claims against the funds out of fund shares. Stylized funds adjust their portfolios
according to portfolio theory, with an eye to risk and return. These assumptions are
further restricted through guidelines and existing rules on portfolio composition (see US
regulation of MMFs and European guidelines). These balance sheets read as follows:
Bio +Bf + CP + repoi + C = Bi
C = Cf + Cb + Cs
2.3.5 Stylized private sector and central bank
To generate a closed system of intermediation, the private sector (as both lender and
depositor) will be analyzed and displayed in the following section. Households, firms, and
the central bank are not usually directly engaged in the shadow banking intermediation
chain, but belong to a global closed system of the shadow banking intermediation chain.
Households possess a given endowment of financial funds, (net financial wealth; NFW)
which is the endogenous outcome of an intertemporal consumption-saving decision as
it represents the accumulated stock of savings. Households can invest these funds in
physical assets like housing H, shares of managed funds Bhi , or deposits D
h. Typically,
housing is financed by loans issued by commercial banks and shadow banks (in a narrow
sense) Lh. Housing will serve as collateral for loans by banks and shadow banks in a
narrow sense.
A number of studies have addressed the influence of illiquid assets on portfolio manage-
ment and future liquidity needs. Key sources are Grossman & Laroque (1990), Flavin &
Yamashita (1998), and Flavin & Nakagawa (2008). According to Grossman & Laroque
(1990), the household’s utility function depends on the consumption of goods and hous-
ing, as well as on the individual time preference of the household. Households strive
to maximize their utility, investing income in risky assets, risk-free assets, and hous-
ing. Since the development of the housing value a↵ects the allocation of individual
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portfolios, housing plays a major role in the stylized model outlined in the present pa-
per. Housing is mainly funded through credit lending, and an increased demand for
credit to fund individual housing needs explains growing credit markets. Deposits and
shares of institutional investors are held for transaction purposes as risk-free parts of
individual portfolios. Through investment in fund shares, households delegate portfolio
management and investment decisions to the fund, which invests the capital according
to portfolio management theory.
The household balance sheet reads:
Dh +H +Bhi = NFW + L
h
Firms possess a stock of physical capital PC, depositsDf , and shares issued by managed
funds Bfi . Firm deposits are used for transaction purposes only, to fund production and
labor costs. These assets are financed by refinancing debt instruments Bf , loans issued
by commercial banks and shadow banks Lf , and surplus and capital Cf . Funding
through banks or shadow banking credit can be seen as substitutes from the firms point
of view. The balance sheet reads as follows:
PC +Bfi +D
f = Lf +Bf + Cf
The stylized Central bank holds loans receivable to commercial banks Kc and issue
repurchase agreements repoc for commercial banks only. Their balance sheet discloses
minimum reserves rD and Excess Reserves E from commercial banks, reading:
Kc + repoc = rD + E
2.3.6 Stylized Intermediation Chain
Summarizing all segments of the shadow banking intermediation chain stylized interme-
diation chain delivers comprehensive picture of entities and activities within the shadow
banking system. The various balance sheets of entities involved in the intermediation
process can be resumed as follows:
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Banks Lb   Lob + Ls +Bbo +Bbi +Ks + E = (1  r)D + repob +Kd + Cb
Shadow Banks Ls   Los +Bsi +Bso +Ds = repos + CP + Cs + Ls
OBSE Lob + L
o
s = Bo
Institutional Investor Bio +Bf + CP + repoi + C = Bi
C = Cf + Cb + Cs
Household Dh +H +Bhi = NFW + L
h
Firm PC +Bfi +D
f = Lf +Bf + Cf
Central Bank Kc + repoc = rD + E
While reducing these equations the following common relationships apply. The total of
loans issued by banks and shadow banks in the narrow sense amount to the total of loans
used by the private sector. Therefore, the amount of loans issued equals the amount of
loans received.
Lb + Ls = L
h
b + L
f
b + L
h
s + L
f
s = L
h + Lf
Credit issued by the central bank, equal to the delta of interbank loans.
Kc = K
d  Ks
shares issued by institutional investors (Bi) are purchased by a variety of market par-
ticipants including banks and shadow banks (Bbi , B
s
i ) for portfolios structuring purposes
and households as well as firms as investments similar to bank deposits (Bhi , B
f
i ).
Bi = B
h
i +B
f
i +B
s
i +B
b
i
Securities (i.e., ABS, ABCP) transformed and issued by OBSEs (Bo) are transferred
banks and shadow banks (signaling and portfolio structuring). The majority of these
issued Bo are purchased by institutional investors (Bio).
deposit of all market participants aggregated to the total level of deposits D:
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D = Dh +Df +Ds
Repo transactions within the stylized shadow banking sector include institutional in-
vestors, central banks as lending part usey, and banks and shadow banks as borrowing
part. The amount of repo lending equals the total amount of repo borrowing.
repoi + repoc = repo
s + repob
Summing up the aggregation of all balance sheet results in equation:
PC +H = NFW
Prospectively, the resulting balance sheet equations of the main institutions can be
used to outline the interconnections between single participants. The information about
relationships between di↵erent entities and balance sheet positions of this stylized inter-
mediation chain will be used for the scenario analysis in Chapter 3.
Figure 2.20: Stylized Intermediation Chain (Author’s drawing).
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2.4 Drivers of the growth in Shadow Banking
2.4.1 Supply Side
The latest growth in the overall shadow banking system, up to Dollar 71 trillion, as well
as the growth in certain parts of the system (such as securitization or repo markets)
can be attributed to di↵erent, closely related drivers. Gorton & Metrick (2012) use two
approaches to explain the growth of di↵erent markets and entities that are linked to the
shadow banking system, and that are responsible for the growth of the overall system.
One approach is to look at the system from the supply side, meaning that originating
institutions and OBSEs supply a massive amount of securitized assets to the market. Due
to regulatory constraints, traditional banks face competition from institutional investors,
finance companies, and broker–dealers. These non-bank financial intermediaries are
able to o↵er higher interest rates, thanks to innovative products and weak regulatory
constraints. Cetorelli et al. (2013) state that traditional banks have evolved to become
conglomerate specialists, usually in form of bank holding companies, in order to compete
with other entities. Bank holding companies also constitute an e cient solution for
the new intermediation model of shadow banking. Investment in MMFs, a significant
financial product innovation by the time of introduction, was an alternative to interest
rate ceilings on deposits. This competition lowered banks’ earnings. Concerning capital
regulation, banks were not able to compete with finance companies and broker–dealers,
which have not been subject to tight capital regulation in the way that commercial banks
have. In order to expand their credit issuance, depository institutions have to expand
their existing reserves. The demand for yield uplift and regulatory arbitrage stimulated
traditional banks to change if they wanted to maintain their role as an industry and
stay competitive (Gorton & Metrick, 2012, p. 20 f). Traditional banks therefore shifted
from traditional loan issuance and funding (i.e., originate-to-hold) to an originate-to-
distribute model. Instead of holding loans on their balance sheets, originators could
easily sell and transfer these loans o↵ balance sheet. Loans were transferred to specially
created SPVs or OBSEs. Issued loans were pooled, underwritten, and sold as ABS. The
originate-and-distribute model allowed for the risk associated with loans to be sliced,
diced, and dispersed (i.e., CRT). Traditional banks were able to free up capital, which
they used to issue further loans to the private sector. This helped traditional banks
to manage risk and provided regulatory benefits. The issuance of ABSs has grown
considerably since the late 1980s, both in the US market and across Europe. Issuance
reached its peak in 2007 with almost Dollar 3.000 billion in outstanding US ABSs, and
almost 1.200 billion dollars in ABCP. When the 2008–2009 crisis hit, outstanding ABSs
decreased to about 1.500 billion dollars.
Cerrato (2010) provides empirical evidence as to why banks securitize. Securitization
is the process whereby banks and other financial institutions issue marketable securi-
ties backed by an underlying asset pool. Liquidity is a principal motive for banks to
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securitize, as a loan portfolio, on the asset side, can be considered both long-term and
illiquid. There does exist evidence that liquidity and improved performance are the
most decisive factors for securitization, and there is also some evidence that the transfer
of credit risk and regulatory arbitrage are major motivators. This is consistent with
Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) and DeMarzo & Du e (1999). A nito & Tagliaferri
(2010) show that capital requirements play a role, and Basel regulation created regula-
tory incentives to move o↵ balance sheet. Despite the fact that regulatory arbitrage and
CRT can be seen as drivers of securitization, liquidity will be viewed as the main driver
in the present paper. The BCBS (2011) considers fife reasons for securitization which
are consistent with the beforehand mentioned drivers in empirical literature, including
funding diversification, risk transfer, revenue generation, and capital and accounting
benefits. Capital and accounting benefits can be considered as regulatory arbitrage.
2.4.2 Demand Side
The growth of the shadow banking system was also driven by the demand side, as entities
demand marketable securities as attractive collateral for money market transactions,
such as repurchase agreements (Gorton & Metrick, 2012, p. 20 - 21). Two forces
drive the growth from the demand side: the demand for investment securities for funds’
portfolios; and the growth of repo transactions, following the demand for collateral by
banks and other entities to collateralize these transactions.
Over the last few decades, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of assets
under management, and an enormous growth of the repo market. The total market of
assets under management amounted to about Dollar 105 trillion in 2009. Managed funds
and other institutional investors are important risk takers, through their investment in
securities and other market debt instruments like ABSs and ABCP (Gorton & Metrick,
2010b).
The institutional investors (i.e., investment funds and di↵erent investment schemes) are
also interested in safe alternatives to bank deposits, in order to store large amounts of
liquid resources. Although deposit insurance generally works well, it is limited to rela-
tively small sums. Institutional investors, such as managed funds, cash-rich non-financial
companies, and states therefore lack access to safe, short-term, and interest-earning in-
vestments, which led to the use and growth of the repurchase agreement market. A
repurchase agreement or shortly repo is defined as the sale of a security combined with
the simultaneous agreement to repurchase the same collateral at a specific contracted
date and price. Institutional investors appear as lenders in order to store their liquid
resources in a way that was safe and backed by collateral. The increased use of re-
purchase agreement transactions led, in turn, to an increasing demand for high quality
collateral. This growth in demand for collateral can be posited as a driver of securiti-
zation. However, there is no direct evidence that the growth in collateral demand led
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to a growing ABS supply (however, for indirect evidence, see BIS, 2001). High-quality
structured products were used as collateral to raise short-term liquidity in repurchase
agreements transactions. Both main forces (demand and supply side) were assisted by
governmental decisions and regulatory changes that allowed excessive securitization and
repurchase agreement transactions and innovative product design. Specialization of fi-
nancial intermediaries within the shadow banking system led to further growth of the
system, benefits from economies of scale, and further comparative advantages.
2.5 Global Monitoring of the Shadow Banking System
2.5.1 An e cient monitoring process
A broad monitoring process is important to obtain a comprehensive picture of the market
and its future development. It is essential to analyze what else the system consists of and
what weak points might exist, to determine what needs regulation and harmonization.
This monitoring should outline the sub-segments of the shadow banking system to target
single details more precisely. To receive a clear picture of size and development and
to estimate possible risks of di↵erent shadow banking activities and entities, the FSB
applies a monitoring approach. A combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis
aims to o↵er a widespread picture of the size and growth of this roughly di↵erentiated
sector, as well as detailed data and characteristics about single entities or activities
(Financial Stability Board, 2011a). Quantitative information about the shadow banking
sector has already been given by Bouveret (2011), Kocjan et al. (2012), Bakk-Simon
et al. (2012) and the descriptive analysis above. However, these studies are not based
on the same data, so their estimates of the shadow banking sector may di↵er (see Kocjan
et al. , 2012, p. 9), resulting in no harmonized and su ciently tested way to monitor
shadow bank activities and entities. The definition of types of financial intermediaries
diverge across jurisdictions; this definition, in turn, influences the size and appropriate
monitoring process for shadow banks (see Kocjan et al. , 2012). Given this inconsistency,
it is not possible to map a consistent global picture, and wide-ranging estimates have
been proposed. Clearly, the authors viewing the mapping and monitoring process should
aim to generate comparable and harmonized data, and a harmonized definition will
facilitate this. To date, data on the flow of funds and other monetary statistics have
been used for shadow banking size estimates. However, since this data was issued for
a di↵erent purpose, estimates calculated on this data have limited validity. Hence,
authorities, central banks, and the industry need to generate more specific and granular
data.
To ensure more e cient monitoring, the FSB has introduced high-level monitoring prin-
ciples (see Financial Stability Board, 2011b). These principles are as follows: (1) The
scope of authorities should be such that they can obtain a comprehensive picture of the
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shadow banking system and the risks that have an impact on the financial system; (2)
the monitoring process should be reported on a regular and frequent basis, to ensure the
identification and assessment of risks; (3) relevant authorities should collect relevant
data and information and define pursuant parameters for reporting shadow banking
data; (4) the monitoring task should be flexible and able to capture innovations, as
well as the changing nature of activities and entities; (5) concerning regulatory arbi-
trage, monitoring authorities should keep in mind that changes of regulation could be
an incentive to expand shadow banking activities; (6) in applying monitoring, regulatory
authorities should keep the features, characteristics, and approaches to definition of dif-
ferent jurisdictions in mind, to make up for di↵erences: the meanings and structures
of local financial markets, and their international interconnections, should be taken into
consideration; (7) authorities should exchange information within and across specific
jurisdictional borders on a regular basis, which could help to identify certain spill-over
e↵ects and contagion risks.
The FSB monitoring approach (Financial Stability Board, 2011b) is split up into two
steps, in which di↵erent types of information and data are gathered and diverse analytical
methods are used. While looking at the shadow banking system from amacro-mapping
prospective (Step 1), authorities focus on quantitative and system-wide data. This first
step starts with gathering data, mainly on the flow of funds, as well as supplementary
data, such as monetary statistics, regulatory and supervisory reports, and observations
of banks and non-bank subsidiaries. In the present paper, this data will provide a
useful overview on shadow banks and their interconnection with the traditional banking
system.
It is di cult to simply aggregate flow of funds data across di↵erent jurisdictions, as there
exist varying definitions and compositions of the term financial intermediary: some data
include non-bank financial intermediaries, such as MMFs or central banks, and some do
not. Flow of funds data might lack granularity regarding the financial sector. These
aspects, varying composition of flow of funds, di↵erent definitions as well as insu cient
granularity, contribute to more complexity in the global picture of the overall system.
To obtain more consistent and assimilable data, the FSB recommends improving the
granularity of data. Authorities also need to break down information on di↵erent non-
bank financial intermediaries, such as pension funds, insurances, and MMFs, and should
gather more information on the interlinkages between banks and NBFIs (i.e., using
regulatory proposals of direct banking regulation to regulate shadow banks indirectly).
The second step of the FSB monitoring approach, the micro-mapping prospective,
aims to narrow down the focus to specific systemic risk factors and regulatory arbitrage
concerns. These factors should be monitored on a regular basis. The monitoring pro-
cess should also be supplemented by taking specific factors of other jurisdictions into
account. According to the FSB (2011b), the following key systemic risk factors should
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be assessed: 1) the extent to which financial intermediaries use maturity transfor-
mation (to determine this, authorities need to obtain the weighted-average maturity
and classify the remaining maturities); (2) the degree of liquidity transformation (al-
though this is di cult to define); (3) regarding CRT, o↵ balance sheet exposures and the
appropriateness of credit-risk mitigation techniques, such as guarantees, commitments,
credit derivates, liquidity puts, and other implicit liquidity support; and (4) concerning
leverage, the degree of leverage, especially leverage associated with o↵ balance sheet
activities.
Non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g., MMFs, broker–dealers, and other collective in-
vestment schemes) are not subject to the same regulatory and supervisory constraints
as traditional banks. Therefore, banks have an incentive to circumvent regulation in
order to stay competitive and balance out disadvantages. Monitoring should aim to de-
tect regulatory arbitrage, meaning that it must be su ciently flexible, forward-looking,
and adaptable to identify new activities, innovations, and mutations within the financial
system. Authorities should therefore gather disciplinary expertise from di↵erent areas,
such as legal, economic, accounting, and policy research. Authorities need to combine
quantitative data (performance indicators) and qualitative information (regular supervi-
sory dialog). Cooperation and information exchange between supervisory agencies and
regulatory authorities is necessary, on both a national and an international basis.
When conducting a detailed assessment, authorities need to pay particular attention
to factors that may potentially have negative impacts on the financial system. The
monitoring framework should provide information about the degree of interconnection,
as there are strong interconnections between traditional banks and NBFIs, through asset
holdings, derivate positions, and funding interdependencies. Authorities should also pay
attention to the size of the shadow banking sector and collect data regarding total assets
and liabilities on a regular basis. Earning performance indicators (e.g., Return on Equity;
ROE, Return on Assets; ROA) should also be monitored to assess the sustainability of
the loss-absorption capacity of shadow banking entities and activities.
2.5.2 Monitoring report results
Financial Stability Board (2012a) and Financial Stability Board (2013b) depict the re-
sults of the FSB monitoring process. To conduct a detailed macro mapping, data and
information, including flow of funds data from the end of 2011 or early 2012, analy-
sis of national shadow banking developments, and additional information taken from
questionnaires from, for example, finance companies, from 25 jurisdictions and the Euro
Area was collected (Financial Stability Board, 2012a). By the end of 2011, the shadow
banking system was estimated to have a size of about Dollar 67 trillion (proxied by the
assets of Other Financial Institutions; OFI). The 2013 report recorded further growth,
to Dollar 71.2 trillion, which is equivalent to around 27% of the total financial assets
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of the areas surveyed, as well to 117% of GDP for the areas surveyed (aggregated for
20 jurisdictions and the Euro Area 11). There was a divergence in the definition of
NBFIs among jurisdictions, depending on these entities’ overall importance, their size
relative to GDP, and growth trends (Financial Stability Board, 2012a). Policy recom-
mendations and future regulation will influence individual jurisdictions in di↵erent ways.
Compared to the 2012 report, monitoring in 2013 continued macro mapping, enhanced
data granularity, and reduced undefined areas.
The 2012 monitoring report points out that high growth rates were recorded in all
jurisdictions before the 2008–2009 crisis. Post-crisis, growth decelerated in almost all
jurisdictions. In some areas, growth of the NBFI sector declined (e.g., France, Canada,
Italy, the US). An intense growth could be observed in emerging economies such as India
and Indonesia. However, the shadow banking system remains small relative to overall
national financial system of the emerging economies. In some advanced economies robust
growth rates are still observable (e.g., the UK and Switzerland). With Dollar 23 trillion,
the US has the largest shadow banking sector, followed by the Euro Area (Dollar 22
trillion) and the UK (Dollar 9 trillion). The US holds 35% of the total shadow banking
system funds. A decline in US shadow banking assets was compensated for by increased
asset volume in the Euro Area, the UK, and other jurisdictions, such as Brazil, China,
and Hong Kong (Financial Stability Board, 2012a, p.14). Global development diverges
strongly, from  11% in Spain to +42% in China (see Financial Stability Board, 2013b,
p. 12, Exhibit 3-2). On average, emerging markets experience growth rate at about
20%.
The NBFI sector can be divided into sub-segments. With Dollar 21 trillion (equaling
35%) ‘other investment funds’ constitute the largest sub-sector. This subsector comprises
entities other than MMFs, such as equity funds, bond funds, mixed funds, ETFs, and, in
some jurisdictions, hedge funds12. Securitization vehicles (SPVs) are a Dollar 5 trillion
sub-sector, representing 8% of the shadow banking sector. Finance companies represent
about 8% of the total NBFIs, and have the highest concentration in the US (35%) and
in the UK (15%). Broker–dealers experienced a strong growth, from 5% to 12% (about
Dollar 7 trillion). For example, the broker–dealer sub-sector is valued at 52% in the US.
Money Market Funds account for about 6% of the whole OFI system, although their
individual size di↵ers in each jurisdiction. Money Market Funds are mainly located
in the US and the Euro Area, with these two areas together representing 90% of the
global MMF industry. Jurisdiction-specific entities are the last sub-sector of the shadow
banking system, with examples including US funding corporations (4–5%), Dutch Special
Financial Institutions (4–5%), and hedge funds (0.4%).
11These jurisdictions comprised Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey,
the UK and the US, as well as the Euro Area
12In some jurisdictions, hedge fund data can not be separated
Chapter 2. Definition and Development of the Shadow Banking System 61
The 2012 monitoring report also makes a statement regarding the interconnection be-
tween banks and NBFIs. To measure potential risk stemming from interconnections
between banks and shadow banks, direct credit exposures and funding dependency are
used. Intermediaries pose credit and funding risks to each other via credit contracts
(dependent on the size and maturity structure of assets and liabilities). This analysis
can be briefly summarized as follows: there is a high degree of interconnectivity between
banks and shadow-banking entities, as was already intuitively assumed. In some juris-
dictions, where there is a large dependency of NBFIs on bank funding, there might also
exist a dependency of banks on NBFI funding, and vice versa. These interdependencies
are points by which stress could be transmitted into both sectors. Funding obtained by
banks increased in some jurisdictions in the period of 2002–2011 (e.g., Australia, the
Netherlands). For further evidence on the matter of interconnection and the develop-
ment of interconnection, it is useful to analyze the di↵erent development of di↵erent
countries relatively to each other to understand why this di↵erent development occurred
and to identify the risks that this might pose (Financial Stability Board, 2012a, p. 22↵).
As mentioned in the above paragraph, banks and NBFI are highly interconnected, which
can lead to risks. The monitoring report of 2012 introduced a number of measures that
can to capture the risks that travel through interconnection channels. Notable mea-
sures include (1) sector-to-sector exposure information, which measures direct exposure
between banks and non-banks using flow of funds data. This measure is useful for inter-
connection information between two sectors, but such data is only widely available for
Japan and the Euro Area, and it might be di cult to find data for detailed analysis in
other jurisdictions; (2) the analysis of equity investment by financial institutions in other
entities of the financial sector, which may also bolster the understanding of intercon-
nection and associated risks; and (3) the gathering of data on funding instruments such
as repos, as financial institutions are a↵ected by changes in those markets (Financial
Stability Board, 2012a, Annex 4). These data are also useful for additional insight on
interconnection.
The monitoring report 2012a also reveals shortcomings in data availability and infor-
mation gathering. In some jurisdictions, even those with large NBSF sectors, there is
no data that breaks down the assets and liabilities of banks and NBFIs. Furthermore,
there are persistent domestic consolidation issues for data from di↵erent jurisdictions.
The di↵erences in flow of funds data and figures by authorities may a↵ect how prob-
lems of NBFIs that operate across borders are handled. This lack of and di↵erence in
information hinders the accountability of activities, as they cannot be clearly assigned
to specific domestic monetary statistics or flow of funds data.
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2.6 Summary
Chapter 2 defined and outlined the shadow banking system, so as to identify potential
weak points and risks that have persisted beyond post-financial crisis reforms. In order
to determine the entities and activities that are related to the shadow banking system,
a proper definition needs to be derived, since the size and components of the shadow
banking system di↵er as a function of the definition used (see Kocjan et al. , 2012).
The shadow banking system is therefore described as a system of di↵erent entities and
activities that together conduct the financial intermediation process as a single bank
would do. Following this definition, the three major parts of the shadow banking inter-
mediation process—loan origination, loan warehousing and securitization, and wholesale
funding—are all carried out by di↵erent shadow bank entities.
The evaluation of the quantitative development of shadow bank entities and activities
enables readers to determine the role of single entities within the shadow banking system.
This stylized picture of the shadow banking sector is used to understand the scenario
proposed in Chapter 3 and to evaluate the regulatory proposals described in Chapter 4.
Loan Originators (e.g., depository institutions, credit institutions, and finance compa-
nies and others) provide loans to the real sector. It is assumed that these entities sell
major parts of their loan portfolios to OBSEs in order to free liquidity and regulatory
capital, transfer risks (i.e., CRT), and circumvent capital regulations (i.e., regulatory
arbitrage). The loan origination part of the shadow banking intermediation chain re-
mained relatively stable during the crisis of 2008 and 2009, although it was observed
that assets shifted towards more liquid portfolios. Originated loans, however, are still
the major asset on banks’ balance sheets.
O↵ Balance Sheet Entities, as loan warehousing and securitization vehicles, buy loans
issued by the group of loan originators. These entities then securitize illiquid loans and
other bought underlying assets into tradable ABSs, which serve as investment opportuni-
ties for institutional investors and as collateral in repo transactions. In the run-up to the
2008–2009 crisis, the securitization process became opaque and complex. This decrease
in transparency allowed for asymmetric information among market participants, which
led to defective CRT. This process influenced the valuation of assets, and consequently
the stability of the shadow banking system.
The wholesale funding part of the shadow banking intermediation chain is tasked with
the general funding of all activities conducted. The institutional investor sector experi-
enced tremendous growth during the two decades before the crisis. This growth led to
rising demand for collateral in repo transactions (see Section 2.4). To fund loan orig-
ination, loan sale, and securitization, funds acquired funding from the general public
(i.e., the private sector). The growth of institutional investors shows the importance of
a functioning wholesale funding system, as a failure of institutional investors threatens
funding and, hence, the stability of the shadow banking system.
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During the 2008–2009 crisis, most entities and activities involved in the shadow banking
intermediation process experienced declines. In recent years, the shadow banking system
has recovered, and constant growth has been recorded. According to the quantitative
data available, the shadow banking system is still experiencing growth, with an estimated
value of Dollar 71 trillion in 2013.
The initial growth of the shadow banking system over the past three decades has been
attributed to various aspects on both the demand and supply sides. On the one hand,
the growth of the shadow banking system was mainly driven by the demand for collateral
for use in repo transactions and securities lending. The intense growth of assets under
management held by institutional investors led to the need to store liquid resources safely
(i.e., backed by collateral) and on a short-term basis. On the other hand, the increased
need for liquidity and the demand to transfer credit risks and circumvent regulation led
to the growth of the securitization market and a growing supply of securitized assets.
The growing shadow banking system and, hence, the importance of the overall financial
system, entail risks that will be described in the following Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
Risks within the Banking and
Shadow Banking System
3.1 Risks within the financial system
3.1.1 Legitimation of financial regulation to address risks
The following scenario analysis of the shadow banking intermediation chain will discuss
the e↵ects and interconnections between the traditional and the shadow banking sys-
tems, as well as risks stemming from the activities of financial institutions and di↵erent
transactions. There are diverse risks within the financial system that could endanger
overall financial stability. Many of these risks and the resulting problems are addressed
by regulatory regimes such as the Basel Accords, the Dodd-Frank Act, and Capital
Requirements Directives (CRDs) II–IV. Such regulatory presence and intervention is le-
gitimated through appeals to consumer protection, latent instability, costs arising from
banking instability, and contagion e↵ects (Utzerath, 2010). The regulation of financial
markets increases the resilience of financial institutions and overall market robustness.
Regulation aims to raise stability and strengthen market-based finance, thereby sustain-
ing global growth (Financial Stability Board, 2013a).
The Basel Accords were developed to strengthen regulation supervision and risk man-
agement, allowing the financial system to sustain its ability to absorb shocks and remain
stable. To date, regulators have focused their attention on consumer protection rights
and regulation of individual financial entity. The need for consumer protection and the
costs created by financial instability justify such financial regulation. Private investors
are, compared to banks and financial intermediaries, uninformed. Such information
asymmetries13 create incentives to act as if there are no risks, which is ultimately to the
disadvantage of private investors. In the case of a critical event (i.e., financial crisis),
13Inherent protection of consumers is addressed by Waschbusch (2000).
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adjustments in banking assets or declines in asset return can exceed banking capital,
meaning that redemption requests by depositors might not be satisfied. Appropriate
regulation and supervision could reduce misaligned incentives that are to the disadvan-
tage of depositors. In general, regulators act as representatives of investors’ interests,
legitimating regulatory intervention (see also Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994).
To date, regulators have not focused on stability aspects, regulation of the whole system,
or the interactions between two or more entities. The inherent instability of banks and
the interconnections of financial institutions are additional reasons for regulating the
financial system. The permanent redemption of liquid deposits and illiquid portfolio
structures creates a maturity and/or liquidity mismatch. This mismatch creates no
risks if only some part of the deposits is redeemed upon request. However, sudden and
large redemptions of deposits, and the resulting imbalances, could lead to an institutional
breakdown, and hence to a bank run. Interconnection and loss of confidence can create
systemic breakdowns from problems with a single bank; explicit and implicit protection
is meant to shield the financial system and overall stability from such dire e↵ects of
the breakdown of any one financial entity. This study will concentrate on the risks
and problems that influence the functioning of the financial system, inducing contagion
e↵ects and consequently leading to financial instability. These risks and problems include
procyclicality, contagion risks, problems arising through interconnection, and possible
bank runs, as well as further risks stemming from CRT or international regulatory
di↵erences.
3.1.2 Procyclicality
Part of the regulatory e↵ort addresses the procyclical impact of capital requirements,
with a goal of protecting the economy as a whole from downturns and from a decrease
in the credit supply. Negative cyclical fluctuation could result from increased capital
requirements due to rising nonpayment, or as a consequence of degraded valuations of
balance sheet positions due to mark-to-market valuation (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011,
p. 40). Procyclicality is defined as the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate
around a trend with increasing amplitude. According to Utzerath (2010), a variable can
be considered procyclical if its growth within a boom period is less than its decline in
corresponding downturn periods. Such a downturn might lead, in the banking sector,
to a reduced capital base, or possibly to reduced loan origination due to loan defaults
and higher capital requirements. Banks reduce their lending activities during cyclical
downturns, which is attributed to the direct relationship between banking activities
and the economic cycle. The solvency of creditors depends on economic development,
and more optimistic conditions during boom periods lead to excessive risk capital and
loan origination (Rajan, 2009, p. 400). This procyclical tendency is enhanced in the
banking sector, and a downturn with preceded credit lending could severely destabilize
the banking system. As the capital base of banks is driven by credit default, stresses
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and strains are higher in recession periods. Credit default materializes countercyclical.
Procyclicality can have negative feedback in the real economy, and may lead to a credit
crunch or to strengthened dynamics, with deep overall economic recession during periods
of downturn.
Financial regulation addresses procyclicality with a variety of instruments, with the
goal of strengthening the bank’s capital base. The first instrument is bu↵ers, which are
designed to absorb losses in the event of a crisis, keeping banks from sinking below the
minimum quota of regulatory capital. This regulatory measure also enables banks to
supply further credit to the real economy (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011).
3.1.3 Interconnection of financial entities - Risk of Contagion
Linkages between two or more market participants take many forms. While looking at
traditional and shadow banks direct and indirect linkages become apparent. Institutions
are for instance contractual connected through contractual obligations (direct intercon-
nection). Besides these contractual interconnections, financial institutions can also be
connected through common exposures as investment in the same or similar assets (in-
direct interconnections). Common exposures appear as more complex, as they occur in
many di↵erent forms and concentrations (see Georg & Minoiu, 2014).
Interconnections between banks and shadow banks are both direct and indirect (see
Schoenmaker, 1996). Direct linkages exist when shadow banks are in relationship with
traditional banks, and are part of the intermediation process. In the construction of
a bank holding company, direct interconnection is created by the bank’s ownership of
a shadow banking entity. Banks are directly connected with shadow banks when they
provide support as sponsors to OBSEs or other shadow banking entities (i.e., explicit and
implicit commitment). Many MMFs are supported by sponsor banks (McCabe, 2010 and
Brady et al. , 2012). These commitments, however, may increase the liquidity pressure
on banks (see Acharya et al. , 2013). After financial support, funding dependence is
another form of direct interconnection. This could take the form of investment into each
other’s assets. Investment in debt instruments issued by OBSEs, which is mainly done
for signaling purposes by the bank as an originator, is one direct way of interconnection.
Indirect linkages could exist through investment in the same or similar assets, or through
exposure to common counterparties.
The risk of contagion or systemic risk is defined as “the risk of experiencing systemic
events in the strong sense.” (DeBandt & Hartmann, 2000). Systemic events arise when
bad news or the failure of one or more entities lead to widespread adverse e↵ects, which
may spread to other entities. The interconnection of financial intermediaries, espe-
cially between traditional and shadow banks, facilitates the spread of liquidity and sol-
vency problems throughout the financial system. Any dysfunction or distress within the
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shadow banking system (e.g., a bank run) may be transferred to the regulated bank-
ing sector through various forms of interconnection, including both direct and indirect
connections. Spillover e↵ects between banks exist through interconnections such as in-
terbank loans and similar lending transactions.
Common shocks can be transferred through contagion channels within the financial sys-
tem from one entity to another, and feedback loops enable stressors to be amplified.
Also, di↵erent parts of the financial system (especially the loan originating part of the
intermediation chain) rely on repo funding. Problems in the funding process through
repo contracts could transfer wide funding problems throughout the system. The com-
mitment by banks and other shadow banking entities to retain a portion of their sold
and securitized loans and their usage as collateral for repo transaction constitutes an
interconnection between the securitization, banks, and repo funding sectors. Investor
doubt could mitigate the initial action of share redemption, causing a severe funding
problem for entities relying on short-term funding (i.e., repo) and the disposition of
loans for securitization.
3.1.4 Bank Run
A bank run is an event that can reach systemic importance, although the distinction
must be made between a bank run that a↵ects a single bank or a banking panic, whereby
an initial bank run on a single entity evolves into a systemic event involving additional
entities. This process is amplified by interconnections between banks and other finan-
cial entities (see also DeBandt & Hartmann, 2000). The perceived risk of a bank run
prompts the panicked withdrawal of deposits by bank clients. Several studies have cov-
ered the impact of early withdrawal or bank runs. The most important paper in this
area, Diamond & Dybvig (1983) (DD), proposes a model for optimal bank contracts to
reduce or, ideally, prevent bank runs through deposit insurance14. In the two-period DD
model, banks o↵er either short or long-term investments to depositors. The short-term
investment is terminated at the end of the first period (T = 1) and is considered to be
liquid. The long-term investment terminates at the end of the second period 2 (T = 2);
premature liquidation of such long-term investments incurs liquidation costs. The bank
allocates capital and enables individuals to make consumption decisions. It is assumed
that each individual investor’s consumption demand di↵ers from their individual endow-
ment. Totzek (2009) assumes a particular outflow of deposits, with a certain probability
as normal. However, Totzek argues that deposits are withdrawn from the banking sector
due to a loss of confidence and the anticipation of possible liquidity problems. Depositors
face risks and, consequently, di↵erent liquidity needs.
14For further literature on the influence of early withdrawals on the financial system see Gilkeson et al.
, 1999, Ringbom et al. , 2004 and Stanhouse & Stock, 2004; for further literature on classic runs on a
single bank see Waldo, 1985, Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988, Chair & Jagannathan, 1988, Calomiris &
Kahn (1991) and Carletti, 1999. Multi-bank systems are addressed in Garber & Grilli, 1989, Smith,
1991, DeBandt, 1995 and Temzelides, 1997
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In equilibrium, pareto-e cient allocation is ensured when banks accept deposits at any
time and each consumer terminates deposits only when individual liquidity demands
need to be satisfied. The bank is able to anticipate this liquidity demand and invests
deposits in short- and long-term projects. However, banks face other possible scenarios:
ine cient and e cient run equilibriums. The first bank run equilibrium, the ine cient
scenario, arises due to investor worries about the safety of their money, leading depositors
to panic and withdraw their investments within the first period. Seeing this panic,
other depositors are likely to withdraw their investments, too, as the face value of their
deposits is larger than the liquidation value of the bank’s assets, and as bank insolvency
appears increasingly likely. In this scenario, banks face rising liquidity costs as they
work to liquidate long-term investments to satisfy depositors’ liquidity demand; the
more the demand, the higher their risk of insolvency. The second run equilibrium is
considered to be e cient. Depositors are assumed to be rational actors who withdraw
their investments only in the event of a severe liquidity shock. The behavior of other
depositors is not anticipated to be e↵ected, as they are assumed to not be a↵ected by
these factors.
The solution proposed by the DD model is to provide deposit insurance and to introduce
capital regulation, thereby reducing the probability of a bank run. In this case, the
motivation for a run is removed, as the optimal ratio between consumption and allocation
is ensured. The DD model also limits what redemptions can be requested.
With regard to financial system stability, the shadow banking system is also prone
to runs, as their funding source of short-term fund shares is run-able, as modeled in
Diamond & Dybvig (1983). Shadow bank funding markets are specifically vulnerable
to modern-type bank runs as they provide short-term (mostly overnight) funding for
long-term assets, posing a maturity mismatch. This kind of maturity transformation is
conducted without governmental security systems or access to lenders of last resort. A
modern-type bank run can be defined as redemption requests for fund shares by investors.
As put forward by Diamond & Dybvig (1983), the possibility of bank runs can be reduced
by o↵ering deposit insurance. A logical consequence might be the establishment of such
a security mechanism for funds. The occurrence of runs in the financial system leads to
refinancing problems, which will be described in the following scenario. In the course
of a bank run, any type of financial intermediary may be forced to liquidate assets,
leading to the phenomenon of fire sales (described in the next paragraph). The pressure
to liquidate assets may be increased by the impossibility of borrowing through private
money markets. The possibility of deposit insurance will be discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1.5 Fire Sales
Financial intermediaries are especially likely to be confronted with funding problems
if they rely on short-term funding. In decisive situations of liquidity shocks and the
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high valuation of assets, investors have incentives to liquidate their security holdings
and to sell assets at a discounted price to non-specialized buyers. This phenomenon of
deleveraging of financial portfolios works destabilizing and is defined as fire sales (see
Shleifer & Vishny, 2011).
Payable liabilities may result from negative market conditions or from a lack of investor
confidence. To meet those liabilities, banks need to liquidate their assets on short notice;
this triggers a wide deleveraging process, which leads to fire sales. If banks seek to
maintain their assets, their equity will be wiped out to meet the requested liabilities.
Assets on the bank’s balance sheet will decline in value, as the bank is forced to sell them
at short notice. As these assets were also intended to serve as collateral for short-term
lending transactions, the bank will then face the problem of a short-term lending gap,
as discontinued funding cannot be compensated for (Shleifer & Vishny, 2010). Fire sales
deplete the bank’s balance sheet and weaken their overall financial stability (see therefore
also Squam Lake Group, 2010, p. 67). The breakdown of one bank can set o↵ a cascade
of banking distress, impacting other banks. This can leads to decreases in the overall
lending and risk-bearing capacity of the financial system: due to interconnections, the
asset decline of a single bank can lead to a systemic event. Other market participants
that invested in the same or similar assets and are a↵ected by the same shock face market
distress and are forced, in turn, to sell their assets. This simultaneous sale of assets by
many entities entails further declines in asset prices. These e↵ects are self-reinforcing;
asset sales by multiple investors leads to downward spirals, illiquidity, and, ultimately,
to systemic risk, which transmits shocks from the financial system to the real economy.
3.1.6 Defective CRT
Misaligned incentives, asymmetric information, or incomplete or absent monitoring
and screening within the securitization process all impair the e↵ectiveness of the CRT
(Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). This defective CRT influences the valuation of securi-
tized products, and could lead to destabilizing e↵ects. Originators might be encouraged
to securitize as much as possible, so long as the securitized products find a ready market.
Securitization allows investors to diversify their portfolio according to their individual
risk attitude, and so o↵ers economic benefits. However, the possible failure of ABSs
or negative expectations about market conditions can persuade investors to question
the return and quality of structured products. Wholesale investors of ABSs, or private
sector investors in funds that buy ABSs, might anticipate problems in credit quality, the
probability of return, or incomplete or absent screening and monitoring processes. In
such cases, investors divest themselves of investments in securitized products, and OB-
SEs (i.e., the purchasers of asset portfolios and sellers of ABSs), face problems of ABS
turnover, making them unwilling to buy further assets and loans. The funding of the
securitization process no longer o↵ers any benefits, influencing the funding of di↵erent
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entities within the financial sector that rely on financing through loans and asset sales
to OBSEs.
Regulators address the problem of defective CRT with di↵erent risk-retention approaches.
Risk retention aims to protect the promised quality and return of the transaction. As
originators need to retain a set percentage of the originated portfolio on their own bal-
ance sheet, this creates a signaling e↵ect concerning overall quality, thereby reducing
possible instabilities within the securitization sector, and, by extension, the overall fi-
nancial sector. Retention can be approached from the investors’ or originators’ side. An
analysis of the optimal retention approach to ensure proper securitization is given in 5.
Some risks do create conditions encouraging each other, occur in combination, or entail
other problems, as the detailed example of the interconnections and risks of modern-
type bank runs demonstrates. While such interconnection is not inherently a threat to
the entire financial system, solvency problems in one institution or a possible run could
spread to other entities and cause system-wide instability. These interconnections arise
through investment in the same or similar assets, investment in each other’s assets, or
contingent credit lines.
The proposed regulations are designed to address risks stemming from the characteristics
and structure of the financial system. The following scenario outlines di↵erent risks
inherent in the system and their impact on its vitality. The regulatory proposals are
also explained and their possible impact on specific risks is analyzed.
3.2 Scenario of risk contagion within the shadow banking
intermediation chain
The (shadow banking) intermediation chain and financial transactions can be interrupted
at di↵erent points. These financial shocks can then be transmitted to the whole financial
system, thereby leading to financial failure (systemic risk and transmission of financial
shocks is addressed by DeBandt & Hartmann, 2000). The main interruptions include,
among others, early withdrawal of bank deposits, early redemption requests of fund
shares, or loss of confidence in asset values. The focus in this scenario is on the with-
drawal of bank deposits and the redemption of fund shares, which together constitute a
bank run. The withdrawal of MMF shares and bank deposits does have severe spillover
e↵ects on the whole financial system, leading to a spiral of further withdrawal and fire
sale mechanisms. As a consequence of these withdrawals, funds need to liquidate assets
and stop contracting in short-term repo markets, thereby removing a funding source
that other market participants count on. This liquidation can cause fire sales. The
traditional banking system and shadow banks are connects through di↵erent channels
that could transmit funding problems throughout the financial system. The following
scenario analyzes the transmission of risks within the system initiated by MMFs that
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operate without explicit guarantees. This run scenario can be triggered by both the
private sector (i.e., households and firms) and by banks. During a run, funds are forced
to meet redemption requests made by investors. A withdrawal of a tremendous number
of shares from the MMF sector can be seen in Figure 2.17, and was observed in the
bank run during the 2008–2009 crisis. The Primary Reserve Fund ‘broke the buck’ as a
consequence of the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. “Breaking the
buck” refers to a decline in funds’ assets, reflected by the constant NAV falling below
one dollar. This decline in the Primary Reserve Fund below one dollar resulted from
the value decline of Lehman Brothers certificates, where the fund was invested. Using
a short-term governmental guarantee, the Primary Reserve Fund was initially able to
suspend redemption by investors. However, the requested redemption caused uncer-
tainty regarding asset value, which led to uncertainty in share value development and
expected returns. Investors of funds assumed that values would decline, triggering a
14% redemption of shares in US prime funds within one week after Lehmann Brothers
became insolvent (PwC, 2012 and Scharfstein, 2012).
Households, insurance companies, other funding corporations, and banks can all be
investors in MMFs. In the following scenario, it is assumed that funds are dealing with
two di↵erent investor groups that could request to redeem fund shares. If investors
in funds expect a decline in asset values and severe economic e↵ects, and hence fear
the loss of their invested endowment, they will tend to withdraw deposits and request
the redemption of their MMF shares. The requested redemption of fund shares by the
private sector or by banks will be discussed in the following section and is pictured in
Figure 3.1. The first group is private investors (Figure 3.1; (1)), who have a comparably
smaller invested endowment. Households as investors are able to invest their available
income in two di↵erent ways: either as a bank deposit with a traditional bank, or as
an endowment in the form of investment fund shares, which can be redeemed at any
time. While individual households or private investors might each have only a small
endowment, together they represent an intense force, especially as this group is prone to
collective, herd behavior, and a large proportion of investments might be withdrawn at
the same time. The second group of investors is banks (Figure 3.1; (2)). If banks request
redemption of shares, this will have a severe impact on MMFs and on the funding of
the larger financial system, especially the shadow banking system. It is assumed that
banks have two reasons to redeem significant numbers of their shares. This first reason
would be that banks are exposed to personal liquidity shocks, or other situations that
require liquidity, such as when large numbers of private investors are withdrawing their
deposits (Figure 3.1; (A)). If this happens, and if this withdrawn amount exceeds the
amount guaranteed by deposit insurance, banks are forced to generate liquidity out
of their balance sheet. Since they are a short-term and easily liquidated investment,
MMF shares are the first investment to be liquidated. The second reason that banks
might want to redeem their shares would be if they, like private investors, considered
their investment in those MMF shares to be a poor one, and they saw redemption as a
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Figure 3.1: Redemption of MMF shares by the (1) private sector and (2) banks.
Banks have two reasons to redeem shares: (A) own liquidity shock and (B) anticipation
of share value decline.
way to avoid a major loss of their investment (Figure 3.1; (B)). However, whatever the
motives, large-scale redemption has severe e↵ects on the MMF sector. As banks are,
proportionally, one major shareholder in MMFs, the withdrawal of large amounts of
fund shares can have severe consequences on the financial system’s funding. The e↵ects
of these redemption requests will be discussed further on in the direct scenario.
In the case of negative market developments or expected severe market distortions,
households can withdraw their bank deposits at any time or request MMF share re-
demption. Bank withdrawal is secured, up to a certain value, through deposit insur-
ance. Banks can draw on their deposit insurance up to a capped amount to meet these
requests for the withdrawal of deposits 15.
Money Market shares are assumed to be highly liquid and easy to redeem at little to
no cost; they are therefore regarded as safe and liquid alternative to bank deposits.
However, such funds are not eligible for government guarantees, such as the federal
discount window and other guaranteed liquidity. These funds are therefore forced to
hold su cient assets, or to liquidate assets to meet all requested redemption. Holding
a part of the portfolio as liquid assets reduces the e ciency of the fund’s portfolio
management and will not reach the frontier of e cient portfolios. To meet all possible
requests, funds need to retain a specific amount of liquid resources, or need to be able to
15Deposit insurance for Germany and the majority of countries in the EU is capped at Euro 100.000
for demand funds, restricted cash, and account books; in the UK the cap is Pound 85.000 (see European
Commission, 2010, Art. 7(1a) as of December 2010). The US increased the amount of deposit insurance
up to Dollar 250,000 with the passage of the DFA (initially introduced by FRB, n.d.).
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Figure 3.2: Run Scenario Step 1 - Redemption requests by MMF investors lead to
a decreasing Bi depicted by a blue downward arrow. This in consequence results in
portfolio restructuring to meet sudden redemption requests, starting with highly liquid
and easy to liquidate repo contracts repo# (depicted with a red downward arrow).
liquidate assets and free up capital at no cost. The FSB has proposed mandating that
funds retain specific levels of liquidity, a capital bu↵er (this will be discussed further on
in Chapter 4). The e↵ects of redemption requests by the private sector and banks are
reflected in the decreasing Bi on the fund’s balance sheet in Figure 3.2.
For simplicity’s sake, it is assumed that MMFs invest their available resources in secu-
rities, such as ABSs, ABCPs, and other assets, as well as in repos (as seen on the asset
side of the fund’s balance sheet in Figure 3.2). As mentioned in Chapter 2, repos serve
as a short-term funding source for banks, especially shadow banks in a narrow sense.
It is assumed that repos are collateralized by high-quality assets that can be treated as
secure and liquid investments to provide temporary cash balances and working capital.
In the presented stylized model of the shadow banking system, it is assumed that banks
and shadow banks rely on repo funding. In the case of a traditional bank, repos can be
used for short-term funding, as an alternative to interbank loans. However, traditional
banks do not rely as heavily on repo funding as do shadow banks (Gorton & Metrick,
2010c, p. 3). Shadow banks, in contrast, do not receive deposits and rely on short-term
repo funding (see Figure 3.3). Repo lending allows a wide range of market participants
to participate in wholesale money markets. Within the fund’s portfolio management,
repos can be viewed as safe admixtures. Funds use repo contracts as an alternative to
deposits, allowing them to store liquid resources safely, while still making those funds
available at any time and earning reasonable interest. Funds are not able to store large
amounts of money in savings accounts in traditional banks (which would give them a
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Figure 3.3: Run Scenario Step 2 - Due to a repo funding gap, institutions that rely
on repo funding now face tight liquidity positions. Institutions need to liquidate assets
in order to serve claims and requests, and compensate defaulted repo contracts.
safe, liquid way to generate reasonable interest), as federal deposit insurance is capped
at levels that would not cover the amounts invested by MMFs. The amount of liquid
resources increases with the assets under management, as MMF shares are an interest-
earning alternative to bank deposits for the private sector (Gorton & Metrick, 2010c).
Repos constitute a highly liquid asset within the funds’ balance sheets, and one that is
di↵erent than other assets with longer maturity, such as investment fund shares, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental bonds, and stocks. Repos are realizable at little cost
and within a short period of time, and can therefore be used to meet initial redemption
requests. High requested redemption causes a decreasing Bi, which prompts portfolio
restructuring to meet additional potential requests. Funds then work to free up resources
to meet redemption requests, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Repo contracts, which are viewed as a cheap and broad financing possibility for financial
intermediaries, are assumed to be the first resource that will be liquidated. In the event
of liquidation of contracts or of failed prolongation of revolving contracts, funds will
revoke this funding source for a number of market participants. Funds will not be able
to pursue or prolong repo transactions and consequently withdraw a funding source for
mainly shadow banks in a narrow sense and also banks. This constitutes one point where
funding problems of one entity, the fund due to redemption, leads to severe liquidity
problems of a whole sector due to interconnection.
Banks and other financial intermediaries use repos to ensure their (mostly short-term)
financial needs. Alternatively, banks can participate in the interbank credit market. The
Chapter 3. Risks within the Banking and Shadow Banking System 75
immediate reverse transactions free up liquid resources and meet redemption requests.
This leaves market participants with tighter liquidity positions, as they might rely on the
funding provided through revolving short-term repo contracts on a longer-term basis.
Normally, these short-term repo contracts will be renewed. In case of a reverse transac-
tion to free up liquid resources, funds may no longer be willing to renew these contracts.
Banks and shadow banks need to liquidate assets as well as other, including ABS or
ABCP in order to compensate for defaulted repo funding, as described in Figure 3.3.
Declining repo lending result in the sale of assets to compensate for funding shortages,
and the immediate sale of assets to fill these gaps might lead to declining asset prices.
As not all redemption requests might be satisfied following the liquidation of repos, funds
will realize portfolio components in a successively cascaded manner, according to their
maturity and ability to be liquidated at low costs. A rapid realization of risky and high-
yield assets might lead to a markdown, which could cause a downward spiral of mounting
redemption requests. A price decline in assets is expected to have an impact on the
price development of fund shares, as private investors and banks withdraw all remaining
investments as they notice price decline. Investment funds recall further investments,
such as ABCPs and ABSs, which leaves entities that rely on funding through the same
of ABCPs or ABSs with funding problems. At this point, the fund portfolio will be
dissolved, with increasing markdowns or also called haircuts and liquidity charges, which
eventually risks triggering fire sales mechanisms.
In this scenario, funds will not buy available ABSs, ABCPs, or other assets that are
sold by other market participants. Due to portfolio regrouping, funds do not act as
consumers of either assets o↵ered by banks and shadow banks in a narrow sense, or
of securitized OBSE assets. Securitized assets remain unsold and do not generate the
desired liquidity for banks and shadow banks in a narrow sense. Next to funding through
repos another major funding source is therefore missing. Furthermore, funds will not
keep illiquid assets in their own portfolios, as they want to generate enough liquidity
to meet redemption requests, as well as other possible but unknown requests. Banks
and other shadow banks are therefore forced to sell assets at discounted prices to find
transaction counterparts. Furthermore, OBSEs are not able to place securitized ABSs
and ABCPs on the market, as there are no potential recipients, so OBSEs do not buy
originated loans, as they usually do. Loan originators do not gain liquidity through
origination and distribution, leading to reduced loan origination and loan supply to the
real economy.
To avoid tight liquidity positions, banks and other financial institutions might substitute
or supplement their financial needs with interbank credits or other suppliers of short-term
credit, which can be seen as near substitutes for repo contracts. In perfectly performing
markets, these substitutes can be unwound frictionlessly. In the case of non-performing
or poorly performing interbank markets, banks need to look for other funding sources.
Banks and shadow banks in a narrow sense (that highly rely on repo funding) must
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Figure 3.4: Run Scenario Step 3 - Continuing liquidation of repos and other assets
to satisfy further redemption requests (light blue #) and due to declining asset values.
Shadow banks reduce the issuance of ABCP and ABS, as there doesn’t exist a market
for trading and MMFs no longer purchase securitized assets due to portfolio liquidation
(dark blue #).
compensate for their higher liquidity needs - which have risen due to the lack of renewed
repo contracts - through new repo contracts. However, in such a scenario, borrowers (i.e.
capital-seeking parties) in those contracts might be required to provide more security to
lenders. This contractual haircut reflects the anticipated performance of the underlying
collateral. In the case of high haircuts, the involved participants expect a sharp decline in
prices in the near future, along with a decline in the value of the collateral. This means
that capital-seeking parties need to provide more collateral. It might be possible for
banks and shadow banks in a narrow sense to acquire funds through repo transactions if
the market is still o↵ering such contracts; however, in such a scenario, the capital-seeking
parties might not be willing or able to raise the expected amount of collateral to satisfy
their financial needs. These severe financial needs might force banks to liquidate their
asset positions, as funding by the liability side is not guaranteed, causing a shortening
of the asset side of the balance sheet (balance sheet contraction). Banks and, especially,
shadow banks in a narrow sense that are missing a funding source might be forced to
liquidate other portfolio assets to compensate for this funding gap. The liquidation of
portfolio assets under pressure leads to a decline in asset prices, as assets need to be
liquidated as fast as possible to reduce the funding shortfall.
Consequently, financial intermediaries (i.e., banks and shadow banks in a narrow sense)
are only able to sell illiquid assets at enormous markdowns or also called haircuts, or
under hindered conditions. It is unclear whether these markdowns and price declines
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Figure 3.5: Market participants liquidate further assets to minimize a funding gap.
As assets need to be liquidated fast asset price decline (markdown). Herd behavior of
simultaneous asset sale by market participants leading to fire sales (orange #).
are also influenced by the expectations of market participants. The asset market price
or fundamental value is influenced both by expectations about the market (e.g., self-
fulfilling prophecies) and by price development. The sudden liquidation of assets leads
to declining prices and fire sales (see Figure 3.5), which fuels further price deterioration.
3.3 Summary
Risks and structural aspects that threaten both the traditional and the shadow banking
system are described in Chapter 3, and include procyclicality, risks stemming from
the interconnection of entities, bank runs (which can lead, ultimately, to fire sales),
and defective CRT. These risks persist in the traditional banking system, and might
be enhanced in the shadow banking system through this system’s unique structural
characteristics and features.
Procyclicality is already addressed by banking regulation by the BCBS. It is defined as
the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend with increasing amplitude,
which can enhance downward spirals and destabilize the financial system. Activities
such as repo lending can increase procyclicality within the financial system Concerning
regulatory proposals on shadow banking activities, regulators need to have an eye on
those activities that raise procyclicality.
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Interconnections between financial entities do not necessarily spread risks. The failure of
one entity could, however, transfer negative e↵ects throughout the system via contrac-
tual or common exposure interconnections, spreading funding problems and failure to
other entities and raising the risk of a systemic breakdown. In seeking to control these
contagion e↵ects, regulators need to take possible interconnections, their development,
and their meaning for the financial sector into consideration.
One potentially systemically important event that can be transferred throughout the
financial system by such interconnections is a bank run. Following negative expectations
regarding the development of market conditions, banks face huge sudden withdrawals
of bank deposits. Interconnections can turn the resulting bank failure into a systemic
failure, including additional institutions and, potentially, the entire financial system.
The characteristics of a bank run can also be transferred to the shadow banking system,
where MMFs might be threatened by modern-type bank runs by investors in MMF
shares.
During a bank run or other systemic events, banks and other market participants must
liquidate assets as fast as possible to close funding gaps. This liquidation exerts an
increasing downward pressure on prices, i.e., fire sales. Market participants who invest
in the same assets are directly a↵ected by fire sales; further on, market participants who
hold common exposures or who invest in similar assets might be a↵ected indirectly, as
the decline of prices is transferred to additional asset classes.
Defective or incomplete CRT is another risk to financial stability. A well-functioning risk-
transfer process indicates high quality and accurate valuation of securitized assets. In the
case of a financial c risis, prices remain stable, so long as their pricing is profunded. To
control risks relating to incomplete CRT, regulators have mainly introduced instruments
that strengthen the assessment of security values and reduce asymmetric information
and frictions within the securitization process (i.e., risk retention).
The second section of Chapter 3 introduces a scenario of a modern-type bank run.
This scenario aims to identify the risks that appear during the shadow banking inter-
mediation process, as well as interconnections that transfer those risks throughout the
financial system. Areas of potential regulatory need are then pointed out. In the event
of a modern-type bank run, MMFs might face the redemption of MMF shares by in-
vestors, similar to the way in which deposits are withdrawn from traditional banks.
Since MMFs are a major funding source for the shadow banking system, the redemption
of MMF shares and the liquidation of repos leaves the shadow banking system with a
funding gap. As shadow banking entities and connected institutions in the traditional
banking sector seek to close those funding gaps as quickly as possible, the high pressure
liquidation of assets could trigger fire sale mechanisms. This creates a risk of severe
declines in asset prices and further destabilizing e↵ects throughout the financial system.
Chapter 4 outlines the financial regulations that could potentially control or limit the
risks described in this scenario.
Chapter 4
Proposed Regulation addressing
the Shadow Banking System
4.1 Traditional regulation of risks to stabilize the financial
system
4.1.1 Basel regulations
4.1.1.1 Basel regulatory framework
In addition to prompting suggestions regarding regulations of the shadow banking sys-
tem, the financial crisis of 2008–2009 unveiled the shortcomings of existing banking
regulations, especially regulation of systemic risks and systemically important institu-
tions (SIFIs). The G20 leaders responded to those shortcomings with a new regulatory
framework: Basel II.5. This framework is an amendment to Basel II. Basel III was then
endorsed as a regulatory framework in 2010, to contribute to a more resilient “global
banking system by raising the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank
capital and liquidity, constrains the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and
introducing capital bu↵ers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon
in bad times” (BCBS, 2012c; BCBS, 2010 and BCBS, 2010/2011). The breakdown of
the regulatory proposals contains a capital reform, liquidity standards, and issues con-
cerning systemic risk and interconnections. The Basel Accords are therefore segmented
in three Pillars: (1) capital, risk coverage and leverage (2) risk management and su-
pervision, and (3) market discipline. The first of three Pillars intends to strengthen
the banks’ capital base and aims to reduce bank failure and enhance their possibility
to absorb losses. The international harmonization of risk management and supervisory
oversight to enhance the ability of banks to manage risks are the objects of Pillar 2. Pil-
lar 3 comprises public disclosure and market discipline to enhance transparency (BCBS,
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2012c, p. 1). In addition to microprudential regulation, the new regulatory approach
includes a macroprudential approach to stabilizing the financial system against risks
arising from interconnection and interactions between financial institutions. The new
regulatory standards on banking supervision also address consolidation and accounting
issues, large exposure regimes (i.e., Groß- und Millionenkreditverordnung; GroMiKV),
and risk-based capital rules (G20, 2011). The Basel Accords aim to provide an inter-
national consensus for bank and financial market safety and soundness. International
harmonization in banking regulation is essential, as variation in regulations could disad-
vantage banks and other financial institutions. Di↵erent regulatory regimes also open the
possibility for regulatory arbitrage, which entails further risks and problems of general
regulatory enforcement.
The BCBS introduced a reformed framework for future banking regulation in 201016.
The BCBS aims to raise and strengthen the quality, consistency, and transparency
of regulatory capital, thereby enhancing the resilience of banks and, hence, the overall
financial system. Furthermore, regulators want to achieve a consistent definition, as well
as an understandable and harmonized terminology, of capital across various jurisdictions,
to promote comparability and market assessment. This appears to refer to shadow
banking regulations, as necessary. The definition of shadow banking can be considered
to follow from a clear definition of banking. To set up a clear and consistent definition, it
is crucial to define financial markets and banking precisely (see Chapter 2 for a definition
of shadow banking). The regulatory framework of traditional banks constitutes another
source of shadow banking regulation. This regulatory framework may highlight unknown
needs regarding the regulation of shadow banking. Hence, it is important for banking
regulators to develop clear and globally consistent terminology regarding the financial
system and banking. This will allow them to create and enforce consistent regulatory
approaches, thereby preventing regulatory arbitrage. A globally consistent definition of
banking helps create clearer definition and ideas about shadow banking, which facilitates
adequate regulation.
Pillar 1 of the Basel Accords addresses systemic and procyclical risks through regulation
concerning capital, adequate risk coverage, and leverage. To approach capital and make
institutions more resilient against losses, the BCBS suggests a greater focus on improved
quality and higher levels of own funds. Own funds consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital
(Art. 72 CRR - Regulation (EU) No 575/2013). Tier 1 Capital is composed of 4, 5%
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1) and 1, 5% Additional Tier 1 Capital. Including
the Tier 2 Capital own funds sum now up to 8% (Art. 26 ↵ and 62 ↵. CRR - Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013). Also introduced is a capital-conservation bu↵er of 2, 5% and coun-
tercyclical bu↵er of between 0 and 2.5% to counteract excessive credit growth (Art. 440
CRR - Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; see Georg, 2011 and Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011).
16“Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” (BCBS,
2010/2011) and “Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and
monitoring” (BCBS, 2010)
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Further mandatory bu↵er will apply to banks that are labeled as systemically important
(KPMG, 2013). To cover risks within the banking sector, banks need to strengthen the
general capital base. Pillar 1 also proposes enhanced risk coverage through stronger
capital requirements, which would capture both on and o↵ balance sheet credit risks.
Regulators have also turned their attention to the capital treatment of securitization
and the trading book. This includes significantly higher capital and generally strength-
ened capital for complex securitization transactions, trading and derivative activities,
and counterparty risks. Proposed actions include a stressed value-at-risk framework, a
more rigorous credit analysis, and a counterparty risk framework. The Basel framework
aims to strengthen the supervision of counterparty risks and exposures to the central
counterparty. To constraint a possible build-up of leverage, the BCBS introduced a
leverage ratio to supplement capital requirements and constrain banking sector leverage
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011).
The risk management and supervision proposed in Pillar 2 seek broader governance
and risk management to detect o↵ balance sheet exposures and securitization activities
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 28). This should incentivize the management of risk
concentration, risk and return, sound compensation and valuation practice, and stress
testing, and should also improve governance and accounting standards. Pillar 3 also
introduces revised disclosure requirements, which should enhance transparency and pro-
vide more detailed information about exposures, sponsorships, components of regulatory
capital, and the calculation of capital.
To strengthen the liquidity position of banks and the associated supervision monitoring,
the BCBS introduced a liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) that would require banks to have
“su cient high-liquid assets,” as well as a long-term net stable funding ratio (NSFR),
which would address liquidity mismatches and give banks incentives to use stable sources
of funding (liquidity will be regulated in Art. 411 ↵ of the CRR - Regulation (EU) No
575/2013). The BCBS also introduced principles for sound Liquidity Risk Management
and Supervision, which could be used to review sound practices for managing liquidity
risks. These principles also include monitoring to identify and analyze liquidity risks
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 30).
Addressing systemic risks and the interconnection of market participants is another
important issue, as risks are transmitted through interconnection across the financial
system and the economy (G20, 2011). The question is whether regulators can artic-
ulate and implement regulatory approaches without the support of a clear theoretical
and model-based analysis of the system and the economic e↵ects arising from banking
and shadow banking interaction. The regulation of SIFIs and the interconnections of
financial market participants can be considered a crucial issue for shadow banking reg-
ulation. Interconnections among both the traditional and the shadow banking sectors
create potential risks. The direct regulation of traditional banks influences the develop-
ment of shadow banks, in the form of indirect regulation. Working together, the BCBS
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and the FSB are designing quantitative and qualitative indicators to capture the sys-
temic importance of specific financial institutions and to develop specific requirements
concerning exposures and interactions.
Banking regulation plays an important role in shadow banking regulation. Banking and
shadow banking entities are mutually dependent through interconnections, in several
ways. Actions taken by banks and shadow banks, together or individually, can cause
e↵ects to both sectors. Consequently, an e↵ective regulation of the shadow banking
system also depends on adequate banking regulation; this would, for example, help to
avoid regulatory arbitrage inadvertently created through strict banking regulation (see
Section 4.2.3). A recent article of Piper (2014) however argues that the new banking
regulation concentrating on less risky activities enhances regulatory arbitrage. There-
fore, banking regulation and the impact on the shadow banking sector is approached
in the first Workstream of the proposed FSB framework to shadow banking regulation.
With respect to shadow banking regulation and the impact of banking regulation on
shadow banks, transactions with the shadow banking sector or liquidity back up lines to
funds need to be covered with more regulatory equity. Rules concerning consolidation
will include specially outsourced SPVs in order to display a real picture of the banks’
engagements. For example, the regulation of governing large exposures and million loans
reporting (i.e., GroMiKV) explicitly includes and regulates extended credits and large
exposures to shadow banking entities (see Financial Stability Board, 2013c).
4.1.1.2 Basel III Implementation
The Basel III implementation review program was designed to operate as a three-level
review. This review focuses on ensuring (1) the timely adoption of the Basel III accords,
(2) the consistency of the Basel III accords, and (3) the consistency and harmonization
of the outcome. Perceptions regarding Level 1 were released frequently every quarter
as “Progress Report on Basel III implementation.” So far, progress has been as follows:
As of May 2012, 21 of the 27 member states have implemented the Basel II regulations,
including the US, Argentina, China, and Turkey still to go. In the US, Basel II has been
mandatory for institutions to implement in their approaches to credit and operational
risk. These institutions are therefore called “in parallel” run and report to supervisors.
Institutions operating under parallel run are subject to Basel I regulations (BCBS, 2012b,
p. 3). The preliminarily version of the Basel II.5 regulations has been fully implemented
by 20 member states; Russia and the US have drafted regulations, but, as of the time
of writing, have not passed any finalized regulations. United States authorities tend to
finalize regulations after considering a public consultation process (BCBS, 2012b, p. 5).
According to the BCBS, there might be challenges in meeting the final deadline for Basel
III implementation, as no member states have yet fully implemented final regulations.
To be in full compliance with the Basel regulations, member states must fully implement
the suggested accords by 2019.
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European Regulation - Implementation of the Capital Requirements Direc-
tive IV package
Within the Euro Area, the internationally agreed-upon Basel Standards have been
adopted by the Capital Requirements Directive. So far, implementation of the Basel ap-
proach comprises CRD I (see Directive 2006/49/EC and Directive 2006/48/EC) CRD II
(see Directive 2009/111/EC; Directive 2009/27/EC and Directive 2009/83/EC), which
together aim to ensure the soundness of banks and investment firms, and CRD III (see
Directive 2010/76/EU), which proposes capital requirements for the trading book and
for re-securitizations. The proposed Basel III standards are implemented by the CRD
IV package (CRDIV - Directive 2013/36/EU and CRR - Regulation (EU) No 575/2013).
The CRD IV Package includes the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR - Regula-
tion (EU) No 575/2013) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRDIV - Directive
2013/36/EU). Directives allow the member states to legislate individually and separately,
but in consequence hinder full harmonization of regulation. The regulation, which in-
cludes references to technical standards and guidance, is not required to be adopted
into national legislation, but will apply to all EU Member States. The CRR will also
be titled singe rule book for banking regulation. The CRR and CRD were ratified by
the European Parliament on 17 April 2013 and will come into e↵ect on 1 January 2014
(Ho¨pfner, 2014 and Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013). The assessment process within the
Euro Area revealed that most of its key components are compliant or largely compliant
with the Basel III framework. However, substantial gaps do exist in the clear defini-
tion of capital and the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach. The assessment further
points out that the EU approach of maximum harmonization may be at odds with the
minimum harmonization concept proposed in the Basel rules. This does not necessarily
represent an inconsistency, but rather reflects the supra-national and complex structure
of the Euro Area. Overall, the EU framework is geared towards maximum harmoniza-
tion, which entails harmonized banking rules and limited gaps between the approaches
used by national authorities (BCBS, 2012a, p. 8). Law adopted at the EU level must
be agreed on by and applies to all member states. A full implementation is expected by
January 1, 2019.
US Regulation - Dodd-Frank Act - Implementation
Apart from the suggested Basel regulations, US regulatory authorities introduced the
DFA of 2010. This act addresses capital requirements for banks “to promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the finan-
cial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”
(Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, for further details on the DFA framework see, Kern, 2010).
Both the implementation of the final version of Basel II.5 and the proposed regulations
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of Basel III were introduced in June 2012 as an Integrated Capital Framework (ICF)
consisting of the Basel III Notice of Proposed Rule-making (NPR) and the Market Risk
Final Rule. The ICF will prompt consistency within the constraints of the implemen-
tation of the DFA. However, proposed rules will not become valid until January 2013
17.
4.2 International approaches to shadow banking regula-
tion
4.2.1 United States Dodd-Frank Act
The DFA addresses systemically important nonbank entities, using a rather general
entity-based approach (nonbank SIFI). The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
is empowered within Section 113 of the DFA (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 codified at U.S.C.,
Title 12) to designate a nonbank financial company as a nonbank SIFI. Those nonbank
SIFIs need to be supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (FED)
System if a “material financial distress at the nonbank financial company, or the na-
ture, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the
nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United
States” (U.S.C., Title 12 Chapter 53 Sec. 5323). By June 2013, the FSOC had desig-
nated three financial service companies (AIG, GE Capital and Prudential) as nonbank
SIFIs according to Section 113 of the U.S.C.. Section 165 of U.S.C. extended the pru-
dential banking regulation of nonbank SIFIs to include aspects of capital, leverage and
liquidity requirements.
The FSOC can also include systemic activities and utilities under the regulation of the
DFA, so long as the “conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or intercon-
nectedness of such activities or practice” create or increases risk or spread problems
“among bank holding companies and other nonbank financial companies” (U.S.C., Title
12 Chapter 53 Sec. 5330).
Despite what it does accomplish, the prudential banking regulation might not, however,
be adequate to regulate and supervise nonbank SIFIs, as it lacks nuance and does not
elaborate on special nonbank characteristics. Furthermore, questions may arise as to
whether the FED has the relevant expertise to create adequate shadow banking regu-
lation, as well as if it is necessary to target only bank-like activities, or all activities of
nonbank SIFIs.
17http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20121109a.htm
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4.2.2 European Commission Green Paper
Parallel to the FSB approach to shadow banking regulation, the European Commis-
sion published a Green Paper on shadow banking (European Commission, 2012). The
European Commission finds that the EU showed global leadership in meeting the 2010
G20 commitment (G20, 2010). The Commission further “considers it a priority to ex-
amine in detail the issues posed by shadow baking activities and entities.” Similar to
the FSB’s definition, the Commission focuses on entities and activities (see Chapter 2
for the definitions of shadow banking). Moreover, the FSB and the EU Commission
can be considered as working in parallel, as the Commission has contributed to a great
extent to the elaboration of the FSB. The conclusions and views of the FSB and the EU
Commission are therefore very close.
Following a consultation period and a conference on shadow banking, the Commission
published a final communication regarding the steps the EU should take to address
the risks stemming from the shadow banking sector (see European Commission, 2012,
p. 14↵. and European Commission, 2013). In this communication, the Commission
identifies a number of priority issues, including regulation through banking regulation,
transparency, a harmonized framework for asset management and risk transfer, and
security financing transactions and others.
The EU has taken a global leadership position in financial reform, passing a number
of regulations. For example, the EU has addressed the issue of regulatory arbitrage,
which pushed the growth of the shadow banking system and threatened financial sta-
bility, by reinforcing requirements imposed on banks. This indirect approach to shadow
banking regulation concerns prudential banking regulation, including the implementa-
tion of CRD II and CRD III, and the future implementation of CRD IV. With regard to
the asset management sector (i.e., wholesale funding and other alternative funds), the
EU established a harmonized framework, AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU and strength-
ened the UCITS Directive 85/611/EEC amended by Directive 2009/65/EC, Directive
2010/43/EU, and Directive 2010/42/EU. With the introduction of the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the European Parliament and Council introduced a
framework for risk-transfer instruments and securitization, with the goal of enhancing
transparency and promoting stability (Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation
(EU) No 236/2012). To enhance overall transparency of the shadow banking sector, the
EU initiated an additional monitoring process on both the national and the suprana-
tional levels, with the goal of identifying and monitoring the risks associated with the
shadow banking system (European Central Bank, 2013).
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4.2.3 Mandate of the Financial Stability Board
There are three di↵erent approaches in shadow banking system regulation: (1) the G20
mandated approach by the FSB, (2) the DFA, which focused on significant financial
entities including non-bank SIFIs in general, and (3) the European regulatory proposal
by the European Commission, in the form of a European Commission (2012).
The G20 recognized that adopting new capital requirements can simply cause capital
to migrate to areas that are less regulated, triggering new adverse e↵ects. The G20
therefore mandated that the FSB, in collaboration with other international standard-
setting bodies should “develop recommendation on the oversight and regulation” of
the shadow banking system (see e.g., G20, 2010; Financial Stability Board, 2011b and
Financial Stability Board, 2011a). The FSB has initiated a task force to define and
clarify the shadow banking system and to analyze the role of NBFIs within the financial
system. A further objective is to analyze the risks and identify the scope for additional
regulatory measures, to address both risks and possible regulatory arbitrage (Financial
Stability Board, 2011a).
The FSB set up Workstreams (WSs) to survey di↵erent shadow banking subjects in
detail and to develop specific regulatory proposals to govern the shadow banking sector.
They will review existing regulations and supervisory actions, and establish the necessity
of new policy recommendations to strengthen regulation and supervision (Tochtermann,
2011). The Basel Committee’s responsibility encompasses the indirect regulation of
NBFIs within the direct regulation approaches of Basel II.5 and Basel III, as well as
mitigating spillover e↵ects between banks and NBFIs (WS1). To do this, the BCBS
will review scope of consolidation, large exposure regimes, banks’ investments in NBFI
funds and similar investments of NBFIs and banks. For information on Workstream 1 see
Section 4.1.1.1. The IOSCO is mandated with proposing MMF regulations to reduce sus-
ceptibility to runs (WS2) and the evaluating securitization issues, such as transparency
and standardization (WS4). The FSB task force itself focuses on the evaluation and
mitigation of potential risks concerning other shadow banking entities that have not yet
been examined in detail (WS3), as well as on risk and procyclicality incentives linked
to secured finance instruments, such as repos and securities lending (WS5) (Financial
Stability Board, 2012d, p. 3). In addition to these five Workstreams, the FSB will also
monitor three other regulatory initiatives: (1) data reporting and transparency18, (2)
underwriting standards19, and (3) Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)20(Financial Stability
Board, 2011b).
In the following section, the regulatory proposals concerning issues and risks that arose
in the scenario analysis of a MMF modern-type bank run will be discussed further.
18FSB Enhanced disclosure task force – Report on “Enhancing the Risk Disclosure of Banks”.
19FSB report on “Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage-underwriting Practices”.
20FSB report on “Principles for reducing reliance on CRA ratings”.
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This analysis will only cover regulatory issues of the MMF sector, selected proposals of
securitization, and repo regulation. An overview will be given in Appendix B .
Further steps on shadow banking regulations includes the activating of the proposed
policy framework, by the time recommendations are finalized. The FSB will therefore
introduce a detailed implementation schedule. The implementation process and the
development of the shadow banking system under introduced regulation is accompanied
by intensive monitoring and reporting - in form of detailed peer reviews (Financial
Stability Board, 2013c, p. 8).
4.3 FSB proposed regulation
4.3.1 Principals of future regulation and need for new regulation
Concerning the regulation of NBFIs, the FSB makes it clear that a single approach will
not fit all components, entities, and activities of the shadow banking system, nor will it
cover all risks and problems associated with the various forms of NBFIs. Regulations
need to be di↵erentiated according to the specific needs and capabilities of di↵erent
entities. General principles have therefore been derived to assure e cient and e↵ective
regulation (see Financial Stability Board, 2011b). These principles are as follows: (1)
Regulatory measures should be carefully designed and focused to target specific risks
and externalities. Furthermore, regulators should keep in mind that regulation can have
a far-reaching impact, and there may be unintended consequences, such as impaired
competition, moral hazards, or other disruptive e↵ects. (2) Policy recommendations
and future regulation should be set up proportionally; smaller and less interconnected
entities should not be burdened with disproportional regulation and concomitant costs.
(3) To account for future development and emerging risks, regulation should be for-
ward looking and adaptable: new measures should not only cover the risks that
are presently apparent, but also address potential evolving risks, the development and
growth of entities and activities, and changes to the structure of the NBFI system. (4)
Regulations should be designed and implemented in an e↵ective manner and should
also consider international activities to avoid cross-border arbitrage. (5) Regulatory
measures should be subject to regular assessment and review to adjust and improve
e ciency if needed. Policy options could be used along or in combination with others
rules and guidelines; hence, regulators should keep in mind that combining regulatory
measures could have unintended impacts.
Chapter 4. Proposed Regulation addressing the Shadow Banking System 88
4.3.2 Regulatory reform of Money Market Funds and analysis
4.3.2.1 IOSCO mandate
The FSB emphasized the need for reform of the regulation of MMFs. This need for
the regulation and supervision of asset management has also been taken up by the
European Commission. The EU aims to introduce a harmonized framework for asset
management and alternative investment funds. This framework would take into account
the characteristics and roles of di↵erent entities in funding markets, as well as how they
contributed to the course of the financial crisis. A critical and comprehensive analysis of
the shadow banking system is needed to inform potential regulation. It is important to
research the overall role of MMFs and their interconnection with other financial institu-
tions and market participants. To create appropriate regulations, di↵erences concerning
categories, characteristics, and systemic risks posed by the funds in di↵erent jurisdictions
need to be analyzed. The significant size and role of MMFs within the financial system
highlights the need for the monitoring and implementation of potential regulation. Due
to the characteristics of deposit-like instruments, MMF shares are exposed to risks of
modern-type bank runs. The position of MMFs within the financial system is clearly
described in Chapter 3. The scenario in Chapter 3 makes the significant role of MMFs
as a funding source and as a money market access point apparent. Existing regulatory
initiatives and standards also need to be taken into consideration (Financial Stability
Board, 2011b, p. 20).
The Workstream on MMF risk analysis and reform options is executed and supervised
by the Technical Committee of the IOSCO. The consultation report “Money Market
Fund Systemic Risk Analysis and Reform Options” (IOSCO, 2012d) was published in
April 2012, with the objective of sharing the analysis regarding possible risks stem-
ming from MMFs and mapping out possible policy options. A consultation period gave
authorities, governments, academics, and the industry an opportunity to comment on
proposed regulatory approaches. The final report on regulatory possibilities was issued
in November 2012. The report published in April 2011 mainly analyzed the features and
characteristics that make MMFs vulnerable to risks, and proposed possible regulatory
measures. The aim of the MMF working stream is to implement common standards
for management and regulation across various jurisdictions. The realization of regula-
tory standards may vary depending on local economic conditions, as well as on regional
regulatory and legal structures (IOSCO, 2012e, p. 8).
4.3.2.2 Characteristics and development
The role of MMFs within the financial system can be elucidated using quantitative
market data. The volume of assets under management amounted to Dollar 4.7 billion
worldwide in the third quarter of 2011. Money Market Funds, as a subcategory of
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the CIS, comprise about 20% of total mutual fund assets. Together, US and European
MMF assets represent 90% of the global industry (see Figure 2.15; IOSCO, 2012d, p. 1).
About 60% of MMF assets are located in the US. To ensure that entities and schemes
with similar objectives are captured by appropriate regulation, the term MMF should
be explicitly defined. Existing limitations concerning assets in which MMFs may invest
must also be defined, including average weighted terms to maturity and weighted average
life of the portfolio. In order to trace the development and impact of regulatory measures,
authorities should regularly monitor MMF development, as well as the development of
vehicles similar to MMFs.
The run on several funds in 2008 alerted regulators to the fact that MMFs could poten-
tially raise systemic risks (see PwC, 2012 and Scharfstein, 2012), despite the fact that
they did not cause the initial crisis. The run on di↵erent MMFs was, rather, an indica-
tion of an overall unstable system and uncertainty about the development of di↵erent
financial assets, in which MMFs played a significant role in spreading risk and amplify-
ing the crisis (IOSCO, 2012d, p. 5). Money Market Funds have di↵erent features and
vulnerabilities, which make them systemically important and a focus of regulators.
Within the financial system, MMFs are important providers of short-term funding, and a
diversified alternative in economical terms to bank deposits. As institutional investors,
they provide funding to a variety of businesses, other financial institutions, and even
governments. A confidence shock of MMFs and the subsequent redemption of shares
can have a crucial impact on both the funding market and on broader economic circum-
stances (IOSCO, 2012c). Shareholders have an incentive to redeem their shares for any
reason, before others do, as they might otherwise su↵er a loss. Money Market Funds
are neither equipped with regulatory capital bu↵ers nor with insurance for when they
must pay these liabilities. In order to meet redemption requests by investors, funds must
retain liquid resources, rather than investing in commercial papers or other short-term
instruments. This leads to funding problems for those relying on MMF investments. It
also makes apparent the reliance of traditional banks on short-term funding, and the
significant role of MMFs in funding markets (IOSCO, 2012d, p. 7).
Another characteristic of MMFs is their connection with the traditional banking sector,
through the investment of banks in MMF shares. This creates further vulnerabilities, as
during periods of stress funds may be confronted with large and simultaneous redemption
requests by banks (see Figure 3.1).
In comparison with banks, MMFs can be considered safe and diversified alternatives
to bank deposits. As collective investment schemes (CIS), they provide diversified and
high class rated investment opportunities, and enable investors to participate in favor-
able markets. Money Market Funds also constitute e cient cash-management tools for
diverse sophisticated investors and institutions (IOSCO, 2012c).
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The reliance of MMFs on capital support creates risks for capital sponsors, as sponsors
must cover potential losses, which could lead to contagion e↵ects. Reduced funding by
MMFs can also cause funding problems that can be transmitted throughout the system
and can throw of financial stability. This is another interconnection with the banking
sector, as traditional banks can function as MMF sponsors (IOSCO, 2012d, p. 8). It
should be noted that support by sponsors is implicit. Meaning, this support is expected
by the funds, but not guaranteed. This uncertainty regarding the availability of liquid
resources can enhance the likelihood of runs. Investors should be aware of the fact that
sponsors are not always willing and able to o↵er support. The IOSCO recommends that
these warning should be included in funds’ financial documentation (IOSCO, 2012e, p.
24). The eventuality of access to central bank liquidity will be discussed further on in
the last section of regulatory proposals to MMFs.
4.3.2.3 FSB Policy recommendations and further proposals
Current regulation
To implement adequate MMF regulation, recent trends and the current regulations
should first be considered. In the US, MMFs are regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 codified in 15 U.S.C. Para 80a-1–80a-64, Rule 2a-7 of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 amended in 2010 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)21. Adopted pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940, all
MMFs must be registered with the SEC. In the Euro Area, MMFs must comply with the
UCITS Directive. To harmonize CISs, the Committee of European Securities Regula-
tors (CERS) issued guidelines for CISs that apply to collective investment undertakings
authorized under the UCITS Directive, which was replaced by the European Securi-
ties Markets Association (ESMA) Committee of European Securities Regulators (2010).
Implementation of the UCITS Directive varies across jurisdictions in the Euro Area
and is accompanied by the simultaneous enforcement of the Eligible Assets Directive
(Directive 2007/16/EC and Committee of European Securities Regulators, 2007). Key
regulations that arose from the 2008–2009 financial crisis include the harmonization of
funds through CERS (now ESMA) in the Euro Area, as well as an Amendment to Rule
2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 in the US.
It is essential that funds comply with strict criteria concerning credit quality and liq-
uidity management. The interconnectedness with banks and other financial institutions
and their role within the financial system makes the safety of such funds extremely im-
portant. The IOSCO report emphasizes that policy options should reinforce the safety
and robustness of MMFs (IOSCO, 2012d, p. 14). Authorities should be able to explain
the rationale behind policy measures and regulatory changes, which will also help to
prevent unforeseen and undesirable reactions.
21(http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/ic-29132.pdf)
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The consultation report of April 2012 (IOSCO, 2012d) emphasizes the need for regulation
of the following issues: (1) the mandatory move to variable Net Asset Value
(vNAV) and structural alternatives, (2) the valuation and pricing framework,
(3) liquidity management, and (4) reliance on ratings. Referring to the scenario
stated before in Chapter 3, the following analysis will focus on liquidity management,
split into liability and asset-side regulation, valuation and pricing, and the mandatory
move to vNAV funds.
The following section analyzes the choice of regulatory instruments. Regulatory propos-
als by the FSB apply to di↵erent points of the modeled scenario of a modern-type bank
run and risks of transmission throughout the global financial system. Regulation focuses
on the mitigation of risks. Instruments concerning the direct regulation of MMFs will be
studied first. Their purpose is to stabilize MMFs against massive redemption requests.
This will prevent funding and liquidity gaps within the financial system due to excessive
asset sales and failed prolongation of repo contracts. The second purpose of these reg-
ulations is to ensure functional credit risk transfer process and repos contracts, thereby
ensuring short-term money market funding, the stability of MMFs, and the stability of
the larger financial system.
The susceptibility of MMFs to runs, and the threat this causes to overall financial
stability, indicates a need for regulation. The FSB proposed di↵erent instruments to
directly regulate MMFs, stabilizing the funds against the e↵ects of risks caused by
maturity and liquidity transformation, and preventing bank runs. To stabilize MMFs
against risks, funds need adequate liquidity management. Liquidity requirements or
redemption restrictions can help to reduce redemption pressure.
Possible barriers to competition and cluster risks should be kept in mind, as well as
how the proposed instruments may function in relation to each other, circumstances,
and stakeholders. Regulators propose di↵erent strategies to respond to stability and
systemic issues. The first strategy is changes to the valuation of funds (which will
be discussed in the second part of this section), and the second is the mitigation of
risks through structural restrictions of the asset and liability side of the balance sheet
(discussed in the following section).
Regulation of the Asset Side
Regulation of the asset side of MMF portfolios aims to restrict risks connected to cer-
tain investments and to raise liquidity, to better respond to liquidity shortfalls. The
fundamental objective is to obtain international harmonization to minimize liquidity
requirements. This has been mainly hampered by divergent classifications of liquid and
illiquid asset in di↵erent jurisdictions. Along with liquidity backstops, there could also
be requirements like redemption restrictions (e.g., the number of shares for sale) or liquid
fees for premature redemption of shares (for further information concerning the liquidity
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management of CISs (see IOSCO, 2013). These proposals include, but are not limited
to, provisions regarding the liquidity, maturity, and concentration of portfolio assets
(i.e., portfolio regulation). The establishment of mandatory liquidity bu↵ers also comes
into consideration. Strict portfolio regulation is a common practice for pension funds
and life insurances. However, in pension funds and insurances, portfolio regulation is
not used for stability purposes, but rather for the equalization and maximization of in-
vestment returns. To date, portfolio regulation has been conducted to protect investors’
endowments in fund shares and to ensure a certain liquidity of the fund portfolio to
cover potential losses. As in all cases, instruments used to ensure stability and protect
investors’ rights may have unintended e↵ects. In Europe, portfolio regulation for mutual
funds is grounded in the UCITS Directive. American funds are regulated under Rule
2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Davis (2000) analyzed the regulation of portfolios for pension funds and life insurances,
and found that the regulation of investments (concerning maturity, liquidity, and the
concentration of assets) a↵ects the competitive ability of funds, the optimal allocation
of assets, and the formation of an e cient portfolio. Davis (2000) describes this as an
inability to follow the frontier of e cient portfolios. A study by the European Com-
mission (1999) considered the quantitative regulation of portfolios to not be useful, as
this does not lead to an optimal allocation of assets. Funds could be at a competitive
disadvantage due to strict regulations that prevent them from structuring appropriate
portfolio following the frontier of e cient portfolios.
Given these threats to fund competitiveness, possible regulation has to be considered
with care. Competition also serves as a process whereby possible risks can be detected:
the enforced parallelization of competition through regulation might lead to undesired
arbitrage e↵ects and make the process of risk detection impossible. Competition should
be considered as an invigorating instrument and as beneficial for market vitality. Funds
that are subject to tighter portfolio regulations (i.e., when national directives di↵er)
have competitive disadvantages, and fund activities may simply move to less regulated
regions.
Furthermore, constraining specific investment portfolios increases cluster risks. Prior
to strict quantitative portfolio regulation, funds invested in di↵erent types of securities
(e.g., government and corporate bonds, ABSs, repos). Funds structured di↵erent port-
folios in pursuit of the frontier of e cient portfolios. These e cient portfolios might
di↵er in structure, volume, and risk appetite, in response to individuals needs. In some
cases, funds might have invested in similar assets, but with the concentration of par-
allel investments within limits. However, due to new strict portfolio regulations, funds
are now strongly compelled to invest in similar portfolios, with similar and or even the
same assets. Risks and benefits connected with these portfolio regulations could lead to
contagion e↵ects. All funds under regulation are exposed to the same risks and benefits
stemming from the composition of e cient portfolios. Losses and price declines could
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logically lead to a breakdown of any funds that hold these assets in their portfolios.
Minimal investment in similar or identical assets by various funds, or joint asset alloca-
tion, both reduce contagion e↵ects, restricting problems to a single fund or to a limited
number of funds. Portfolio regulation and compelled investment in the same assets and
asset classes raises a risk of clustering. Losses and price declines of assets a↵ect the
stability and portfolio performance of various funds. First, the funds are a↵ected by the
decline of asset values, since they have over-invested in the same assets. Transmission
e↵ects then result in price declines in related asset classes. These potential losses are
transmitted throughout the MMF sector and, subsequently, the whole financial sector.
Regulation of the Liability Side
The FSB has suggested instruments to address the liability side of MMF balance sheets
or to regulate requests for share disbursement. These regulatory proposals are geared
towards minimizing the risk of bank runs where investors of MMFs request sudden
redemption of MMF shares and subsequent fire-sale mechanisms. Instruments applied
to the liability side hope to diminish the herd behavior of investors, and the suspension of
redemption requests o↵ers funds valuable time to generate liquidity or liquidate assets
at reasonable prices to meet liabilities produced by redemption requests. This could
prevent fire sale mechanisms, as it is the compelled sale of assets that leads to price
markdowns and fire sales. These restrictions would be in the form of gates, fees, or
notice periods; investors would need to understand that the investment in funds is not
a perfect substitute in economic terms for bank deposits.
Share restrictions to control the liability side include di↵erent liquidity restrictions (e.g.,
gates, side pockets, withdrawal fees) and suspension instruments (e.g., lockup or redemp-
tion notice periods). Regulations that suspend the redemption of shares using lockup
or notice periods are used by hedge funds or other funds for institutional investors. To
request share redemption, investors need to comply with a determined notice period and
pre-announce their scheduled withdrawal. In case of a market depression, funds have
valuable time to liquidate parts of the portfolio.
For the hedge fund industry, these instruments have been incorporated into their busi-
ness model, rather than being used for stability purposes. This has enabled these funds
to invest in long-term assets, as the investor endowment is locked up for a specific period
of time, by contract. Managers are able to plan with a longer investment horizon and
to generate a higher portfolio return. Instruments such as notice and lockup periods
should, therefore, mitigate the risk of bank runs and enhance the overall stability of
the financial system. To date, most of the existing literature has been on the theme of
withdrawal suspension, or been on the theme of share restrictions as a business model,
as opposed to as a risk-reducing instrument. Share restrictions can be in the form of
transaction costs, which discourage the sale of fund shares by investors Maier et al.
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(2011). The, in most cases, empirical literature by Aragon (2007), as well as additional
work by Bali et al. (2007), Liang & Park (2007) and Agarwal et al. (2009) been on
the theme of an illiquidity premium in non-crisis periods. The previously cited work by
Aragon (2007) and Liang & Park (2007), as well as that by Khandani & Lo (2011), all
find a negative relationship between share restrictions and portfolio liquidity, indicating
that restrictions increases portfolio illiquidity. Schmid & Schaub (2013) empirically in-
vestigated the relationship between share restrictions and portfolio liquidity. According
to Liang (1999), instruments of suspension reduce the required liquidity needed in the
fund portfolios: since redemption needs to be pre-announced, funds do not need to hold
liquidity available to meet redemption requests by investors. Funds are therefore able to
invest in more long-term assets, and have valuable time to liquidate assets at moderate
prices, as opposed to with excessive markdowns. Managers that invest in longer-termed
assets might not be forced to make fire sales that might also be harmful to other funds
Coval & Sta↵ord (2007). A strict regulation of the liability side might, in light of these
findings, lower the need for portfolio restrictions.
Instruments that suspend impact or redemption requests should also be considered. For
example, is it possible to introduce suspension and gates as situative used instruments?
In this case, regulators should introduce specific proceedings and precise trigger points
to indicate when these instruments should be used. If those instruments are instead used
at individual funds’ discretion, they could be used inappropriately, which could irritate
investors and raise the risk of preemptive runs. Investors of funds could anticipate
problems in other funds, leading to run-like events. It is also not known if fund shares
would remain an attractive liquid alternative to bank deposits if regulation introduces a
permanent lock-up period or period for requested redemption - given such changes, the
private sector could be reluctant be invest, costing the MMF sector its major investor
group. The situational use of lock-up and notice periods could cause funds to anticipate
problems or could create negative market conditions, both of which might lead to runs
on other market participants. The market might react with asset markdown, and fire
sales could come into e↵ect earlier than expected.
Another question is how long this notice period should be, and whether this time interval
would actually su ce to liquidate relevant assets to meet redemption requests. The use
of notice and lock-up periods also draws into question the necessity of building up a
liquidity bu↵er - if banks are able to liquidate assets in time for a adequate price, it
might not be necessary to also hold liquidity. One possible option is a combination of
a notice or lock-up period and a liquidity bu↵er. An appropriate notice period could
reduce the amount of required liquidity, enabling funds to liquidate assets for a decent
price without delaying the payout of requested MMF shares to investors. Access to
central bank liquidity might also be one possible way to reduce the amount of liquidity
held in liquidity bu↵ers, and could potentially eliminate the need for a notice or lock-up
period.
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Alternative instruments to reduce the sudden withdrawal of fund shares are gates and
side pockets. Using these instruments, funds are able to hold on to a specific amount
of the portfolio assets and hence limiting the amount withdrawn (gates) or separate an
illiquid portion of the portfolio from liquid assets into a side pocket. This fraction of the
portfolio does not need to be liquidated to meet investor redemption requests, and can be
instead sold later on at a fair value, after the market has stabilized. These instruments
had been used in the past to ensure fund performance, as part of the portfolio can be
invested in more illiquid assets to meet expected performance. Introducing restrictive
instruments into the funds industry ensures that funds can invest in more illiquid and
complex assets under normal market conditions. In the 2008–2009 financial crisis, funds
were overwhelmed with extraordinary volumes of redemptions requests, which led to fire
sales. To cope with such high redemption requests, funds introduced side pockets and
gates. Through side pockets or gates, fund investors are forced to stay engaged with
the fund, at least to some degree. This enables at least some part of the portfolio to
recover from vast price declines. Gates can entail temporary, partial, or fully restricted
redemption of an endowment. By using side pockets, funds create a separate account
with an illiquid or hard-to-value proportion of the portfolio (Aiken et al. , 2013, p.
7). When these instruments are in place, investors must stay engaged with the funds
for an extended time. In their empirical study, Aiken et al. (2013) address liquidity
restrictions and their consequences for investors. These restrictions can extend fund
managers’ ability to invest in illiquid assets and avoid fire sales. However, on the other
hand, these instruments also impose costs on investors, and Aiken et al. (2013)’s study
indicated that such funds may perform poorly, meaning that investors do not benefit
from locked up accounts.
Klebeck (2012) argues that redemption requests lead to liquidity gaps as liquidity used
in repo transactions is used to meet investor requests (see the scenario analysis in Chap-
ter 3). As redemption requests might be satisfied through the liquidation of repos, funds
do not face a liquidity gap in the first place. The termination of repos can be consid-
ered a transitory process, with liquidity gaps arising further down the intermediation
chain, where other market participants rely on repo funding that has been discontinued.
Holding liquidity available or acquiring time through suspension might prepare funds for
sudden requests, but it also leads to poorer performance. Such restrictive instruments
are considered positive tools to increase financial stability, as they prevent investors from
redeeming their fund shares.
Using suspending instruments for one fund could influence other funds that do not
use suspension - if investors anticipate negative market conditions, they will transfer
these expectations to other funds, and make redemption requests. If this happens,
redemption requests will overwhelm other funds, triggering fire sales throughout the
financial system. In this case, instruments that are primarily intended to reduce the risk
of sudden redemption lead to increased redemption elsewhere. This risk was noted by
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the IOSCO (2011), which warned that instruments that suspend redemption or impose
costs can lead to herd behavior elsewhere in the financial system.
In case of a market breakdown, investors in MMFs may have an incentive to redeem
their investment as fast as possible to take advantage of the so-called “first mover advan-
tage.” McCabe et al. (2012) suggests a combination of share restrictions and liquidity
restrictions, meaning redemption is suspended to a later date and limited to a certain
percentage, to disincentivize a run on funds. The Minimum-Balance at Risk (MBR)
is a suggested small fraction that could only be redeemed with a delay. Consequently,
investors stay invested with a fraction of their endowment. This reduces the benefits of
early redemption, as investors share in any losses caused by withdrawal. The work of
McCabe and others outlines the MBR concept using a small example, which models the
optimal size and potential impact on liquidity and demand for MMFs. In terms of fees,
MBR can be classified as an internal fee for requested redemption.
The FBS has also suggested direct fees on redemption as another instrument of re-
demption restrictions, which would disincentivize sudden and overwhelming redemption.
Sudden redemptions oppose funds and remaining investors to costs associated with the
redemption of shares. Fees, as a restrictive instrument, are addressed by the HSBC
(2011a), Ge↵en & Fleming (2011a), and Ge↵en & Fleming (2011b). Similar to the argu-
mentation made by McCabe et al. (2012), the HSBC argues that sudden redemptions
requested by investors impose transaction costs on the remaining investors. Fees on
redemption, instead, redistribute these costs to those investors who are actually respon-
sible for these costs. The reasoning is that investors will have less of an incentive to
request redemption, as they will pay in the form of redemption fees. Ge↵en & Fleming
(2011a) and Ge↵en & Fleming (2011b) both support the HSBC (2011a) argumentation,
and consider fees a potent instrument to internalize any costs that may arise. The inter-
nalization of costs imposed by redeeming investors could be considered a Pigovian tax,
whereby a tax is applied to a market activity to regulate a negative externality and so
correct an ine cient market outcome. If redemption fees were introduced, funds might
be considered less desirable investment vehicles. However, conversely, such a regulation
could also attract new investors, who appreciated the risk mitigation added by such a
regulation.
Capital bu↵ers have been proposed as possible ways to improve MMFs’ general stabil-
ity, by providing an appropriate liquidity base. The build-up of a capital bu↵er ties up
resources that could otherwise be used for investment, a↵ecting the overall competitive-
ness of funds. Bu↵ers also influence or limit the possibility of repo contracts, as free
liquidity goes towards building up the required liquidity bu↵ers, instead of funding the
shadow banking intermediation chain through repo contracts - recall the risk-detecting
function of competition and possible disadvantages. In case of a crisis event, the capital
base should absorb possible losses, congruent with the capital bu↵ers of the Basel III
framework. However, the question arises as to whether these bu↵ers will mitigate risks
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as much as is hoped. From a psychological standpoint, it is not known whether the
establishment of a capital bu↵er might encourage investors to stay engaged with the
fund, even during times of financial stress or crisis.
A wide range of literature including the Squam Lake Group (2011), Mendelson & Hoerner
(2011), Goebel et al. (2011) and McCabe (2010) supports the creation of capital bu↵ers.
One of the first questions that arises is who is responsible for building up such bu↵ers.
There is considerable disagreement on this point. Goebel et al. (2011) thinks investors
themselves should be responsible, through retention of earnings. This would, however,
lead to a rather slow buildup. McCabe (2010) and BlackRock (2011) believe a third
party should be responsible for establishing bu↵ers (BlackRock, 2010); this would require
a sponsor to provide a capital bu↵er for the fund. A contingent commitment by a
sponsoring bank could partly be replaced by a capital bu↵er, changing that bank’s role
from a contingent sponsorship to an actual bu↵er. None of these alternatives address,
however, what would happen in the case of a critical event and how write-downs on the
capital bu↵er would proceeded. Such capital bu↵ers could also disincentivize prudent
risk management, as small management mistakes leading to losses would be absorbed
by the bu↵er.
Change in Valuation Practice
The use of cNAV funds raises the expectation that MMF shares are a risk-free cash
element. Conversely, a move to vNAV funds would counteract this expectation, and
would emphasize that MMFs are sensitive to losses and carry the potential risk of a run.
CNAV funds are established to maintain a stable value per share (i.e., usually Dollar
1 or Euro 1). The general NAV of a fund fluctuates. Therefore the market value of a
MMF share is not always fixed to a specific amount. In order to maintain a stable share
price cNAV funds use amortized cost accounting while evaluating assets. Shareholders of
MMFs purchase and redeem shares with a stable value. Using the amortized cost method
keeps the numerator stable. In the case of vNAV funds the numerator is calculated with
the mark-to market method which leads to a fluctuating numerator. Dividing a constant
numerator by a constant denominator results in a constant value. Dividing a fluctuating
numerator by a constant denominator results consequently in a fluctuating share value.
NAV =
Assets  Liabilities
Amount of shares
Evidence suggests that vNAV reduces shareholder incentive to run through price trans-
parency. A change to vNAV could reduce the risks associated with cNAV pricing. Vari-
able NAV funds reduce the likelihood of a run, as they allow for price fluctuation. These
funds also improve investor understanding of the risks associated with funds, and stress
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the clear distinction between MMF shares and bank deposits. The move to vNAV
could be challenging in certain jurisdictions, and might require a transition period. A
mandatory move to vNAV funds would also prohibit the use of amortized cost valuation.
However, full immunity against MMF runs is not ensured, even for vNAV funds. Dur-
ing the consultation process, respondents did not consider the risk of runs as su cient
reason to ban the use of cNAV (IOSCO, 2012e, p. 23; IOSCO, 2012d, p. 14, see also
EFAMA, 2012, p. 18). If there was a change in valuation, higher cost and complexity
would adequately reduce the expected risks.
In addition to the structural regulation of the asset and liability side, the FSB suggests a
change in the valuation practices of funds. Money Market Fund share value is generally
calculated using di↵erent valuation methods. Funds classified as cNAV calculate shares
using the amortized costs method, while variable vNAV funds calculate shares by fair
value (i.e., mark-to-market calculation). The regulatory proposal of a valuation change
dictates that the valuation of funds must shift from constant to variable valuation. The
present valuation of constant NAV shares reflects an ine↵ective mechanism to calculate
price risks. Constant valuation assumes that asset return has a minimal risk of loss.
Risks and return are mutualized. Many investors perceive shares with a constant NAV
as being deposit-like and collateralized investments. Using HSBC’s logic, a variable NAV
reflects changing share fluctuation, as well as the risks connected with the investment.
If they are made aware of these aspects, investors have a disincentive to request share
redemption.
Several papers have argued that a simple valuation change does not completely remove
the risk of a run (see ICI, 2012; HSBC, 2011b and Bengtsson, 2013). The HSBC (2011b)
holds that, while investors have a disincentive to redeem shares if they can observe
the fluctuation of shares, this is not su cient to fully eliminate the risk of a run. To
date, there is no clear evidence that cNAV and vNAV funds have unequal risks if the
fluctuation of share prices is observable. According to Financial Stability Board (2013c),
regulators consider the move to a floating NAV for prime institutional MMFs as useful
to be adopted.
Birdthistle (2010) and Gordon & Gandia (2012) support the idea of observable fluctu-
ation, a concept that enables investors to recognize the inherent risks and fluctuation
of investments, and that encourages them to stay engaged and withstand what appear
to be temporary changes in asset value. A number of alternatives to the elimination of
cNAV funds have been put forward (Birdthistle, 2010, Gordon & Gandia, 2012 and Wit-
mer, 2012). Collective collateralization, in the fashion of bank-like collateralization, is
one possible scenario. Birdthistle argues in favor for a bank-like collateralization similar
to deposit insurance. Possible is here a collateralization by the sponsor of fund-advisor.
In this scenario, a premium is raised and any costs that arise are distributed throughout
the investor base in the form of reduced interest. However, the possibility of central
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bank liquidity access or some kind of deposit insurance would entail regulation regard-
ing minimum balance requirements. This will be discussed further on in the section
regarding “central bank access”.
Fluctuations are not equivalent to market breakdowns; encouraging investors to under-
stand price fluctuations gives them a disincentive to run from MMFs at the first sign of
trouble. Alternatively, Gordon & Gandia (2012) advise implementing a capital bu↵er to
absorb possible losses (see McCabe et al. , 2012; for information concerning competitive-
ness of MMFs in the international markets see regulation of the asset side). According
to Witmer (2012), it is empirically evident that funds are less prone to risks if they
are valuated using a mark-to market method. Witmer (2012) empirically examines if
variable NAV provides any benefits. However, as mentioned before, elimination of cNAV
funds does not remove these risks entirely.
The negative e↵ects of changes in valuation practice (including administrative expendi-
tures) must also to be considered. It is also assumed that markets and other participants
in related financial transactions anticipate negative e↵ects stemming from those valua-
tion changes. The argument is that changing valuation practices will enable investors
to view the price development of their shares, making them more willing to hold onto
their investment as they anticipate growth under normal market conditions. This might
reduce the risk of a bank run and sudden redemptions. Being able to observe price
development allows investors to draw conclusions regarding future development, which
might encourage them to reclean large portions of their invested portfolio. This change
might not occur suddenly, but might have a major impact later on (Fisch & Roiter, 2011
and HSBC, 2011b).
Fisch & Roiter (2011) and HSBC (2011b) consider changes in valuation practice to be
counterproductive, reducing the stability and vitality of the entire fund sector. Further-
more, it is argued that cNAV and vNAV funds have similar characteristics, and that
simply making it possible to observe price fluctuation is not a strong enough reason
to undertake this valuation change. The HSBC (2011b), along with Jank & Wedow
(2010), find no empirical evidence that a change in valuation practice would guarantee
that there would be no bank run in the case of market distortion.
Another way to create awareness of sudden redemptions is to put into place policies and
procedures to evaluate the investor base regarding future cash needs, their approach to
risk, and level of sophistication. Regarding investor evaluation, there is a question of to
what extent it is possible to evaluate the investor base and individual investor sophis-
tication without imposing unbearable costs on funds. It is also unclear which criteria
institutional investors should use to calculate what constitutes a su cient investor base.
The IOSCO recommends adding additional safeguards to enhance stability in the overall
system, notably, limits on further purchases by individual investors, the establishment
of a minimum holding period, and the creation of a longer notice period for redemption.
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The IOSCO also recommends that MMFs conduct a regular stress testing based on his-
torical and/or hypothetical events (IOSCO, 2012e, p. 14). Funds should also be able to
react to exceptional market conditions and redemption pressure with a variety of tools.
Central Bank Access - A Proposal
As pointed out beforehand, MMFs do not receive explicit governmental support in the
form of access to central bank liquidity. Granting them access to a short-term supply
of liquidity might help avert negative consequences stemming from sudden redemption
requests. In the event of tremendous and sudden redemption requests by investors,
funds could then satisfy these requests with liquid resources supplied by the central
bank, rather than having to liquidate their portfolio positions, allowing these funds to
continue supplying market participants with MMF funding. By giving MMFs access to
central bank liquidity funds, these funds have an alternative source to serve requests by
investors, and the transmission of funding problems that have negative e↵ects on the
intermediation chain is stopped at an early stage.
The following section introduces the approach for granting MMFs access to central bank
facilities. Is the possibility to participate in open market and credit operation conducted
by the central bank legally feasible and how will this operations a↵ect the general pro-
ceedings of MMFs. Legal feasibility will be discussed further. Access to central bank
liquidity would be provided through open market and credit operations, as well as by
standing facilities. This would include refinancing operations with di↵erent maturities,
with main refinancing operations (MRO) of one-week liquidity. This would provide both
and long-term refinancing operations (LTRO). Main refinancing operations aim to man-
age short-term liquidity needs at participating institutions. Standing marginal lending
facilities would provide overnight liquidity to eligible counterparties. There is currently
some debate over whether MMFs can be considered eligible counterparties, and therefore
be granted access to central bank liquidity.
According to the Protocol (No 4) on the statute of the European System of Central
Banks of the ECB (defined by Art. 129 (2) TFEU), National Central Banks (NCB)
are authorized “to conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market
participants” in order “to achieve the objectives of the ESCB” (Protocol No 4 on the
Statute of the ESCB and ECB Art. 18.1 - C326/238). The EU defines a credit institution
through CRD IV and CRR as “an undertaking, the business of which is to take deposits
or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account” (Title
(1) Art. 3 No. 1 Pt. (1) - L176/351 of CRDIV - Directive 2013/36/EU and Part One
Title (1) Art. 4 No. 1 Pt. (1) of the CRR - Regulation (EU) No 575/2013). No definitive
answer can be given as to whether or not MMFs match this definition. Such funds receive
investments from the private sector, which can be regarded deposit-like. However, the
term share deviates from the legal term of deposit, as stated in the definition of taking
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deposits. Investment in MMF shares are “payable funds from the public.” By using
repo transactions as short-term securitized credit, MMFs “grant credit for [their] own
account.”
The ECB definition considers Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) “resident credit
institutions (as defined in EU law) and all other resident financial institutions whose
business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other
than MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic terms), to grant credit
and/or invest in securities” and “the latter group consists predominantly of money
market funds”22.
Following this argumentation, MMFs cannot be considered credit institutions in a legal
sense. They do, however, undertake the same tasks as credit institutions, from an
economics standpoint. From this point of view, MMFs can be considered other market
participants, as they perform activities closely related to those of credit institutions.
Hence, other market participants can be put on the same level as credit institutions.
Money Market Funds may therefore be eligible counterparties to participate in open
market and credit operations with the ECB.
Article 18.2. of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB states that
general principals for credit operations are specified by the ECB. Concerning this matter,
the Guidelines of the ECB from September 20, 2011 on monetary instruments and
procedures of the Euro System (The Governing Council of the European Central Bank,
2011a, L 331/11) are cited to articulate who is considered a transaction counterparty.
Eligible counterparties in outright and credit operations “may fulfill certain eligible
criteria” specified in 2.1(a) of the Guideline of the ECB; eligible counterparties comprise
“institutions subject to the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system according to Article
19.1. of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB [. . . ]. Institutions which
are exempt from their obligations under the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system [...]
are not eligible to be counterparties to Eurosystem standing facilities and open market
operations.”
As MMFs and other asset managers are not subject to the minimum reserve system, they
cannot be considered eligible counterparties in ECB open market and credit operations.
Under the current regulation, they therefore cannot have access to central bank money
through credit operations. In working to avert possible future financial crises, it might
instead be possible to engage other market participants in open market transactions to
bridge liquidity gaps and to secure the stability of the overall financial system.
In order for MMFs to be considered eligible counterparties to the ECB in open market
operations, the Guideline of the ECB need to be broaden who is included in the definition
of eligible counterparties in Article 2.1(a) of the Guideline of the ECB, beyond the
22http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossm.en.html#447
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institutions subject to the minimum reserve system by other market participants, which
includes MMFs. This would constitute a change of secondary legislation.
A change in secondary legislation would require lawmaking by the EU institutions within
the framework of their primary legislative powers. However, broadening Art. 2.1(a) of
the Guideline of the ECB would entail broadening the minimum reserve requirements to
include MMFs, in order to achieve the parallelization of their legal position. If MMFs
had the same rights (i.e., access to central bank liquidity through open market and credit
operations), they would need to have the same regulatory requirements (i.e., regulation
of minimum reserves).
Including MMFs under the minimum reserve requirements would require a change of Art.
19.1 of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. This change would
require changes in primary legislation by the ordinary legislative procedure. The bases
of such a change to the ECB statute are Art. 129 (3) TFEU and Art. 40 of the Protocol
No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB, which allow the European Parliament and
the European Council to change pre-defined articles, including Art. 19.1 of the Protocol
No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB, within the ordinary legislative procedure
outlined in Art. 294 TFEU.
The change of Art. 19.1 of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB would
require a change of the regulation of the central bank (Regulation (EU) No 1358/2011)
with an internal resolution of the ECB Governing Council. A change of the Council
Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 134/2002) is not required, as this Council Regulation
refers only flexible to Art. 19.1 of Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB.
However, a change in council regulations would indicate a procedure under Art. 129 (4)
TFEU, as these regulations are based on Art. 19.2 of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute
of the ESCB and ECB.
There is a question as to which liabilities from MMF balance sheets would be subject
to minimum reserve requirements. Unlike banks, funds do not receive deposits. How-
ever, as already mentioned, fund shares can be considered deposit-like in an economical
sense, which might be a legitimate reason to consider shares—and, by extension, the
funds issuing them—as subject to minimum reserve requirements. It is also unclear how
liquidity acquired through outright transactions with the central bank could be used
to mitigate the risk of a modern-type bank run. Liquidity gained in an open market
or credit operation cannot be transferred directly to private sector accounts to meet
redemptions requests.
Central bank liquidity could be used to mitigate the risk of a modern-type bank run,
thereby mitigating contagion e↵ects and preventing fire sales. In this scenario, in the
event of a redemption request, the Bi of the liability side is expected to decrease (see
Figure 4.1). To meet redemption requested by investors the fund is not willing to
liquidate assets or repo contracts in order to secure the funding of further entities in the
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Figure 4.1: Central Bank Access Step 1 - Decreasing Bi (orange #) needs to be served.
Raising of credit from the Central Bank implies raising reserves (green ").
Figure 4.2: Central Bank Access 2 - Transformation of reserves to Di held on the
bank’s balance sheet (Di green ").
shadow banking system. Since repos provided by funds play a major role within both
the funding of shadow banks in a narrow sense and banks, the fund is trying to secure
the funding, and consequently, the stability of the overall financial system.
As funds may participate in outright transactions with the central bank, they may
obtain liquidity through credit. This credit would appear on the liability side of the
fund’s balance sheet, and would generate a reserve, credited to the asset side (see Figure
4.1). The fund would then transfer these reserves as demand deposits into a banking
account (see Figure 4.2). In order to meet fund shareholder requests (Bi), the fund
would then reduce the level of demand deposits (Di #) before liquidating other assets.
The aggregated level of deposits on the bank’s balance sheet would therefore be balanced
out. The private sector would substitute the withdrawal of fund shares by making larger
bank deposits (Bi #, Dh "), as bank deposits are considered similar to fund shares for
private sector investors and promise a secure investment. On the bank’s balance sheet,
there would be an exchange of Di to Dh (see Figure 4.3). In the end, the access to
central bank liquidity would allow risks to be mitigated through the transfer of reserves
to a bank account and a reduction of those deposits in the event of large redemption
requests.
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Figure 4.3: Central Bank Access 3 - Funds reduce deposits Di # in the bank’s account
to meet redemption requests without liquidation of further assets. Households swap
Bhi # to Dh ". Level of deposits remains constant on the bank’s balance sheet as
deposits withdrawn by funds are balanced by enhanced deposits by the private sector.
4.3.3 Regulation of Repos and Securities Lending
4.3.3.1 FSB Workstream
The Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos developed policy options and recom-
mendations to enhance regulations. The FSB task force issued a consultation paper in
April 2012, followed by a Consultative Document in November 2012 Financial Stability
Board (2012c). Repo and securities lending constitute s ignificant global refinancing
options. Both options are important for price discovery and secondary market liquidity;
however, in addition to these benefits, repo instruments can create additional leverage
and enhance the risk of becoming illiquid in the event of failed follow-up financing (Fi-
nancial Stability Board, 2012c, p. 2). It is therefore crucial to investigate the special
characteristics and risks of repos, and of the approaches being proposed, to mitigate the
possibility of future market failure. The majority of participating institutions in repo
transactions are regulated entities. Banks, for instance, play a significant role and need
to be taken into account in creating a new policy framework. To date, as already men-
tioned in Chapter 2, regulation has been focused on consumer protection rather than on
financial stability. Policy goals regarding the repo and securities lending markets want
to ensure transparency and limit risks stemming from these transactions (e.g., the risk
of fire sales through a modern-type bank run), with the goal of guaranteeing overall
stability.
4.3.3.2 Repos and securities lending markets
The securities lending and repo markets can divided into four di↵erent market segments:
(1) the securities lending segment, (2) the leveraged investment fund financing and secu-
rities borrowing segment, (3) the inter-dealer repo segment, and (4) the repo-financing
segment (see Financial Stability Board, 2012b). For a detailed descriptive analysis of
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the repo segment and development within the 2008–2009 financial crisis, see Chapter 2.
The securities lending segment lends securities from institutional or other sophisticated
investors to banks and other lenders against collateral, such as cash or other securities.
This type of lending is typical for the US and Japanese markets. The second segment
assists in the financing of leveraged investment funds’ long positions, using revere repo
transactions or margin lending. This second segment also includes the lending of secu-
rities by prime brokers to cover short positions of hedge funds. The inter-dealer repo
segment covers repo transactions for government bonds among broker-dealers and banks,
with an overnight maturity. The last segment is the repo-financing segment. Here, banks
and broker–dealers borrow from cash-rich and sophisticated entities such as funds (e.g.,
MMFs). The key motivation of these banks and broker–dealers is to finance short-term
liquidity needs. Asset Backed Securities are regularly used as collateral, which can be
considered a key driver of the growth in ABS issuance (see Gorton & Metrick, 2010c),
Those repo transactions can be conducted as bilateral or tri-party transactions.
The FSB Workstream describes di↵erent drivers of market growth (see, Financial Sta-
bility Board, 2012b, p. 5). There is a need for money-like instruments for institutions
with a specific and individual certain risk aversion triggering the widening of repo trans-
actions in order to retain a required amount of liquidity. These entities usually do not
have regular or guaranteed access to central bank liquidity or similar guarantees. Mar-
ket participants, such as MMFs, reserve managers, insurances, and pension funds are
normally excluded from deposit insurance, or their invested cash holdings exceed the
amount normally covered by deposit insurance. Through repo transactions, these en-
tities are able to cover short-term lending with collateral and store cash surplus safely
- and with interest. The total value of repo transactions grew significantly, along with
the growth of institutional investors in the last three decades (see Gorton & Metrick,
2010b, p. 12). The growth of the repo segment has also been driven by the financing
needs of commercial banks and broker–dealers. Such entities use collateralized short-
term funding as part of their wholesale funding or securities dealing. Highly leveraged
or insu ciently creditworthy funds also use repo and securities lending transactions to
cover short-term liquidity needs. The increased supply for accessible securities to op-
timize collateralization due to growing securitization has enhanced the growth of repo
markets. The acquisition of collateral can be referred to as collateral mining; during
this process, banks and broker–dealers want to ensure the smooth conduct of repo and
security lending transactions. Another driver that has enhanced the growth of the repo
market has been the lending of securities by institutional investors to generate additional
income.
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4.3.3.3 Policy recommendations
General Annotations
The FSB (2012b) di↵erentiates between risks associated with shadow banking only and
risks that span traditional as well as shadow banking. Risks that are purely associated
with shadow banking include risks caused by the direct use of repos as money-like
instruments, short-term liabilities, and securities lending as a collateral reinvestment
instrument. All three of these activities enhance the use of maturity and liquidity
transformation outside the banking system and, hence, pose risks to the overall stability
of the financial system. Regulators and authorities could counteract those activities
by enhancing transparency, limiting risks arising through the build-up of leverage, and
limiting the reinvestment of cash collateral. Risks that arise from the interconnection
of banks and shadow banks, i.e., those that span both traditional and shadow banking,
include variations in asset values, which have a tendency to increase the procyclicality
of leverage; the risk of fire sales, which can cause counterparty defaults and sudden
redemptions; and the inadequate valuation of assets.
Various approaches to enhancing the stability of repo markets and, consequently, that
of the financial system, have been proposed. These approaches attempt to improve
transparency, as well as to address both specific regulatory issues and larger structural
concerns. To enhance transparency within the repo and securities lending markets, more
information needs to be made available to investors. This thesis will therefore, here,
discuss proposals that address the risk of high haircuts, which lead to the liquidation of
repos.
To date, banks and other major counterparties in repo transactions have been regulated,
and have been required to improve consumer protection and risk management for both
lenders and borrowers. As the Basel regulations are not harmonized across jurisdictions
and have not been fully implemented, the regulation of repo transactions still varies.
Further, the Basel regulations do not directly address specific repo market issues. The
regulated parties in repo transactions are banks, investment funds, and insurance com-
panies, all of which are restricted and regulated by di↵erent requirements. Together,
these regulations are intended to manage counterparty credit risks, liquidity risks, and
collateral guidelines (for more details, see Financial Stability Board, 2012b).
The FSB approaches focus on borrowing via the repo market, enhanced maturity and
liquidity transformation, investment of safe cash collateral in risky investments, and
collateral swaps. To address the stability of financial markets, regulation should focus
on the enhancement of transparency in complex and rapidly developing markets, stabi-
lization of repo instruments, and mitigation of procyclical leverage build-up. The re-use
and re-hypothecation of collaterals, as well as the re-investment of cash collateral, is also
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addressed. Investors may be uncertain about the source, use, and treatment of collater-
als. Policy goals mainly encompass the standardization and transparency of valuation,
as well as the documented use of collateral. In order to avoid fire sales and other risks,
regulators need to develop su cient valuation and management practices.
The Consultative Document of the Financial Stability Board (2012c) publishes policy
recommendations addressing transparency, disclosure and reporting, general regulation,
and structural aspects of the repo and securities lending segment. Since the repo and
securities lending markets are so complex, the FSB recommends improving transparency
in order to detect and monitor risks stemming from lending activities. Standardized data
and processes would be helpful in reducing complexity and processing various forms of
data, thereby improving regulatory reporting and enhancing market transparency. Data
collection could take place through regular reporting, trade repositories, and market
surveys coordinated by the FSB. The FSB Data Gaps Group developed a comprehensive
overview and consistent framework to pool and share relevant data.
Transparency and standardization
To improve general data availability and, hence, enhance transparency of the repo market
and repo transactions, the FSB Workstream on repos and securities lending suggests the
establishment of transactions registers (TRs), as well as a central clearing counterparty
(CCP). Before these systems can be put in place, however, more information is required
as to whether this regulated and artificially created transparency will indeed lead to a
more e cient pricing process. Regulators must also bear in mind the trade o↵ between
enhanced transparency and the costs of establishing TRs and CCPs. This constrained
transparency, data gathering, and forced trading via a CCP would also restrict freedom
of choice in conducting transactions, and might have the unintended consequence of
inhibiting potential transactions.
Transparency and enhanced disclosure requirements are assumed to o↵er more insight
into the interconnections among shadow banking entities and other financial intermedi-
aries, and to reduce complexity and risks. Both private investors and regulators ben-
efit from transparency and standardization, as enhanced transparency leads to liquid
markets, price detection, and risk valuation. Enhanced transparency also removes infor-
mation asymmetries between transaction counterparties, and stabilizes trust in market
conditions (see also IOSCO, 2011p).
Transaction registers would collect all date associated with repo transactions, including
size, volume, collateral, and involved counterparties. This acquisition, storage, and dis-
closure of data would enable regulators to supervise markets and transactions, allowing
them to identify the patterns and gaps that lead price irritations and potential distor-
tions. Distortion of the normal transaction process can be spotted using available data,
and the risks associated with transactions and underlying collateral can be accurately
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calculated. This call for comprehensive data gathering is also supported by Adrian et al.
(2013).
To fully enforce the scope of these TRs, it is important to set out general requirements
regarding how and to what extent data is gathered. The exchange of data between
di↵erent TRs is key to detecting interconnections and further commonalities between
transactions and counterparties; this allows regulators to implement precautionary mea-
sures in the event of a market breakdown. In addition to the data exchange between
di↵erent TRs, international or supranational data comparison would be facilitated, and
patterns in other regions could show evidence of distortions and enable regulators and
market participants to take precautions. The harmonization of requirements and data
gathering is supported by BIS and IOSCO (2011). Of course, one should bear in mind is
that not all data collected through a TR would be significant, and that TRs would not
deliver all of the desired information; for example, irregular transactions might not pro-
duce meaningful data. To be most useful, data collection needs to include information
about the frequency of various types of transactions.
The FSB’s consultative report introduces CCPs as another important structural and
transparency instrument. This multilateral netting might reduce the interconnection of
institutions within the market, and a central counterparty would also promote standard-
ized and centralized data. However, the benefits and costs of CCPs need to be taken
into account, as they pose a number of moral hazards and associated costs (for detailed
information see Financial Stability Board, 2012e). It is hoped that introducing CCPs
would reduce the complexity of the repo transaction market, as all counterparties con-
duct their lending transactions with one central counterparty, the CCP. As a result, the
sum of all repo transactions could be considered a non-transparent web with a number of
counterparties, where all participants contract with each other. A central counterparty
would structure these transactions and all transactions run in one direction.
The concept of CCPs has already been introduced to the derivatives market. Gai &
Kapadia (2011) examine the impact of the establishment of CCPS on complexity and
concentration. Their findings confirm the general assumption that CCPs would reduce
complexity and the number of bilateral contracts, helping the structure of the market to
evolve into a more radial and organized system. Transactions between already system-
ically important institutions would be reduced, as they now contract with the CCP as
opposed to directly with each other. It should be noted that the risk of direct contracts
is not eliminated, but is reallocated to the CCP.
This risk reduction between direct counterparties and reallocation to the CCPs has
also been approved by BIS and IOSCO (2004). The management of risks connected to
transactions though the CCP leads to a more resilient risk control. As noted by BIS and
IOSCO (2004) and Gai & Kapadia (2011), risk is not eliminated, but rather reallocated
to another market participant, which, as a result, becomes a significant and systemically
important institution. Putting CCPs in place would contribute to more standardization,
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as transactions with the CCP follow defined patterns. However, besides the positive
e↵ects, negative aspects also need to be taken into consideration. With the CCP as the
only transaction counterparty, all risks are reallocated and concentrated in the CCP,
making the CCP a systematically relevant institution whose failure could have severe
e↵ects on both the repo market and the overall financial system. The structure of the
market has been clearly modified, with the CCP becoming an important hub for repo
transactions. The failure of a CCP could lead to contagion e↵ects within the financial
system, especially if there were only one monopolistic CCP. Regulators need to ensure
that CCPs are subject to appropriate risk management (i.e., risk detection and control),
and that they have suitable resources and capitalization. Adequate risk management
implies that clear eligibility requirements concerning collaterals and processes are in
place for parties that wish to contract with CCPs.
With the overarching goal of risk reduction, especially due to systemic risks, the question
arises as to whether establishing a more structured and organized market would also
create new systemically important institutions that need to be supervised carefully.
The wisdom of a trade o↵ between risks stemming from unorganized and unstandardized
markets, and the creation of other systemically important institutions, is unclear.
The transparency concerns in the repo and securities lending segment also require en-
hanced disclosure of data and information about transactions (see Financial Stability
Board, 2012e). To improve corporate disclosure, institutions should frequently disclose
comprehensive information about their exposures and activities, improving investors’
and authorities’ insight into their activities. To date, disclosure practice is poor in com-
parison with the regulation of transactions and activities. Enhanced disclosure should
include the sources and use of collateral. This could be arranged as additional footnote
information, as templates for firms on the basis of Basel Pillar 3, or as more quantitative
information in the companie’s management report or the note. Information about im-
portant or large transactions should be disclosed on a very timely manner. The FSB has
also focused on improved reporting to end-investors. Reports of institutions involved in
repo and securities lending must deliver appropriate information to investors, to allow
those vendors to make informed investment decisions. This information should include,
for example, global data, such as securities on loans relative to assets under management;
absolute data, such as counterparty information and concentration; and specific data,
broken down into repo, reverse repo, and the re-use and re-hypothecation of collateral.
Another issue is the investment of cash collateral. The FSB intends to minimize the
risk stemming from cash collateral reinvestment through the introduction of minimum
standards. To accomplish this, high-level principals were derived (see Financial Stability
Board, 2012e, p. 20). Investors of cash collaterals should be prepared for unexpected
requests for cash collateral that can be recalled at any time on short notice. Investment
guidelines and strategies should take this into account before investing the liquidity
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available. Furthermore, the use of cash collateral should be consistent with the over-
all investment policy of investment institutions, so as to add no further risks. For the
purpose of enhanced transparency and disclosure, transactions should be properly doc-
umented and communicated to all stakeholders. Those guidelines should be approved,
documented, and regularly reviewed. To mitigate risks due, for example, to liquidity
and maturity, investments should be limited and in line with consistent risk management
structures.
To ensure the proper re-use or re-hypothecation of collaterals, so as to mitigate risks
and deter excessive leverage build-up, Financial Stability Board (2012e) is lobbying
for more safeguards, su cient disclosure, and adequate regulation of liquidity risks.
These changes would improve investors’ understanding of their exposure. The harmo-
nization of re-hypothecation requirements would prevent cross-border arbitrage, and
re-hypothecation activities should not encompass own-account transactions.
Structural regulation
Haircuts reflect changes in collateral value and should therefore capture risks associated
with the quality and value of collateral. Haircuts also reflect the expected liquidity un-
der all market conditions, as well as the risk of price fluctuations during times of market
stress. The value of collateral is influenced by the simultaneous liquidation of large ex-
posures, the concentration of a single counterparty and default; all of these influences
should therefore be taken into account. The FSB has proposed minimum standards and
guidelines for calculating haircuts appropriately. Financial Stability Board (2012e) intro-
duced a framework for haircut regulation and for the minimum margins to compensate
against losses.
Unusual changes in haircuts (particularly during the 2008–2009 financial crisis) can
enhance the risk of procyclicality (see Chapter 3) and harm financial stability. The
literature has emphasized the need for constant haircuts in order to mitigate those risks
(BIS, 2010; Ashcraft et al. , 2010, and Charles A.E. Goodhart and Anil K Kashyap
and Dimitrios P. Tsomocos and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2012). As mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, however, raising haircuts might trigger entities to liquidate their
assets rapidly, before the values decline further, so as to ensure a decent sales price.
Raising haircuts would distort markets and might lead to destabilizing actions by market
participants, including runs on bank deposits or MMF shares. The regulation of haircuts
up to a peak value might (i.e., constant haircut) cause contagion e↵ects. However,
constant haircuts are not being considered as a stand-alone instrument to mitigate risks
associated with repo transactions (see ICMA, 2012; Gai & Kapadia, 2011 and Charles
A.E. Goodhart and Anil K Kashyap and Dimitrios P. Tsomocos and Alexandros P.
Vardoulakis, 2012).
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To date, there is insu cient significant data on the impact of constant haircuts on
procyclicality, leaving questions about how constant haircuts should be designed so as
to generate the most significant positive impact and best mitigate risks. A constant
haircut needs to cover a number of di↵erent types of collateral, which di↵er in respect
to their ability to be liquidated, their maturity, and their quality, all of which need to
be considered to set a constant haircut. Omitting any of these aspects could have severe
negative e↵ects on financial stability. For instance, if there was one specific underlying
aspect not covered by the haircut regulation, a negative development in the underlying
aspect could have an e↵ect on the haircut of this transaction, and could consequently
impact the value of other types of collateral and assets, even perhaps triggering fire sales.
With regard to the establishment of CCPs, the regulation of constant haircuts could be
beneficial, as constant haircuts support standardization and transparency of transaction.
However, the introduction of constant haircuts could also trigger a rationing e↵ect and
intrude into the price detection mechanism. It is possible that transactions might not
be performed with a strict and constant haircut that is set. Since haircuts are generally
negotiated while performing the transaction and reflect the individual development of
the underlying activities, a constant haircut is unable to ensure a correct reflection of the
development and risks associated with the collateral. The setting of a small, regulated
haircut could that risks are reflected insu ciently. Setting the haircut level to high
might entail the circumstance that transactions are not conducted at all and leaves
counterparties with unsatisfied liquidity positions.
4.3.4 Securitization issues
4.3.4.1 Securitization in general
The IOSCO, in coordination with the BCBS, was mandated to find regulatory ap-
proaches for securitization. Following a consultation report in April 2012, the IOSCO
issued the final report on “Global developments in Securitization” in November 2012
(IOSCO, 2012a). The IOSCO gave an overall analysis of global initiatives on securitiza-
tion regulation (e.e, risk retention, transparency, and standardization, and further). In
this analysis, the US and the EU were named as the largest markets, globally, making
them of particular interest for regulators and capital market authorities. The US and
the EU are similar but independent regulatory regimes. Any policy needs to support the
recovery of global securitization markets, restore trust and confidence, and prevent the
creation of excessive leverage. To achieve these aims, the IOSCO and the BCBS want
the following issues to be addressed: (1) risk retention by investors and originators,
(2) improved and standardized disclosure, and (3) investor understanding of complex
securitization products (IOSCO, 2012a and IOSCO, 2012b)
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Securitization markets are crucial, as they constitute a valuable alternative funding
market (see, Chapter 3 for information on the funding on shadow banks in a narrow sense
and Chapter 4 for information on the relevance of securitization within the presented
scenario). Securitization markets enable investors to raise funds from alternative and
diversified sources. In the 1980s, housing in the US was almost completely financed
through securitization, although the full diverse benefits not fully unfolded. Banks also
rely on funding from securitization markets, which depend on sound and reliable markets.
Banks receive liquidity and freed up regulatory capital through the securitization of
illiquid assets. Looking back on the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, financial markets
and securitization markets were adversely a↵ected by an overreliance on ratings, a lack
of due diligence on the part of investors, and inadequate pricing of risk. Securitization
markets are not purely domestic, and cross border-issuance and investment are crucial
features. Securitization markets vary across jurisdictions in terminology, underlying
assets, forms, and structure of issuance. Those di↵erences reflect diverse regulatory
regimes and can impose additional costs on market participants who interact across
borders. Consistency and integration for all market actors is the desired goal, in order
to prevent additional costs (IOSCO, 2012b).
Data shows, that the securitization market in the US seems to be recovering, although
the European market is still weakened. Several data sources can provide an approximate
picture of the securitization markets. Data provided by the Securities Industry and
Markets Association (SIFMA), was used in IOSCO (2012b) final report, and set the size
of the US non-agency issuance at Dollar 124 billion in 2011. Most securitized underlyings
in the US are auto and student loans. The European market peaked in 2008 with Euro
700 billion (of which Euro 25 billion have o cially been placed on the market, the rest
was retained), and is now valued at Euro 207 billion (Euro 88 billion placed). For a
comprehensive overview of the development of the securitization market in the Euro
Area and the US see Chapter 3.
A sound securitization process plays a crucial role in preventing scenarios such as
modern-type bank runs and their negative sequelae. A high-qualitative and well-functioning
securitization process determines the value of the securitized assets and promotes their
value development. Stable asset values of, for example, ABSs and ABCPs, are crucial
in protecting from sudden and unexpected price declines in the event of a modern-type
bank run.
In the following section, the instruments of risk retention will be analyzed further. Risk
retention is considered crucial to signal stability and to the quality of a well-functioning
securitization process, stabilizing the value of ABSs and ABCPs against price declines.
Chapter 4. Proposed Regulation addressing the Shadow Banking System 113
4.3.4.2 Policy recommendations
Risk retention
In 2009 the G20 recommended that originators and sponsors should be obliged to retain
part of the risks connected with the underlying (G20, 2009). To date, especially in the
time leading up to the financial crisis, investors did not pay attention to information
asymmetries. Retaining a proportion of the securitized portfolio aims to mitigate risks
that arise due to imperfect securitization processes, as well as to adjust misaligned
incentives between suppliers of securitized products and their investors. Retaining a
proportion of the securitized portfolio is also hoped to mitigate regulatory arbitrage.
If sponsors and originators retain a proportion of the issued portfolio or underlying
assets–colloquially referred to as having some “skin in the game”—this might reduce
adverse selection and other agency problems 23. Regulators from both the EU and the
US have attempted to address the issue of risk retention with di↵erent overall approaches,
forms of retention, and exemptions. As with any other form of regulation that di↵ers
across jurisdictions, these regulatory di↵erences could cause friction in the form of access
barriers, compliance costs, and limited flexibility (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 16).
In the Euro Area, retention is set out in the CRD II framework and in guidelines cre-
ated by the EBA. In accordance with CRD II, credit institutions in the Euro Area are
prohibited from investing in securitized products unless the originator or sponsor of the
securitized product retains no less than five percent of the investment. Hopefully, this
ensures that sponsors and originations issue quality products, and have an incentive to
carefully analyze and evaluate the risks of the underlying portfolio. This self-interested
behavior should then signal true portfolio quality. In the US, regulation under the Ex-
change Act requires that sponsors directly retain an interest equal to no less than five
percent of the credit risk connected with the underlying asset. Originators and sponsors
are therefore strongly encouraged to exercise due diligence, as they keep a proportion
of any exposure to risk. The EU approach, in contrast, tends to protect institutional
investors and consequently the the private sector, including households and firms, who
purchase securitized products. However, this more indirect regulatory framework leaves
investors uncertain about whether the originating parties truly comply with the risk
retention requirements. This uncertainty creates additional complexity, creating a need
for more disclosure requirements. These cross-border di↵erences in regulation create
tension and need to be addressed (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 18). The US’s direct risk retention
approach encourages a more stringent due diligence process in portfolio management,
as the issuer retains a proportion of the pure and undiversified risks associated with the
underlying portfolio. In the Euro Area, issuers are, instead, indirectly encouraged to
retain risks: retention requirements are attached to the investor side, forcing issuers to
provide stringent and precise due diligence to persuade investors to invest. Issuers in the
23For more on agency problems and signaling, see Leland & Pyle (1977) and Gorton & Rosen (1995)
Chapter 4. Proposed Regulation addressing the Shadow Banking System 114
EU are also compelled to retain a required proportion of their portfolio, and exposures
and interests cannot be sold or hedged in any way.
The EU directive CRD II introduces risk retention with Article 122a, and will apply
to all credit institutions that are subject to State Member authorization. “A credit
institution, other than when acting as an originator, a sponsor or original lender, shall
be exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position in its trading book or non-
trading book only if the originator, sponsor or original lender has explicitly disclosed to
the credit institution that it will retain, on an ongoing basis, a material net economic
interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 5 %.” (The European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union, 2009a, p. L302/110 and Art 404-410 CRR -
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013). In this rather indirect approach, originators are not
directly required jurisdiction to retain a proportion of their portfolio. If originators wish
to place securities for sale in securitization markets they need to retain at least five
percent, so regulated credit institutions are allowed to to hold securitized positions as
an investment. This retention can be structured in di↵erent ways. The issuer is obliged
to retain at least five percent of the nominal value of each tranche sold or transferred
(i.e., vertical slice). In the case of revolving securitization, issuers retain a pari passu
share of no less than 5 percent of the nominal exposure value. This can be in the
form of at least 5 percent of randomly selected exposures or, alternatively, investors can
retain the first-loss piece of the transaction, and other tranches, so that the retention
(in total) equals no less than 5 percent (The European Parliament and the Council of
the European Union, 2009a, p. L302/110 andCEBS (2010)).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires a general risk retention of no less than 5
percent. Acceptable forms are similar to those under CRD II. Under the vertical slice
option, issuers are obliged to retain no less than 5 percent of each class in a securitization
transaction. The horizontal retention option demands the retention of at least 5 percent
of the pay last (i.e., FLP) residual of the credit risk of the entire securitized asset pool.
A hybrid option constitutes the L-shaped retention option, whereby a sponsor is obliged
to retain at least 50 percent in the form of a vertical slice and 50 percent in the form of a
horizontal slice. Sponsors are also free to use the representative sample option, whereby
no less than 5 percent of a randomly selected representative sample of the securitized
assets is being retained. Finally, in securitization transactions in the form of a revolving
asset master trust, the sponsor typically retains at least 5 percent of the unpaid principal
balance of all assets held (i.e., seller’s interest) (SEA, n.d., Section 15G p. 253↵ amended
through DF2, 2010, Section 941 p. 515).
Both EU and US regulations include exceptions and safe harbor provisions. Here, too,
regulation di↵ers significantly across jurisdictions: US sponsors or originators do not
need to retain any portion if ABSs are collateralized by certain high quality assets. The
definition of ABSs includes high quality commercial loans, commercial real estate loans,
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automobile loans, and residential loans, as well as other loans that are backed by govern-
ment insurance or guaranteed assets. In the EU, retention does not apply if exposures
are guaranteed by (1) central governments or central banks, regional governments, local
authorities or public sector entities of any Member States; (2) institutions to which a
50% risk weight or less is assigned; or (3) multilateral development banks (The European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009a, Paragraph 3 p. L302/111).
Authorities should limit exemptions to risk retention to only when strictly necessary, as
cross-border issuance is widespread (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 48).
In order to conduct proper cross-border issuance, issuers of ABSs are expected to comply
with retention requirements of the pertinent jurisdictions. Although some structures are
able to meet all requirements, this also entails a loss of flexibility, as complying with both
sets of requirements precludes certain securitization structures, and imposes adoption
costs (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 21). Exceptions impede cross-border issuance and could have
unintended consequences and incentive alignment. Competitive distortion could occur
if foreign issuers want to comply with di↵erent requirements and use exemptions; na-
tional issuers clearly have competitive advantages. Those aspects need to be taken into
consideration when seeking to achieve global harmonization. Jurisdictions have di↵erent
levels of risk retention requirements. Authorities should develop clear and consistent ap-
proaches, which explain requirements and the rationale behind any exemptions, thereby
avoiding competitive distortion and revitalizing international securitization markets.
The following principles support e↵ective risk retention, and need to be kept in mind in
analyzing the retention regulation of the Euro Area and the US (see Geithner, 2011: (1)
retention needs to align incentives to mitigate risks and stabilize the market. (2) When
originators have a stake in the outcome, this provides greater certainty and confidence
among other market participants. (3) Risk retention should promote an e cient allo-
cation of capital to those investors who are subject to risk retention. However, (4) risk
retention rates should preserve flexibility, as the market and other circumstances may
evolve. (5) A broad range of market participants should be able to continue to safely
engage in lending activities.
The majority of academic papers emphasize the importance of risk retention and incen-
tives in monitoring and screening regulations (see Ki↵ & Kisser, 2010; Ki↵ & Kisser,
2011; Fender & Mitchell, 2009b; Fender & Mitchell, 2009a; Geithner, 2011 and IOSCO,
2012b).24 Of their own volition, originators are already retaining parts of their secu-
ritized portfolios for signaling purpose; this highlights the quality of the underlying
portfolio and encourages market participants to purchase the securitized assets. This
signaling communicates that the originator has ‘”skin in the game” in terms of both
costs due to monitoring e↵orts and portfolio-related risks.
24“These requirements have been and are being developed as a means of addressing misaligned incen-
tives that may be embedded in the ‘originate to distribute’ model of some securitization products with
a view to encouraging prudent behavior by issuers and sponsors.” IOSCO (2012b).
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Although most academic papers support risk retention, all of them question the ef-
ficiency of fixed retention rates (Ki↵ & Kisser, 2010; Ki↵ & Kisser, 2011; Fender &
Mitchell, 2009b; Fender & Mitchell, 2009a and Malekan & Dionne, 2012). United States
and Euro Area Regulators introduced a fixed retention rate of at least 5%. However,
this fixed rate does not account for the variety of di↵erent underlyings and participants
in securitization transactions (see Wu & Guo, 2010). The Sta↵ & the FSB Secretariat
(2009) found that the retention rate is a↵ected by a complex array of traits, including
accounting standards, capital requirements, and market conditions. Investors are di-
rectly incentivized by this required retention to invest and operate prudently. Fender
& Mitchell (2009b) also argue that optimal retention is influenced by the size of the
retained tranches and the economic position of the originator. This enumeration can be
completed based on the size of the total portfolio, which impacts the optimal amount of
retention in ways beyond the percentage that has to be retained. This indicates that,
by extension, not all originators can bear the same retention rate: for originators with a
strong capital base, a low retention rate loses the incentivizing e↵ect and might enable
riskier engagements; to smaller originators that depend on sales revenue from securiti-
zation, a fixed and - from their perspective - high retention rate might cause negative
e↵ects. Retention regulation should be flexible and adapt to the existing circumstances
and the characteristics of individual originators and underlying portfolios. This individ-
ualized approach is supported by Ki↵ & Kisser (2011), who argue that a di↵erent credit
pool has a severe impact on the e↵ectiveness of retention.
In addition to external components that can determine e↵ective risk retention rates,
there remain questions as to what part of the underlying portfolio should be retained
so as to ensure the desired impact. Regulations by the EU and the US take di↵erent
approaches to determining the retained parts of portfolios. Ki↵ & Kisser (2011) and
Fender & Mitchell (2009b) argue that strictly retaining the FLP does not necessarily
create the best incentive.
Clearly, the regulation of risk retention needs to be expanded and harmonized to ensure
that the desired incentives and impacts are achieved. The fixed retention that has been
introduced by regulators will not necessarily generate the desired outcome; rather, the
retention rate must adapt to the characteristics of the underlying portfolio and to the
needs of the specific originator. In establishing an optimal retention rate, regulators
should consider the concentration of creditors or specific kinds of credit within the port-
folio, potential future development of the portfolio, and surrounding market conditions
of competitors.
The proposed framework of optimal risk retention needs to be harmonized to prevent
regulatory arbitrage across borders, and other adverse e↵ects. It is especially important
that regulations of risk retention are harmonized between the Euro Area and the US, as
these are the two largest markets. Ideally, a globally consistent regulatory framework
on risk retention calculation should be established.
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The indirect regulatory approach of the Euro Area might leave originators that do not
retain a proportion of their securitized portfolio with unsold positions. However, it
also enables investors to choose from variety of investment possibilities to match their
individual risk appetite, as they might wish to invest in securitized portfolios that are not
subject to retention requirements and therefore possibly o↵er a higher yield. The indirect
approach of the Euro Area might open up possibilities for all market participants, as
opposed to regulating them. However, this topic is not being explored, as this thesis
focuses on the establishment of risk retention.
Transparency and disclosure
To enhance transparency and build confidence in securitization markets and instruments,
it is essential to implement strong disclosure requirements. This aim is well developed,
and harmonized minimum disclosure requirements already exist for a number of juris-
dictions. An analysis of US and EU markets indicates that regulation is already in place
requiring upfront and ongoing disclosure. Upfront disclosure regulations vary according
to whether ABSs are o↵ered publically or privately. In the US, publically o↵ered ABSs
must disclose comprehensive data about payment allocation, credit enhancements, fees,
and expenses payable (DF2, 2010, Section 943). European regulations (defined in the
Prospectus Directive 2010/73/EU) require information about credit enhancements, sub-
ordinate debt facilities, and payment allocation and priorities to be disclosed (IOSCO,
2012b, p. 29). Publically o↵ered ABSs in the EU must comply with CDR II and
AIFMD. Originators and sponsors need to supply a great deal of upfront information,
so as to enable a comprehensive assessment. This information includes data regarding
credit quality and performance of the underlying asset, structure, cash flow, collateral
support, and stress testing (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 30).
The content and form of ongoing disclosure vary across jurisdictions. The EU Prospectus
Directive does not include specific requirements, meaning that there are no required
updates if significant changes occur. Institutions are solely obliged to inform investors
and regulatory authorities if they do or do not supply investors with permanent and
ongoing disclosure information. Under the CDR II, issuers must supply investors with
relevant information to comply with their due diligence obligations. United States issuers
are bound by Exchange Act 15(d) to disclose information for the life of the security.
The disclosure of stress testing information and the outcomes of scenario analysis are of
special interest, as this information allows investors to conduct their own due diligence.
Experts in this area agree that regulatory authorities should support the need for robust
and timely information, which allows investors to conduct detailed analysis and due
diligence and make informed investment decisions, while also avoiding overreliance on
CRA. It is important to provide tools and indicators to investors, so they can conduct
their own stress testing geared to their own information needs (IOSCO, 2012b, p. 34).
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However, the information required is dependent on individual investors’ sophistication
and needs, raising the question as to what kind and level of investor sophistication
regulators want to cater to. It might be too ambitious to cover too wide a range of
heterogeneous investors, as regulators must balance costs and benefits, and providing so
much information might be excessively burdensome for fund originators.
There are also questions regarding disclosure standardization. Most jurisdictions do not
require a standard format for the presentation and documentation of disclosed informa-
tion, in terms of the nature, content, or verification of information. The IOSCO sees
standardization as useful in supporting transparency and facilitating disclosure. There
are regulations regarding asset-level disclosure in several jurisdictions. The goal of the
IOSCO is to strengthen the existing framework, rather than to build a new one. The
enhancement of harmonization supports cross-border issuance, and the standardization
of information and data allows investors to make informed investment decisions (IOSCO,
2012b, p. 29). To achieve this goal, it might be useful to require some minimum level of
harmonized information regarding risk and reward profiles, fees and expenses, possible
scenarios, and securitization structures, as well as performance information for the un-
derlying portfolio and equal access to data and information, without the intermediation
of credit rating agencies. Harmonized disclosure would enhance global comparability of
the securitization process and hence the quality of the process.
Issuers are also being encouraged to o↵er more standardized and less complex products,
so as to create sustainable securitization markets. With regard to liquidity, investors in
securitized products should be able to liquidate their assets in times of market eruptions,
without excessive discounts or time restraints. Regulators should focus on the simplic-
ity and standardization of securitized products and processes. Many jurisdictions favor
greater harmonization, as global minimum harmonization—comprising harmonized stan-
dards for disclosure and standardization of processes, as well as simplified access and
pooling of information—would create greater comparability and transparency.
4.4 Summary
Following the descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 and the walk-through of the scenario in
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 addresses potential regulation of selected aspects of the shadow
banking system. Proposed regulation pertains mainly to the regulation of MMFs to
mitigate risks within the MMF sector, regulation of the securitization process to stabilize
the quality and valuation of asset prices, and regulation of the repo market to mitigate
procyclicality and to stabilize repo funding of the shadow banking system.
Banking regulation has changed in the wake of the financial crisis. The BCBS introduced
new regulation in the form of Basel II.5 and Basel III. These new banking regulations
aim to strengthen the quality, quantity, and consistency of required capital and liquidity,
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and have a goal of enhancing the overall resiliency of banks. The impact of such banking
regulation on the shadow banking sector, due to their interconnections, is addressed by
WS 1 of the shadow banking regulation proposal framework. The BCBS worked out
an agenda addressing many of the regulatory issues that concern shadow banks. These
issues include the consistent consolidation of banking activities, so as to capture potential
risks and mitigate arbitrage opportunities; a framework to measure and control large
exposures by banks and shadow banks, to protect banks from the risks involved with
those lending activities; and banks’ investment in fund equity. In addition to WS 1,
the FSB, as mandated by the G20, has proposed further regulatory changes concerning
MMF regulation (WS 2), other shadow banking entities (WS 3), securitization (Ws 4),
andS repos and securities lending (WS 5).
The analysis of the proposed shadow banking regulation in this thesis concentrates on
proposals regarding MMFs, securitization, and repo transactions.The proposed regula-
tion of MMFs seeks to reduce entities’ susceptibility to runs. This proposals focus mainly
on the regulation of asset-side characteristics (i.e., regulation of the portfolio structure),
the regulation of liability-side characteristics (i.e., suspending redemption, introducing
liquidity fees and gates), and changing the valuation practice of MMFs from cNAV to
vNAV. Access to central bank liquidity has also been proposed. At the time of this
writing, changes in vNAV valuation, as well as the introduction of liquidity fees and
redemption gates are seen as probable, while access to central bank liquidity remains
contentious.
To enhance the quality of the securitization process and stabilize the value of securi-
tized assets, regulators have introduced retention requirements for originators. A fixed
retention rate of at least five percent is currently being discussed in academic circles. To
have the intended e↵ect, the retention rate should be flexibly calculated as a function of
the underlying portfolio and characteristics of the originator, as well as external market
conditions, expected developments, and additional influencing factors.
To address the risks detected in the modern-type bank run scenario, the last section of
Chapter 4 discusses regulation of the repo and securities lending markets. Regulators
have suggested the introduction of TRs and CCPs, to enhance transparency and reduce
complexity, as well as the regulation of haircuts, to reduce procyclical e↵ects that may
arise through moving haircuts. Overall, the introduction of TRs and CCPs is regarded
as a positive step towards transparency and reduced complexity in repo transactions.
The introduction of CCPs, however, bears the risk of creating another systemically
important market participant that needs to be supervised and monitored. The regulation
of haircuts also needs to be approached with care: the intention of capping haircuts to
moderate fluctuations and procyclicality and so stabilize the financial system is clear.
However, the regulation of haircuts could constitute an excessive influence on price
detection and trading. Such regulated haircuts might discourage many transactions,
leaving liquidity or security demands unsatisfied.
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In general, the proposed regulations target enhanced transparency and reduced com-
plexity in both shadow banking activities and in interconnections among market partic-
ipants. In implementing regulatory proposals, however, regulators should keep in mind
possible spillover e↵ects, adverse reactions, and interdependencies, so as to ensure the
most e↵ective regulation.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
The size and nature of the shadow banking system contributed to the growing impor-
tance of shadow banks within the global financial system. Shadow banks o↵er investors
additional investment possibilities, and provide both a funding source to many market
participants and risk transfer possibilities to loan originators. However, this lightly reg-
ulated class of entities and activities has destabilized the global financial system due to
excessive leverage, CRT, amplified procyclicality, a lack of government guarantees, and
missing access to liquidity backstops.
The present work aimed to outline the structure of the shadow banking intermediation
system and to analyze the development of di↵erent entities and activities. Chapter 2
provides an overview of the definitions developed by recent research on shadow bank-
ing, and demonstrates how these definitions strongly influence what is understood to be
the size and composition of the shadow banking system. Once definitions were estab-
lished, the main entities involved in loan origination, loan warehousing and securitiza-
tion, and wholesale funding were analyzed with regard to their development within the
past decade, with an especial focus on the 2008–2009 financial crisis.
Several shadow banking system entities experienced sharp declines in 2008 and 2009,
although various sectors developed di↵erently in di↵erent regions. However, the overall
growth of the shadow banking system from Dollar 67 trillion in 2009 to Dollar 71 trillion
in 2013 indicates that most sectors recovered very well after the crisis. The shadow bank-
ing system is, in this context, described as a chain of entities covering di↵erent functions
(i.e., loan origination, loan warehousing and securitization, and wholesale funding) of
the intermediation process. The shadow banking system was found to be mostly short-
term funded through MMFs, giving these funds a major role within the shadow banking
system.
Chapter 3 analyses the main points of interruption within the shadow banking interme-
diation chain through the scenario of a modern-type bank run on MMFs. This scenario
shows that redemption requests to MMFs are transferred throughout the whole system
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via the interconnections among market participants. Although MMFs might be initially
a↵ected by the run, they just liqudate their assets, thereby passing on these funding
problems to the entities that rely on the short-term funding that they o↵er. This causes
a chain of funding gaps, triggering the further liquidation of assets throughout the whole
system. This prompts a number of severe asset valuation problems, culminating in fire
sales of all asset classes within the financial system.
The problems and risks described in Chapter 3 that are inherent to the financial system
are addressed in regulation proposed by the FSB. Chapter 4 outlines the structures
of proposed regulation and evaluates their e↵ectiveness in controlling MMF stability,
defective CRT and risk retention, and stable repo and securities lending contracting.
In light of this analysis, MMF stability emerged as one of the key points in stabilizing
the funding of the shadow banking system, and, consequently, the financial system as a
whole. Regulation pertaining to MMFs concentrated on structural aspects regarding the
asset and liability sides of funds’ balance sheets. Regulators have proposed guidelines
to control redemption requests, such as gates and suspension fees.
Changing valuation practices from cNAV to vNAV funds seems promising to regulators.
This change enables MMF investors to observe price fluctuations and to better under-
stand the real risks inherent in the investment. This awareness is hoped to encourage
investors to stay engaged with funds, rather than liquidating their shares at the first
sign of negative market conditions. The present paper also explores how o↵ering central
bank access to MMFs could allow these funds to meet redemption requests without liq-
uidating their portfolio assets and jeopardizing the supply of market funding. O↵ering
MMFs central bank access would entail legal changes (e.g., changes to the Statute of the
ECB), and its economic feasibility is explained more in-depth. Making MMFs subject
to minimum reserve requirements is argued to make them eligible counterparties to the
central bank in open market and credit transactions, this ensuring liquidity access.
Academics have, overall, welcomed proposed risk-retention regulation, which requires
funds to retain a proportion of the originated loans. However, the e ciency of a fixed
retention rate of at least five percent is debatable. The analysis o↵ered in this thesis
comes to the conclusion that the retention rate should be able to react flexibly and
to take into account key aspects of the underlying portfolio, such as concentration of
creditors and quality and type of assets, as well as key aspects of the originator, such
as size, market position, capital base, and size of the securitized portfolio relative to
other activities and further aspects. Retention is considered the main instrument with
which to signal the quality of ABSs, stabilize confidence in the securitization market,
and stabilize the valuation of assets.
As repo contracts play a major role in the funding of the shadow banking system,
the regulatory proposals regarding the standardization and stabilization of the repo
market have been analyzed in the present thesis. Initially, standardization and enhanced
transparency, such as through the establishment of TRs and CCPs, seems beneficial.
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However, establishing CCPs would create a new systemically important function that
needs to be understood and supervised. The regulation of haircuts is also considered as
one way to stabilize the valuation of repo contracts and collateral values. This regulation,
however, constitutes a major intervention into both market pricing and the making of
transactions. Such an intervention might prevent transactions from being performed,
potentially leaving the need for cash or securities unsatisfied.
Proposed regulation on shadow banking entities seeks to set requirements that will
create transparency and standardization, thereby stabilizing the shadow banking system.
Structural requirements, such as the regulation of MMFs, should be seen in the context
of a competitive marketplace, where any loss of competitiveness may create additional
regulatory arbitrage for those funds that apply the new regulation. The possibility of
spillover e↵ects, adverse reactions, and interdependencies might influence the e ciency
of well-intentioned regulatory approaches. For this reason, regulatory authorities should
monitor and assess the e ciency of introduced proposals.
Overall, the findings of this work support the argument that the shadow banking system
has developed into a crucial part of the global financial system, and cannot be aban-
doned. It o↵ers a wide range of alternatives to traditional banking, catering to a diverse
range of participants. However, weak points (e.g., MMFs’ lack of access to liquidity)
and risks need to be monitored on a regular basis to detect possible critical events in
advance. As most entities within the shadow banking system are already liable to reg-
ulation, regulators should instead focus more on the interactions among entities and
the smooth handling of transactions. This should include comprehensive monitoring
and reporting on shadow banking entities and activities, with continuous monitoring
and understanding of interconnections between the traditional and the shadow banking
system being of especial importance. Regulators and the financial industry as a whole
need to detect potential points of contagion and proper regulatory approaches, so as to
mitigate risks stemming from those connections.
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